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Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich theoretisch und empirisch mit der
Koexistenz von Open Source (OS) und Closed Source (CS) Prinzipien am
Beispiel Software. OS und CS sind zwei verschiedene Grundprinzipien in
der Definition bzw. dem Schutz geistigen Eigentums – zwei unterschiedli-
che Regime geistigen Eigentums.
Im Fall von Open Source Software (OSS) ist der Quellcode frei und all-
gemein zugänglich. Der somit offen gelegte Quellcode ermöglicht es, den
Aufbau der Software zu verstehen und diese zu verändern. OSS ist ein
öffentliches Gut, das von vielen unabhängigen Entwicklern und Firmen ge-
meinschaftlich produziert wird. Closed Source Software (CSS) beruht da-
gegen auf dem Prinzip von exklusivem geistigem Eigentum und wird von
einzelnen Firmen produziert, die den Quellcode nicht allgemein zugänglich
machen.
OSS hat sich in den letzten Jahren stark verbreitet und wird inzwischen
von zahlreichen Firmen der IT-Branche genutzt. Gleichwohl haben die OS-
Prinzipien die traditionellen CS-Prinzipien nur zum Teil ersetzt, so dass
OSS und CSS koexistieren. Diese Koexistenz ist darauf zurückzuführen,
dass es sich bei OSS und CSS verfügungsrechtstheoretisch um zwei second-
best Lösungen handelt.
In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden die beiden koexistierenden Regime
geistigen Eigentums – OS und CS – unter folgenden Fragestellungen analy-
siert:
• Wie sind OSS Aktivitäten weltweit verteilt?
• Welchen Einfluss haben länderspezifische institutionelle und kulturel-
le Faktoren auf die OSS Aktivitäten?
• Inwiefern ist die Koexistenz von OS und CS Prinzipien hinsichtlich
geistiger Eigentumsrechte verfügungsrechtstheoretisch zu begründen?
xvii
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• Wie lässt sich die ökonomische Rationalität von OS und CS basierten
Geschäftsmodellen unter Berücksichtigung der verschiedenen OS Li-
zenztypen modelltheoretisch darstellen?
• Wie sind Marktgleichgewichte mit OS und CS Firmen wohlfahrtsöko-
nomisch zu bewerten und welche Auswirkungen haben hier staatli-
che Eingriffe?
• Wie unterscheiden sich stark OSS basierte zu stark CSS basierten
Startup-Firmen bezüglicher ihrer Gründungscharakteristika?
Im Kapitel 2 wird die weltweite Verteilung von OSS Aktivitäten unter-
sucht. Dazu werden Daten von registrierten OSS Entwicklern bei Source-
Forge ausgewertet, die vom “SourceForge.net Research Data Archive” zur
Verfügung gestellt wurden. Mit Hilfe der angegebenen Email-Adressen, der
jeweiligen Zeitzone und der teilweise gespeicherten IP-Adressen konnten
dabei 94% der 2006 registrierten Entwickler ihren jeweiligen Ländern zu-
geordnet werden. Zusätzlich wurden Informationen über die Anzahl der
geposteten Forum-Messages ausgewertet, um die Aktivität der Nutzer ein-
schätzen zu können. Das Ergebnis zeigt, dass die relativen OSS Aktivitäten
(Messages pro Einwohner) global ungleich verteilt sind. Dies ist auch dann
noch der Fall, wenn das jeweilige BIP bzw. die Anzahl der Internet-Nutzer
berücksichtigt wird.
Im Kapitel 3 wird daher der Einfluss von länderspezifischen kulturel-
len und institutionellen Faktoren auf diese globale Ungleichverteilung em-
pirisch analysiert. Dabei wird ersichtlich, dass die OSS Aktivitäten eines
Landes stark von kulturellen und institutionellen Faktoren bestimmt wer-
den. Im einzelnen zeigt sich, dass Gesellschaften, die offen gegenüber wis-
senschaftlichem Fortschritt, von einer Kultur des Individualismus und der
Selbstbestimmung geprägt sind, sowohl mehr (aktive) OSS Entwickler pro
Einwohner als auch ein höheres OSS Aktivitätsniveau aufweisen. Des wei-
teren übt auch der Faktor Sozialkapital – gemessen als “interpersonal trust”
– einen positiven Einfluss aus. Darüber hinaus sind eine niedrige Regulie-
rungsdichte und ein guter Schutz von geistigen Eigentumsrechten förder-
lich für OSS. Letzteres verweist darauf, dass OSS zwar die Verwendung
von Urheberrecht in seiner traditionellen Form ablehnt, sich aber dennoch
auf das Urheberrecht stützt. So sind z.B. die OSS Lizenzen auf die Durch-
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setzbarkeit von geistigen Eigentumsrechten bzw. von Lizenzvereinbarun-
gen angewiesen. Dies trifft insbesondere auf OSS Aktivitäten zu, die im
Umfeld von OSS Geschäftsmodellen angesiedelt sind. Die Bedeutung von
OSS Geschäftsmodellen spiegelt sich auch im Einfluss der Regulierung von
wirtschaftlichem Verhalten wieder.
Das Kapitel 4 betrachtet CSS und OSS als unterschiedliche Regime geisti-
gen Eigentums. Die hier vorgenommene verfügungsrechtstheoretische Ana-
lyse erklärt die Koexistenz von OSS und CSS mit ex-post Transaktionskos-
ten. Denn bezüglich des Quellcodes sind einige Verfügungsrechte de facto
nicht separierbar, was zur Dichotomie von OSS und CSS führt. Da eine
optimale Aufteilung der Rechte nicht möglich ist, müssen sich die Indivi-
duen für eine der beiden zweitbesten Lösungen OSS und CSS entschei-
den. Letzteres basiert auf dem Prinzip exklusiver Verfügungsrechte und er-
möglicht eine direkte Kontrolle und Steuerung der Produktion in Firmen
(Hierarchie). Allerdings können dabei nicht alle möglichen Kooperations-
partner einbezogen werden. Dagegen ist die große Anzahl der Beteiligten
die Stärke von OSS, hier wird konsequenterweise auf exklusive Verfügungs-
rechte weitgehend verzichtet und die Kontrolle nur durch passive Entschei-
dungsrechte ausgeübt. Rationale Akteure entscheiden sich für OSS oder
CSS je nach individueller Situation hinsichtlich ihres Ressourcenzugangs,
der Verwendungsmöglichkeit des Quellcodes und den jeweiligen Marktge-
gebenheiten. Beide Prinzipien sind verfügungsrechtstheoretisch pragmati-
sche second-best Lösungen, mit spiegelbildlichen Vor- und Nachtteilen. Es
ist daher naheliegend zu vermuten, dass es gesamtwirtschaftlich Vorteil-
haft ist, wenn sich im Markt eine Koexistenz von OS- und CS-Prinzipien
etabliert. Die Frage ist aber, ob sich so eine Koexistenz auch etabliert. Die
folgenden Kapitel gehen dieser Frage nach und analysieren OS und CS als
kommerzielle Strategien für Firmen.
Das Kapitel 5 analysiert in einem formalen Modell das Zusammenspiel
zwischen Institutionen und dem strategischen Verhalten der kommerziel-
len Akteure. In einem allgemeinen, zweistufigen Oligopolmodell (Cournot)
konkurrieren OSS Firmen mit CSS Firmen. Beide Typen von Firmen bün-
deln Software mit Komplementärgütern (Dienstleistungen, Hardware), wo-
bei die OSS Firmen den Code der Software gemeinschaftlich nutzen. In
diesem Modellrahmen kann gezeigt werden, dass einfache “neoklassische”
Annahmen ausreichen, um die OSS Entwicklung von Firmen rational zu
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erklären. Gewinnmaximierende Unternehmen entwickeln OS Code, selbst
dann, wenn kein Code durch eine “nicht-kommerzielle” Community (beste-
hend aus Hobby-Programmierern etc.) bereitgestellt wird. Allerdings ist in
diesem Kontext die verwendete OSS Lizenz von entscheidender Bedeutung:
während bei restriktiven Lizenzen Firmen bei allen Parameterkonstellatio-
nen OSS entwickeln, führen liberale Lizenzen – die die Vermischung von
CS und OS Code erlauben – in vielen Fällen dazu, dass Firmen bereits gege-
benen OS Code verwenden aber selbst keinen Beitrag zur OSS leisten. Hier
ist es gewinnmaximierend, die ‘öffentliche’ OSS als kostenlosen Input bei
der Produktion ‘privater’ CSS zu nutzen. So produziert keine einzige Firma
OSS, denn alle Firmen veröffentlichen ihren Code nur als CSS.
Das Kapitel 6 untersucht, aufbauend auf dem oben genannten Modell-
rahmen, die implizierten wohlfahrtsökonomischen Aussagen und diskutiert
die Notwendigkeit und Wirkung wirtschaftspolitischer Maßnahmen. Dazu
werden sowohl der sich unter den Bedingungen des freien Markteintritts
etablierende Mix aus OSS und CSS Firmen, als auch deren jeweiliger Markt-
anteil berechnet. Diese Marktergebnisse werden mit dem wohlfahrtsopti-
malen Mix sowie reinen OSS bzw. CSS Industrien verglichen. Es zeigt sich,
dass in den allermeisten Fällen ein Mix aus OSS und CSS Firmen einer
Industrie mit nur einem der beiden Prinzipien vorzuziehen ist. Allerdings
ist die Anzahl der OSS Firmen im Gleichgewicht bei freiem Marktein- und
-austritt im Vergleich zur wohlfahrtsoptimalen Lösung zu groß. Die nun
folgende Analyse möglicher staatlicher Eingriffe zeigt, dass eine Bereitstel-
lung von OSS oder die direkte Förderung von OSS Projekten eine positive
Wirkung hat. Eine Subventionierung von OSS Firmen sollte jedoch unter-
bleiben. Die optimale Intervention des Staates im Modell ist sogar entge-
gengesetzt: OSS Firmen werden besteuert und der Erlös für eine Subven-
tionierung der CSS Firmen verwendet.
Im Kapitel 7 erfolgt eine empirische Untersuchung zur Wahl von OSS
bzw. CSS basierenden Geschäftsmodellen von Gründungen in der deut-
schen IT-Branche. Dazu wurde ein webbasierter Fragebogen entwickelt und
6.000 Firmen kontaktiert, von denen sich über 700 an der Umfrage betei-
ligten. Der verwertbare Datensatz umfasst die Antworten von 680 Firmen.
Das Kapitel fragt nach den signifikanten Unterschieden von stark OSS zu
stark CSS basierten Gründungsfirmen. Die empirische Analyse zeigt, dass
OSS-intensive Start-Ups kleiner sind (weniger Mitarbeiter, weniger Grün-
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dungskapital) und daher auch seltener Probleme mit zu geringem Eigenka-
pital bei Gründung haben. OSS scheint also Firmen-Gründungen zu erleich-
tern. Dabei tritt auch kein negativer Selektionseffekt auf, denn die niedrige-
ren Gründungsbarrieren von OSS führen nicht zu einer (durchschnittlich)




1.1 The Topic of this Dissertation
Despite differences in detail, the number of conceptually distinct incen-
tives (e.g. patents, prizes, grants, contract research, etc.) that society uses
to promote innovation is remarkably small (see Scotchmer, 2004). Against
this background, the emergence of fundamentally new “open source” meth-
ods for producing software in the 1990s surprised and delighted observers.
Open source software (OSS) is marked by free access to the software and
its source code, and is developed in a public, collaborative manner. The
success of OSS has challenged the conventional wisdom of the role of intel-
lectual property rights (IPRs). The open source principle thus represents
a new type of ownership concept for the digital economy.
However, OSS has not completely replaced its counterpart closed source
software (CSS), the latter also called proprietary software. As result, OSS
and CSS coexist, and compete often within the same market. The differ-
ence between OSS and CSS is a difference in institutions.1 OSS and CSS
lead to different kinds of “institutional arrangements” (Davis and North,
1971). These coexisting institutional arrangements are distinguishable by
their distinct use of copyright law that is codified in the software licenses.
The different types of licenses lead to different allocations of IPRs and dif-
ferent governance structures etc.
The present dissertation lays its focus on the coexistence of the two IPR
regimes, OSS and CSS. This coexistence is the result of individual institu-
tional choices, the actions under the particular IPR regime, and the result-
1Institutions are “the rules of the game in a society, or, more formally, are the humanly
devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990, p 3). They “are made
up of formal constraints (e.g., rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (e.g.,
norms of behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement
characteristics” (North, 1994, p 360).
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ing payoffs. Individuals choose to join the OSS community. Developers
choose to publish their code as OSS rather than as CSS. Firms choose to
use OSS-based or CSS-based business models, etc. Given these micro-level
institutional choices, the economic agents choose their action under the re-
spective IPR regime. For example, OSS and CSS firms individually decide
how much code to develop. Strategic interactions play a role here, i.e. an
OSS firm reacts based on the decisions of the other OSS and CSS firms, and
vice versa. The resulting payoffs are such that no IPR regime outperforms
the other, but both principles coexist.
These various aspects are analyzed throughout the present study in dif-
ferent ways. The first part (Chapters 2 and 3) of this dissertation focuses on
the determinants of the geographic allocation of OSS activities. The insti-
tutional and cultural factors that foster individuals’ choices to join the OSS
regime and become active members of the OSS community are analyzed.
One of the findings is that protection of IPR has a positive impact on OSS
activities. This supports the view that OSS is a new IPR regime, a new own-
ership concept, based on intellectual property law. The next part (Chapter
4) therefore presents the rationale for both IPR regimes making use of the
property rights approach. It is argued that OSS and CSS are two pragmatic
second-best arrangements, with both having assets and drawbacks. Choos-
ing OSS and CSS is rational for individuals and firms. Regarding welfare,
the coexistence of OSS and CSS seems to be favorable. Therefore, the third
part analyzes the coexistence, including welfare calculations. Chapters 5
and 6 focus on the strategic nature of OSS- and CSS-based business mod-
els, taking into account the role of OSS licenses (restrictive or liberal). The
equilibrium ratio of OSS and CSS firms (mixed industry) is analyzed. This
is followed by a welfare analysis of mixed and pure industries and of possi-
ble government interventions. According to the model, there can be a lock-
in with only OSS firms, or only CSS firms. This points to the importance
of entry. So finally, the entry of firms with OSS and CSS business mod-
els comes into focus. The last section concentrates here on start-ups with
OSS-based versus CSS-based business models. Chapter 7 analyzes which
characteristics of German ICT start-ups can explain their choice between
the two IPR-regimes. The dissertation ends with a summary and outlook in
Chapter 8: after the summary of the research results, this chapter discusses
possible policy implications and further research aspects.
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The remainder of the present chapter first offers a short introduction
into OSS versus CSS (Section 1.2) and then gives an overview of the state
of economic research (Section 1.3). This literature review ends with a short
note on the contribution of this dissertation.
1.2 Open versus Closed Source Software: Two
Intellectual Property Right Regimes
1.2.1 A Brief History of Open and Closed Source Software
In the early days, software was not a single product but more or less a tool
to run the computers. Hence, revenue was created by selling computers,
and the hardware vendors delivered software for free. Although some firms
were selling the service ‘code writing’, there was no market for ready-made
software products, so-called ‘software packages’.
This picture started to change in the late 1960s, when entrepreneurs re-
alized the opportunity to sell their software to more than one customer,
hence to treat it like an ordinary mass-marketable product. This new con-
cept diffused, and finally, in the 1980s, the mass publication of packaged
software by independent software vendors was established. Meanwhile the
U.S. hardware producers – except IBM2 – withdrew from software (Stein-
mueller, 1996, p 31 ff.). This rise of the software industry went with increas-
ing concern about the protection of exclusive intellectual property rights.
At least since the amendment of U.S. copyright law in 1980, copyright was
used to protect intellectual property rights with respect to computer pro-
grams. Based on this legal ground, ‘proprietary’, i.e. closed source, business
models were established. As such, the early independent software vendors
invented the CSS-based business models, but were also the driving force
for establishing copyright protection for software. Thus, they also induced
a change on the level of formal institutions. The industry transition to CSS
led to some attempts to preserve the ‘free’ programming culture based on
so-called hacker ethics. The most important attempt was the foundation
2A history of IBM’s software licensing strategies, which reflect the paradigm shift to CSS




of a project called GNU (GNU’s Not UNIX). GNU was founded in 1984 by
Richard Stallman, who worked at MIT from 1971 to 1984. Stallman was
dissatisfied with the rise of the closed source principle, namely with its
consequence for the use of UNIX.3 Therefore he designed and introduced
the GNU General Public License (GPL), nowadays the most popular type
of open source license. The basic idea of the GPL was to use “copyright
law, but flips it over to serve the opposite of its usual purpose: instead of a
means of privatizing software, it becomes a means of keeping software free”
(Stallman, 1999, p 59). Thus, the GPL was created in order to preserve a
certain programming culture of free software and hacker ethics.
This changed the level of institutionalization by transferring some norms
of the hacker ethics—i.e. informal institutions—into a formal institution,
namely the GPL. With the GPL Stallman invented a new concept of copy-
right-based ownership: the so-called ‘copyleft-principle’. Although Stall-
man was not motivated by commercial aspects and the creation on the GPL
was an act of ideology, Stallman’s transformation is an economic success
story. For example, all firms with business models build on Linux are based
on a GPL-protected software. After the institutionalization of the OSS prin-
ciple by Stallman and others, several entrepreneurs created business mod-
els based on the OSS principle.
So nowadays, firms and individual programmers have an institutional
choice whether they use OSS, CSS or both. The next section describes the
institutional differences between OSS and CSS. Section 1.2.3 then provides
a brief explanation of OSS-based business models.
1.2.2 Open versus Closed Source Principle
Software is traditionally protected by copyright4 (Graham and Somaya,
2004), and the copyright-based license agreements define the transfer of
the intellectual property rights. The crucial feature which distinguishes
OSS from CSS is the scope of rights transferred by the OSS vs. CSS licenses.
3At this time, UNIX was the most powerful operating system. In the 80s firms started
selling incompatible, closed source versions of UNIX.
4The discussion about so-called software patents is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
For the topic of software patents see e.g. Blind et al. (2005); Hall and MacGarvie (2006);
Lerner and Zhu (2007); Bessen and Hunt (2007, 2004); Kahin (2004); Pilch (2004).
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Technically this is mirrored by the question of whether there is general
access to the source code or not.
The source code is the human-readable recipe of a software program: it
is the program code written in a programming language. To run the pro-
gram on a computer, the source code has to be compiled, i.e. transformed
to a (only machine readable) binary code. CSS vendors like Microsoft typi-
cally transfer their software only as binary code. They sell the right to use
the software, with the scope of legal usage defined by the respective CSS
license. For example, copying is not allowed, and this is enforced by law
and backed by technical solutions like copy protection. Furthermore, users
do not have the right to change the software, and they are also unable to
do so as they have no access to the source code.
In contrast to this, an open source code enables users to copy the pro-
gram code, to understand how the software works, and to change it. Thus,
OSS is based on a principle of openness, which is codified in the copyright-
based OSS licenses. These OSS licenses permit users to read, modify, im-
prove, and redistribute the code under certain conditions. These conditions
vary within a wide range. Liberal licenses—also called ‘public’ licenses—
allow, for example, the use of the open source code to produce CSS. More
restricted licenses confine the scope of usage, mainly to ensure that the
open source code stays open source.
OSS and CSS licenses differ in the scope of transferred rights. The two
IPR regimes thus yield different allocations of IPRs. This has further impli-
cations. The definition of ownership of the source determines the gover-
nance structures: The principle of CSS is to hold exclusive rights regarding
the source code. Closed source code is thus an exclusive asset, and CSS-
products are typically developed within single firms. In this hierarchical
structure based on exclusive ownership of assets, coordination is achieved
by giving orders. Conversely, the source code of OSS is a shared asset. OSS
is developed by a decentralized but nevertheless well-organized commu-
nity. A complex system of rules has emerged to govern OSS development.
There exist some hierarchical elements with respect to decision rights, but
no one can give orders to other OSS developers. We will come back to the
governance structures of OSS in Section 1.3.2 and 4.3.3.2.
The OSS community consists of thousands of volunteers who develop
software, often without direct monetary reward. Additionally, more and
5
1 Introduction
more profit-seeking firms engage in OSS development, thus paying pro-
grammers to develop OSS code. Large companies as well as small- and
medium-sized enterprises use OSS-based business models.
1.2.3 Open Source Business Models
Almost all of today’s high tech products are computerized. While this is
most obviously true for application software (e.g. games), the point increas-
ingly extends to hardware like cell phones and DVD players. In these in-
dustries, a product’s quality—and hence consumer appeal—often depends
sensitively on the software it contains. Before the 1990s, companies usu-
ally developed this as CSS in-house. Since then, however, companies have
increasingly turned to shared open source code instead.
Thus, in many markets software is sold and/or used bundled with other
goods and services. Consequently, open source (OS) business models are
based on these complementary products, as the OS code itself can not be a
profit center (Maurer and Scotchmer, 2006, p 289, 290ff). These comple-
ments can be hardware like servers or cell phones, premium versions of the
software, or different kinds of service like maintenance etc. The following
examples provide some idea of the range of OSS business models:
• Many different products – washing machines, mobile phones, flat-
screen televisions etc. – are controlled by embedded software. Such
embedded software can be OSS. Examples of hardware running em-
bedded Linux are Amazon’s Kindle, Cisco’s MDS and Nexus data
switches, Linksys’s WRT54G W-LAN router, different Motorola, Nokia,
and Panasonic mobile phones, Philips’s LPC3180 microcontroller, the
TomTom GPS navigation systems, and various LG, Panasonic, Sam-
sung, and Sony LCD and plasma televisions. The most recent exam-
ple of embedded OSS is Android. Android is a Linux-based software
stack (operating system, middleware and key applications) for mo-
bile devices. Acer, Barnes & Noble, Dell, HTC Corporation/Google,
Lenovo, LG, Motorola, Samsung, and Sony Ericsson all manufacture
and sell products that come Pre-installed with Adnroid.
• Firms in the software industry typically sell a stack of software and
services. So-called system integrators even sell a stack of hardware,
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software, and services (Riehle, 2007). For example, IBM is selling
several servers with pre-installed Linux like the Red Hat Enterprise
Linux or SUSE Linux Enterprise Server operating system. This is of-
ten based on a collaboration between IBM and the respective Linux
distributor. Red Hat, Novell’s SUSE and other Linux-distributors make
money with ready-to-install ‘distributions’ and the corresponding ser-
vices like support and maintenance. Such distributions consist of
a large collection of well-matched OSS applications, often bundled
with further CSS for ‘enterprise class’ premium versions.
• Internet-based businesses like webhosting and webservices have a
high share of OSS-usage. Most web servers are driven by an OSS
“Lamp Stack” software suite that includes a Linux operating system,
Apache web server, MySQL database, and PHP/Perl/Python program-
ming languages. Development is supported by corporations like Nov-
ell, IBM, Oracle, and Borland who then bundle Lamp with their pro-
prietary hardware and software. Small web developers also use Lamp
in their businesses and contribute code back to the project.
Furthermore, firms with OSS-based business models have joined several
projects and consortia. An example is the Open Handset Alliance, a busi-
ness alliance of 65 firms for developing open standards for mobile devices,
namely the above-mentioned Android. Another important consortium is
the Open Source Development Labs (West and Gallagher, 2006). The Open
Source Development Labs consist of a wide range of Linux-related providers
of hardware, software and services. Table 1.1 provides an overview of the
members and their motivations.
Several authors have set up taxonomies of OSS business models. See for
example Ghosh et al. (2002a), Fink (2002, Chapter 11), or Daffara (2007).
These typologies are of interest for practitioners like managers or for re-
searcher who do detailed empirical research on firms with different OSS
business models. However, the different typologies are not of interest for
the purpose of the dissertation at hand. We will therefore not discuss these
taxonomies further but keep to the following definition that subsumes all
the different OSS business models: Firms with OSS business models gener-
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1.3 Economic Research on Open Source
During the first decade of the 21st century, the new intellectual property
paradigm of OSS (Maurer and Scotchmer, 2006) was attracting more and
more interest by economists. In 2000 and 2001 the working-paper ver-
sions of three contributions were published, each of them representing one
branch of research on OSS. First, the motives of volunteers participating
in OSS (Lerner and Tirole, 2000). Second, the coordination of these con-
tributions, hence the governance structures of OSS (Weber, 2000). And
third, the impact of OSS on market outcomes and competition (Mustonen,
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2001). These three branches were later supplemented by two more recent
research aspects: OSS and firms, and open source beyond software. The
following sections provide a short overview of each of these branches.
1.3.1 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motives of Developers
Probably the most famous research question regarding the economics of
OSS was asked by Lerner and Tirole (2000, 2002): “Why should thou-
sands of top-notch programmers contribute freely to the provision of a pub-
lic good?” Lerner and Tirole emphasize the role of extrinsic motivation,
namely the acquisition of a reputation-signal. They separate this aspect
into two different incentives: career concern incentives, referring to future
job offers or access to venture capital, and the ego gratification incentives,
which stems from a desire for peer recognition. This seminal article in-
spired further research on the motives of OSS contributors, analyzing ex-
trinstic as well as intrinsic motives. An overview of this research can be
found in Rossi (2006). Today, the consensus is that a mix of extrinsic and
intrinsic motives explain the behavior of unpaid5 OSS developers.
Most of the research on OSS developer motivation consists of empirical
studies. These surveys indeed report extrinsic motives like peer recognition
and reputation within the community, self-marketing, and career-related
motives like the improvement of programming skills and reputation sig-
nals (Lakhani and Wolf, 2005; Hertel et al., 2003; Ghosh et al., 2002b;
Hars and Ou, 2002; Lakhani et al., 2002). However, most of these surveys
find intrinsic motives ranking higher than extrinsic ones. Lakhani and Wolf
(2005) find that enjoyment-related intrinsic motivations in the form of a
sense of creativity are more important than extrinsic motivations. Accord-
ing to Lakhani et al. (2002) the two top-ranked motives are ‘intellectually
stimulating’ and ‘improves skill’. Ghosh et al. (2002b) find that the most
important reasons why developers have joined and stay in the OSS commu-
nity are that they want to learn and develop new skills, and that they want
to share their knowledge and skills with other software developers.
5Some OSS developers are paid by firms for developing OSS. In such a case their motiva-
tion is trivial. The question why firms pay developers to do OSS refers to the topic of
firm engagement in OSS (see below).
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It is important to note that most of the empirical studies on OSS mo-
tives are surveys. Thus the results reflect what the OSS developers report
as being their most important motives but do not take into account the
importance of the developers, their effort levels, etc. An exception is the
article by Hars and Ou (2002). They connect the reported motives with the
individual effort and find that, although intrinsic motivations play a role,
external motives have greater weight, see Table 1.2. Hars and Ou (2002)
also point out, that different types of OSS programmers exist. For exam-
ple students and hobby programmers are more internally motivated than
professionals.
Table 1.2: Motivations and Effort of OSS Programmers
(Source: Hars and Ou, 2002)
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1.3.2 Governance Structures and Licenses
Aside from the question of motives, Weber (2000) asks how the OSS de-
velopers “coordinate their contributions on a single ‘focal point’?” (Weber,
2000, p 5). Research on OSS has thus to understand how the implications
of the complexity of large OSS projects like Linux are managed. Conse-
quently, in Weber (2004b) he describes collaborative methods in the con-
text of developing OSS. This points to the institutions of OSS, including
organizational issues and governance structures, the role of hacker-ethics
and the role, choice and rationale of OSS licenses.6
What kind of organization OSS projects represent and how they are gov-
erned is a question that is widely discussed nowadays Markus (2007) offers
a sound survey and a synthesis of this literature. Markus defines OSS gov-
ernance as “the means of achieving the direction, control, and coordination
of wholly or partially autonomous individuals and organizations on behalf
of an OSS development project to which they jointly contribute” (Markus,
2007, p 152). Markus (2007) rightly points out that two branches of re-
search on OSS governance can be distinguished. Some scholars analyze
OSS as a new, distinct but unitary organizational form which can be dif-
ferentiated from CSS development (Raymond, 1998), characterized as a
private-collective model (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003; Osterloh and
Rota, 2007), and so on. Others emphasize the different types of OSS gov-
ernance mechanism, or focus on one of these mechanisms specifically. An
overview of the governance mechanisms is provided by (de Laat, 2007).
He groups the main tools of OSS governance into six categories: modular-
ization, division of roles, delegation of decision-making, training and in-
doctrination, formalization, and authority versus democracy. What follows
contains examples from both types of literature.
Let us start with OSS as a unitary organizational form. Very common in
organizational theory is the tripartite division of types of organization into
‘market’, ‘firm’ and ‘network’ (see Table 1.3). In this context, OSS projects
are mostly characterized as networks. An exception is the interpretation of
Demil and Lecocq (2006). They argue that OSS projects differ from net-
works in that they do not require long-term relations, have no mechanism
6Gehring (2006) and Lessig (2006, 1999) interpret the code itself to be an institution.
However we do not follow this view here.
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Table 1.3: The three Types of Organization




(Source: Brand and Schmid, 2005)
to restrict access, etc. Also Garzarelli (2003) points out the organizational
uniqueness of OSS, arguing that its organizational characteristics can be
explained by a combination of the organizational theory on clubs with the
theory of professions. However, many authors (e.g. Brand and Schmid,
2006, 2005; von Hippel, 2005; Iannacci and Mitleton-Kelly, 2005; Benkler,
2002) interpret OSS projects as (special) networks. Based on a case study
on the KDE project7 Brand and Schmid (2005, 2006) find that OSS com-
bines the coordination mechanism of networks with elements of hierarchy,
the latter typically associated with firms.
These hierarchical elements of OSS organizations are mainly based on
decision rights and the tasks of certain developers. The basic structure of
these hierarchies is often labeled the ‘onion layer’ model, see Figure 1.1.
(See also Section 4.3.3.2 and Jensen and Scacchi, 2007; Crowston et al.,
2006; Wendel de Joode et al., 2003, pp 18,19.) The career of developers
within projects (a participant becomes project leader or specialist etc.), i.e.
their movement into the core of the ‘onion’ is studied by Giuri et al. (2008).
The acceptance of the ‘onion’-hierarchies and the authority of e.g. project
leaders are based on the meritocratic norms of the OSS community, rooted
in hacker-ethics (O’Mahony and Ferraro, 2007). Johnson (2006) and Lee
and Cole (2003) emphasize the importance of peer review processes in the
control structures of OSS. In this context von Krogh et al. (2003) point to
the role of extrinsic motives and incentives like reputation and signaling.
7KDE (K Desktop Environment) is an open source graphical user interface (GUI). Together
with the GNOME desktop it is likely the most-known desktop environment (and devel-
opment platform) for Linux and Unix workstations (Webpage: www.kde.org).
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(Source: Jensen and Scacchi, 2007)
Several authors underline that the evolution of OSS projects over time
has implications for their organizational forms (Sadowski et al., 2008; Lat-
temann and Stieglitz, 2005; Schweik and Semenov, 2003; Wynn, 2003).
Typically, OSS projects start with one or only a few developers who co-
ordinate via direct communication based on trust. With the growth of
the project size, more and more official coordination structures are im-
plemented. Finally the projects characterized by well-defined roles (code-
tester, release-manager, core-developer etc.) combined with a decentral-
ized and modularized organization structure. For example, Crowston and
Howison (2005) have analyzed 120 project teams from SourceForge and
find that growing projects become more modular, with different people re-
sponsible for different modules. Langlois and Garzarelli (2008) explicitly
focus on modularity in open source collaborations, including OSS. They ar-
gue that in such collaborations the division of labor is coordinated through
voluntary exchanges of effort rather than of products.
In his synthesis of research on OSS governance, Markus (2007) con-
cludes that three OSS governance purposes are linked to six OSS gover-
nance categories, see Table 1.4. According to Markus (2007), OSS gover-
nance has to solve collective action dilemmas and coordination problems,






Table 1.4: Relationship between OSS Governance Purposes and OSS Governance Categories








Ownership rules x x
Chartering rules x x
Community rules x x x
Software development process rules x
Conflict rules and rules about rules x x




project (rather than to others). To achieve these goals tools from the six
governance categories are used. For example, rules about the software de-
velopment process and rules about how information will be communicated
and managed using certain tools (repositories) both support coordination.
Conflict rules as well as meta-rules solve coordination problems but also
create a good climate for contributors. The community rules – which de-
termine who can become a member, what roles members can play etc. –
clearly support all three purposes. Finally, tools that solve collective action
dilemmas and create a contributor-friendly climate belong to the categories
of chartering rules and ownership rules. The first refers to statements about
the goals of the project, what the software should look like, and so on. The
second refers to the use of (intellectual) property law: the formal legal
organizational structure (e.g. a foundation) and the type of license etc.
O’Mahony (2003) shows in detail how OSS projects use intellectual prop-
erty law to protect their work. OSS projects make use of restrictive li-
cense terms or trademark registration etc. Additionally, often the copyright,
trademark etc. is transferred to a foundation. Such foundations are better
suited to enforcing e.g. the license restrictions or protecting the brand of
the project.
The type of OSS license is an important institution, as it defines how the
code can be used. Some authors analyze the importance of the respective li-
cense for the governance of an OSS project. For example, Franck and Jung-
wirth (2003) argue that the GPL is constructed such that egoistic motives
(‘rent seeking’) do not crowd out altruistic motives (‘donation’). Moreover,
according to Franck and Jungwirth (2003), the GPL creates incentives for
participation for both rent seekers and donators.
Sen et al. (2008) examine how the OSS license type (ranging from very
restrictive to very liberal) can be explained by the motivations and attitudes
of the OSS developers. They find that intrinsic motivation of challenge
(problem solving) is connected with a preference for moderate restrictions,
while extrinsic motivation of status (peer recognition) is linked to licenses
with least restrictions. Another study on the determinants of OSS license
choice is offered by Lerner and Tirole (2005). They first develop a theoret-
ical model and then test the model predictions empirically. According to
Lerner and Tirole, OSS projects are more likely to have restricted licenses
if they are consumer-oriented (e.g. desktop tools or games) and if they
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are developed in a corporate setting. Projects oriented toward developers
and/or designed to run on commercial operating systems have less restric-
tive licenses. Finally less restricted projects tend to attract more developers.
A discussion about the relationship between OSS business models and the
type of OSS licenses is provided by de Laat (2005). This includes a descrip-
tion of Netscape’s experience with different licenses, when the company
turned its browser Netscape Navigator into an OSS project – today this
OSS project is named Mozilla with its products Firefox and Thunderbird.
The literature on licenses mentioned so far concentrates on OSS licenses
only. But some scholars focus on OSS versus CSS licenses. Using a centi-
pede-type game, Polanski (2007) analyzes CSS versus OSS licensing as a
mechanism design issue. He models cumulative production, thus sequen-
tial production where the outputs of the stages 1 . . . k−1 are inputs for stage
k. In such an environment, according to Polanski, a public (open source)
license is better suited if the project is highly modular and there are sig-
nificant returns to scale. Bessen (2006) uses a model based on incomplete
contracting and the hold-up problem to shed light on the rationale of OSS
licensing. The result of his model is that OSS licensing can be more efficient
than CSS licensing in the case of complex products like software. According
to Bessen, OSS will be mainly used by firms that have complex specialized
needs and their own development capabilities. Another paper based on
incomplete contracting is D’Antoni and Rossi (2007). They analyze the ra-
tionale for liberal versus restricted licenses, hence the BSD license8 versus
the GPL. D’Antoni and Rossi (2007) find that the GPL is superior to coordi-
nate and encourage joint effort by many (possibly small) developers; while
the BSD is better suited to generate positive spillovers to other developers
when no feedback is required.
1.3.3 Market Outcome and Competition
Mustonen (2001, 2003) was the first to analyze the impact of OSS on com-
petition and market outcome. This was followed by several contributions
on this topic. In this context it is useful to distinguish models with non-
commercial OSS from those with commercial OSS. In case of the first, all
8The license of the Berkeley Software Distribution.
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the OSS is provided by the non-commercial community. There can be firms
who use this OSS as input, but there is no OSS developed by firms. The
second branch focuses on markets where firms contribute to OSS.9
Mustonen (2001, 2003) belongs to the branch focusing on non-commer-
cial OSS. He models the interaction between the OSS community and a
CSS monopolist. The monopolist is affected by OSS in two markets: the
product market and the labor market. Consumers can either buy CSS or use
OSS for free. However, both types of software cause implementation costs.
Programmers choose to work for the monopolist at a wage that the mo-
nopolist sets, or develop OSS and thus build reputations that results future
income. In Mustonen’s setting, highly talented programmers have incen-
tives to join the OSS community. The basic result is that if the software
implementation costs are low, OSS and CSS coexist. The presence of OSS
lowers the CSS vendor’s monopoly power in both markets. The impact of
non-commercial OSS on the outcome of software markets is also analyzed
by Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2006). Their model is inspired by
the competition between the operating systems Linux vs. Microsoft’s Win-
dows and is a dynamic mixed duopoly of CSS and non-commercial OSS.
Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2006) take into account dynamic ef-
fects which yield network externalities: the cumulative output of each oper-
ating system (installed base) affects their relative position over time. They
find that Windows can survive in the market, hence coexist with Linux, if
the installed base effect is strong enough.10 Additionally, they show that
welfare in the mixed case can be smaller than under a Windows monopoly.
Economides and Katsamakas (2006) focus on the fact that operating sys-
tems like Linux and Windows are platforms. Making use of the theory
of two-sided markets, Economides and Katsamakas (2006) compare indus-
try structures based on an OSS platform with those based on a CSS plat-
form. They compare a vertically integrated CSS-industry, a vertically dis-
9Clearly, models with commercial OSS also contribute to the topic ‘OSS business models’.
The distinction is made based on the focus of the respective article. If the main purpose
is to analyze the market outcome, then we consider it in this section. If the main purpose
is to explain the rationales for OSS business models, then we mention it in the next
section.
10They assume that in t = 0 Windows is perceived more valuable than Linux. Hence
Windows has an advantage in the beginning.
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integrated CSS-industry, and an industry with an OSS platform and CSS ap-
plications. Economides and Katsamakas (2006) provide conditions for each
of these industries to have the highest industry profits. They also find that
welfare is maximized if the industry is characterized by an OSS platform
with different CSS applications. Also in Bitzer (2004) OSS is developed
solely by the community. He analyzes a case where a CSS firm faces the
emergence of OSS. However, Bitzer (2004) takes into account firms with
OSS-based business models. Firms with OSS business models can use the
OSS code for free and bear only the costs for producing the complementary
products. The CSS firms on the other hand have to bear the costs for both
software development and production of complements. Bitzer (2004) uses
a Launhardt-Hotelling model set-up and derives the result that product het-
erogeneity is the crucial factor in this setting. If the heterogeneity between
the OSS and CSS based products is sufficiently high, the CSS firm will stay
in the market. A model with competition in technological levels rather than
in prices or quantities is proposed by Bitzer and Schröder (2007). They find
that the chosen technological level is higher in markets with OSS and CSS
than in pure CSS markets. The highest technological level is achieved in
pure OSS markets.
Sen (2007) models competition in software markets where CSS vendors
compete against firms who sell improved versions of OSS. The latter repre-
sents the business model of OSS ‘distributors’ as explained in Section 1.2.3,
p 7. Firms take a given OSS and improve its usability with support and ser-
vice (SS). Therefore Sen calls this type of software OSS-SS. Consumers can
thus choose to use either OSS for free, or purchase either OSS-SS or CSS.
The CSS and OSS-SS firms decide on the usability of their software, while
OSS has a fixed, low usability. Furthermore, users differ in their valuation
of software usability (a Hotelling’s model approach). Sen (2007) takes into
account network effects in terms of installed base. Here OSS and OSS-SS
users belong to the same installed base, as both use the same software in
technical terms. Sen (2007) finds the following results, from which he then
also draws management implications. With weak network effects, CSS al-
ways have a market share of more than 50%, with its usability and prices
being higher than those of OSS-SS. If network effects are high, profits for
the OSS-SS vendors are maximized if they offer the same usability as their
CSS rivals. In such a case, CSS is driven out of the market.
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Firms that do not only use but also develop OSS (commercial OSS) are
the topic of Verani (2006) and Schmidtke (2006). In both cases OSS firms
develop code and produce complementary products. While Schmidtke
(2006) analyzes the impacts of OSS business models (e.g. welfare issues)
in a non-differentiated Cournot oligopoly, Verani (2006) uses a duopoly
model to analyze under which conditions firms produce more code, under
an OSS rather than under a CSS regime. To the best of the author’s knowl-
edge, the only contribution that models commercial OSS and analyzes a
mixed industry with OSS and CSS firms is Llanes and de Elejalde (2009).
We will come back to this literature in Chapter 5.
1.3.4 Incentives and Role of Firms
Beside the motives of individual contributors, the engagement of firms is of
interest. Here research analyzes the incentives for firms to contribute and
the roles firms play within the OSS community.
Dahlander (2007) analyzes the role firms play in OSS projects, distin-
guishing between projects initiated by firms versus community-initiated
ones and high versus low degree of firm participation. He focuses on de
novo entrants (new organizational entities are formed) and draws conclu-
sions for the management of OSS-based business models. The fact that an
OSS project was founded by a firm rather than by the community has influ-
ence on its governance structure (West and O’Mahony, 2008). Governance
of community projects is largely pluralistic, while in firm-initiated projects
the ultimate decisions are controlled by the company.11 Furthermore, firm-
initiated projects tend to have less restrictive licenses rather than the GPL.
Here firms are an origin of more flexibly licensed OSS (Koski, 2005), in-
cluding the strategy of dual-licensing (Välimäki, 2003) like e.g. an open
source basic version and a closed source premium version.
Dahlander and Magnusson (2005) examines how the relationships that
firms have to the OSS communities are connected with their way of doing
business. He distinguishes three types of strategies. With the “symbiotic ap-
proach” the firm and the community gain, as the firm strongly contributes
back. If the firm uses a “commensalistic approach” (firm uses input from
11This can also be a group of firms founding an alliance.
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the community), the firm gains while the community is indifferent. Finally
in a “parasitic” firm-community relationship the firm exploits, i.e. uses in-
put without obeying norms, values and rules of the community. Not surpris-
ingly, Dahlander and Magnusson (2005) report that firms who use a more
symbiotic approach have more possibilities to influence the community. But
such firms have to manage their dual roles of being a profit-seeking firm
and part of the community. The competitive advantage of an OSS firm can
hence be influenced by the relations it may have with OSS communities.
Dahlander and Magnusson (2006) emphasize in this context that in order
to successfully cooperate with and gain from the community, firms have to
have capabilities and in-house expertise.
Henkel (2009) focuses on the individual developers who establish the
link between OSS firms and the OSS community. Here a principal-agent
problem might exist, caused by the developer’s double allegiance to firm
and community. Thus some firms fear the risk of losing intellectual prop-
erty, etc. Henkel (2009) uses data derived from interviews and a large-scale
survey. He finds no evidence of commercially harmful behavior induced by
OSS ideology (“Software has to be free” etc.). Also Dahlander and Wallin
(2006) emphasize the role individuals play in the attempts of firms to un-
lock communities as complementary assets. Based on network analysis
they show that firms sponsor individuals to act strategically within the OSS
community.
Based on data from SourceForge (the leading online depository for OSS
projects), Lerner et al. (2006) analyze the kind of projects to which firms
contribute. They find that firms tend to contribute more to larger projects
that grow faster (in terms of code lines). In their dataset, Lerner et al.
(2006) can not find any consistent relationship between the type of OSS
license and corporate contributions.
Henkel (2006) is focusing on the incentive for firms to contribute code
back to the community even if they are not obliged to do so. The ex-
planation he can draw form his empirical study is that that firms can ex-
pect a kind of reciprocal behavior: they receive informal development sup-
port from the community which even includes other firms. At the same
time firms protect their intellectual property by reveling only parts of their
code, only several modules respectively. Henkel (2004) provides a duopoly
model of why firms use and contribute to embedded Linux. The two firms
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require two technologies (or software modules) but value these technolo-
gies differently. As a result, each firm concentrates on producing the soft-
ware it values most, publishes this as OSS and receives the OSS developed
by the other firm. The economic logic of Henkel’s model is basically a dual
version of the ‘exploitation of the great by the small’ analyzed by Olson
and Zeckhauser (1966); Olson (1971). In their duopoly model, Baake and
Wichmann (2004) analyze the rationale of firms to publish parts of their
software as OSS. Because of spillovers, publishing code as OSS reduces
the firms’ coding costs. But OSS encourages entry and thus increases the
expenditures required to deter entry.
1.3.5 Open Source Beyond Software
Some authors discuss the possibility to implement the open source (OS)
paradigm in areas other than software. This must not be confused with
research on online communities beyond OSS, like research on Wikipedia
(e.g. Gaio et al., 2009; Ciffolilli, 2003). Here OS beyond software means
applying similar OS mechanisms to other industries based on digital goods,
i.e. “payoff-relevant bitstring[s]” (Quah, 2003). For example, an important
project of the OS movement in genomics-based research is the International
Human Genome Project. Laboratories from all over the world jointly col-
laborate to map and sequence the human genome, with the resulting data
deposited into the public domain.
Maurer (2008) discuss if and how OS principles and incentives are suit-
able for the several stages of the drug discovery pipeline. Allarakhia et al.
(2010) examine the mechanisms of cooperative knowledge production and
dissemination in OS biopharmaceutical innovation. They analyze about
50 OS initiatives that focus on genomic, proteomic, and systems-based re-
search. Based on this, Allarakhia et al. (2010) develop a two-player game
model in order to further analyze the incentives to participate in OS bio-
pharmaceutical initiatives. In her book “Biobazaar”, Janet Hope discuss
the challenges and implications of applying OS principles to biotechnology.
She argues that OS biotechnology would foster competition in the industry
that today tends to be dominated by a few powerful players Hope (2008).
Henkel and Maurer (2007) discuss the economics of OS synthetic biology,
including the consequence of different access and usage rules regarding
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the community’s Registry of Standard Biological Parts. Finally, Roosendaal
(2007) discusses the (legal) problems that occur when commercial compa-
nies are invited to join OS projects in biomedics. Such problems are a result
of the tension between traditional proprietary regimes and OS approaches
in this field.
1.3.6 The Contribution of this Dissertation
This dissertation focuses on the coexistence of OSS and CSS. As OSS and
CSS differ in institutions this dissertation is based on the viewpoint of the
new institutional economics. The above literature overview shows that
most of the research concentrates on the phenomenon OSS. And even in
models analyzing the effects of OSS on market outcome and the competi-
tion between OSS and CSS firms, the coexistence is exogenously given.12
It is assumed that e.g. several OSS firms compete with one CSS firm or
that an CSS incumbent faces an OSS community. So there is still a lack of
research that is able to explain the coexistence endogenously. The present
dissertation contributes to this. The fact that OSS and CSS coexist is ex-
plained by different individual institutional choices, the actions under the
certain IPR regime (including the strategic interactions) and the resulting
payoffs. In a nutshell: The choices for OSS and CSS on the micro level
and the resulting payoffs are of interest. Neither the one nor the other IPR
regime rules out its counterpart because the OS and the closed source (CS)
principle have relative advantages and drawbacks. Whenever possible, the
analysis uses a general framework such that the results also contribute to
OS beyond software.
The following gives a brief overview on the contributions of the different
chapters. The data about the world-wide diffrerences in OSS activties of
Chaper 2 provide a more accurate geography of the supply side of OSS than
any other study. Based on this dataset, Chapter 3 provides the first study
on the influence of country specific institutional and cultural factors on the
decison to be an active member of the OSS community. Chapter 4 explains
the coexistence of the two IPR regimes using a property rights approach.
Chapter 5 presents the first general Counrot model analyzing the strategic
12An exception is the contribution by Llanes and de Elejalde (2009). For more details on
this paper see Section 5.2.
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nature of OS vs. CS business models and the role of OS license-type. Based
on this, Chapter 6 deepens the analysis by discussing welfare aspects and
the consequence of possible government interventions. Chapter 7 presents




2 The Geographic Distribution of
Open Source Software Activities
2.1 Introduction∗
The provision of OSS appears to be a case of a “private provision of a public
good” (Johnson, 2002). As the community is often described as global, OSS
seems to be a digital public good with a truly globalized private provision.
However, apart from anecdotal evidence for the internationality of certain
OSS project teams, the question remains how global the OSS community ac-
tually is and how the supply side of OSS differs among countries. This has
motivated researchers to study the geographical allocation of OSS develop-
ers. It turns out that the most OSS developers come from North America
and Europe. This result is quite consistent regardless of the method used.
The methods to gather information about the geographic origin of OSS de-
velopers can be broadly distinguished into two approaches. Some studies
are based on survey-data, while other work is based on specific data drawn
from code of certain OSS projects such as credit files, mailing lists or data
from platforms like SourceForge.
Robles et al. (2001) provide a combination of both types of data col-
lection. In Ghosh (2006); David et al. (2003) and Ghosh et al. (2002b)
one can find survey-based information about the origin of OSS developers.
Lancashire (2001) provides information about the world-wide distribution
of Linux and Gnome developers, based on data collected from the Linux
Credit file and in case of Gnome developer-contact information from the
project’s web-site. The most recent research dealing with the geographic
origin of OSS developers is Gonzalez-Barahona et al. (2008). These authors
provide a worldwide picture of OSS developers, weighted by population, in-
∗This Chapter is based on von Engelhardt et al. (2010)
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ternet users and GDP. Gonzalez-Barahona et al. (2008) build on Robles and
Gonzalez-Barahona (2006). Robles and Gonzalez-Barahona (2006) use in-
formation about the email addresses of registered users and the indicated
time-zone to assign developers at SourceForge in 2005 to their countries.
However, they were unable to assign 25% to countries, because of the com-
bination of a generic (non-country specific) Top Level Domain like .com
with the country unspecific timezone GMT. Robles and Gonzalez-Barahona
(2006) develop methods to estimate the geographic allocation of this 25%.
Our work is inspired by Gonzalez-Barahona et al. (2008) and Robles and
Gonzalez-Barahona (2006), but proceeds along two lines: First, we do not
have to estimate any geographic origins, since we can directly assign 94%
of all developers registered at SourceForge in 2006. We make use of rele-
vant information obtained from email, time zone and the Internet Protocol
addresses. Combining these, we are able to assign 1.3 million developers
to their countries without the need to estimate geographic origin. We cross-
checked the results which delivers an indicator for the validity of each of
our methods. Second, we provide information about how active each de-
veloper is. With individual data about the number of posted messages we
have a good proxy for activity. We can thus distinguish active from non-
active (but nevertheless registered) developers, and we are able to show
the worldwide allocation of OSS activities. Information about activities
are important, since members of the OSS community differ in their effort
levels, numbers of contributions etc. (see e.g. David and Rullani, 2008).1
With the active developers and activity, our study can show a more accurate
geography of the supply side of OSS development.
2.2 The Need for Accurate Data about OSS
Activities
Software-development is an important part of each country’s ICT-Sector.
But without information about OSS activities the picture of the software
industry’s supply side remains incomplete. For example, workforce and
1For further literature on the division of labor within open source projects etc. see among
others den Besten et al. (2008); Giuri et al. (2008); von Krogh et al. (2003).
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human capital data typically count only the paid labor force and thus ig-
nore the—for the most part unpaid—OSS developers. On the other hand,
adding the number of OSS developers to the number of paid jobs is also
incorrect for two reasons. First, not all registered developers are active:
at SourgeForge, only every fifth member was active in 2006. Second,
some OSS developers have jobs in the software-sector which would lead to
double-counting. Taking the OSS-activity-level into account can, together
with the numbers of the paid software development, provide a more accu-
rate picture.
Data including the number of active OSS developers and their activity
level by country are important for both, policy makers and businesses. Gov-
ernment competition policy as well as support for OSS development, OSS-
based business models and OSS-based start-ups should be based on knowl-
edge of the national human capital and capacity for OSS. This information
is also useful for e.g. entrepreneurs contemplating an OSS-based start-up,
firms planing to implement an OSS-based business model, etc.
Additionally, a better and more complete picture of software-develop-
ment accross countries can improve cross-country studies, including as-
pects of the digital divide. Finally, our dataset can be used for analyzing
country-specific impacts on OSS activities. The fact that its magnitude dif-
fers among countries points to the institutional and cultural ‘embeddedness’
of OSS. Therefore, the next chapter uses this dataset to analyze the role of
country-specific culture and institutions.
2.3 Data Source and Methodology
SourceForge is an internet platform designed to help developers to control
and manage OSS projects. Figure 2.1 shows the start page of SourceForge.
SourceForge provides a virtual center where the developers of a certain
OSS project can meet, discuss, coordinate tasks, upload new developed
codes, etc. SourceForge also records and documents these activities. For ex-
ample see Figure 2.2 which shows the documentation for committed code
deposited in the ‘TeXniCenter’ project. SourceForge is the largest repository
of OSS projects. While finished version of software can be downloaded by
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Figure 2.1: Start Page of SourceForge.Net
anybody, access to the developer areas requires registration. This includes
some personal data including a valid email address.
Research on OSS often uses SourceForge data.2 Nevertheless, not all
OSS projects are hosted on SourceForge. Namely asain regions are partic-
ularly under-represented, as they have more local OSS communities (see
Gonzalez-Barahona et al., 2008, p 358). However, “from an economic per-
2See for example Au et al. (2009); Giuri et al. (2010); David and Rullani (2008); Eilhard
(2008); Gonzalez-Barahona et al. (2008); Fershtman and Gandal (2008); Comino et al.
(2007); Robles and Gonzalez-Barahona (2006); Lerner et al. (2006); Xu et al. (2006),
and Lerner and Tirole (2005)
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Figure 2.2: Information about Comitted Code on SourceForge
spective it is useful to examine the distribution of participation in global
projects” Gonzalez-Barahona et al. (2008). In this respect, data derived
from SourceForge make a good indicator.
We obtained our data about registered SourceForge.net developers from
the SourceForge Research Data Archive (SRDA). SRDA is offered by the
University of Notre Dame under a special agreement for scientific research
(Madey, n. d., see also www.nd.edu/∼oss/Data/data.html). The data-
base consists of monthly dumps containing parts of the information stored
at the SourceForge web-page. The latest dumps containing all of the in-
formation needed for our analysis date from the year 2006. Because we
are able to identify each user by the user-ID we can compile the indicated
email address and time zone, the saved Internet Protocol address and the
number of posted messages for each registered developer.
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When OSS developers register at SourceForge they have to indicate a
valid email address. Additionally, registering developers have the option
to change the time zone from the default-value to their specific time zone
(e.g. “Europe/Berlin”). Email address and timezone are saved in the ‘users’-
table of SourceForge. However, the SRDA team stopped including email ad-
dresses from user tables in its dumps for privacy reasons starting in October
2006.
The SRDA dumps also contains tables storing the Internet Protocol ad-
dress of the users who logged into the site. Internet Protocol addresses
of registered users can be found in the Tables ‘user_ip_dl_auth’ and ‘au-
dit_trail_users’. The first one consists of information about users who have
registered in the respective month. The second table consists of data gen-
erated by SourceForge in order to be able to restore the data, i.e. are data
used for backups. Here data are saved only when something was changed
(data changed/uploaded by a user etc.). Nevertheless, only the SRDA-
dumps of July, August, September and October 2006 contain the Tables
’user_ip_dl_auth’ and ’audit_trail_users’.
The original 2006 dumps contain approximately 1.4 million datasets. We
clean this information by removing duplicates, fake accounts and unreli-
able data. We then assign to each user his or her geographical origin based
on the email address, the time-zone and the IP address:
country coded Top Level Domain (ccTLD) If the Top Level Domain of
the respective email address is a country coded Top Level Domain
(ccTLD), we can use this information to assign users to countries. For
example, emails ending with “.us” will be assigned to the USA, with
“.nl” to the Netherlands, or with “.de” to Germany. Thus, our underly-
ing assumption is that each user’s ccTLD correctly indicates his or her
native country or the country of (long-term) residence respectively.
So-called open ccTLDs present a special problem. This is because
open ccTLDs are not limited to citizens or firms of the respective
countries, but are made available internationally to any interested
registrant for a fee (Edelman, 2002). The reason is that global web-
sites find certain Top Level Domains very attractive. For example,
“.tv” (for Tuvalu) looks like “television”, or “.ws” (Western Samoa)
looks like “website”. Such open ccTLDs can not be used for geograph-
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ical identification, they are in fact as TLDs like “.org” or “.com”. We
therefore exclude all open ccTLDs from the dataset when identifying
via country coded Top-Level Domain of the email addresses.
Second Level Domain (SLD) All email accounts with generic TLDs con-
tain information in the form of a so-called second level domain (SLD).
For example, “yahoo” the SLD in case of “xyz@yahoo.com”. It is pos-
sible to identify the location of the SLD domain servers. We therefore
manually assign to each of the top 1000 SLDs to a domain server. If
one assumes that the location of the domain server also indicates the
country the user lives in, it is possible to assign users with generic
TLDs to countries. Clearly this method can be criticized since for ex-
ample, a Spanish developer using an yahoo.com email account would
be counted as a citizen of the USA. We return to this point later.
Time Zone (TZ) Another indicator is the time zone (TZ) indicated. A TZ
like “EST” corresponds to several countries and therefore can not be
used for our analysis. The same is true if ‘time zone’ has been left
in its GMT default value. It is impossible to know which registrants
ignored the TZ option and which ones ones ctually live in e.g. the
U.K. Furthermore, the GMT corresponds to several countries. On
the other hand, many TZs are unique and well defined and can be
used to assign a country to users. For example, if one has chosen the
TZ "Europe/Berlin", then this can be assigned to Germany. Here the
underlying assumption is that users report their TZ correctly and that
this indicates their usual place of residence.
Internet Protocol address (IP) If the Internet Protocol address (IP) of
a user is available then this information can be used for geographic
location using GeoIP. GeoIP is a technology that identifies geographic
location of internet-connected devices based on their IP-range. The
location of servers of internet service providers, universities etc., can
easily be identified. Via these providers, the geographic location of
internet users can be identified quite correctly. (The reader can try
this out by visiting www.maxmind.com/app/locate_my_ip.) This
technology lets us use the saved IP dates when this information is
stored in the SRDA dumps. However, some IPs belong to ranges that
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are assigned to regions instead of of specific countries and cannot be
used for our purpose.
Identifying the geographical origin of OSS developers via ccTLD, IP and
indicated TZ seems to be quite reliable, with IP providing the most accurate
results. We check the overall reliability by pair-wise comparing the results
that ccTLD, IP and indicated TZ deliver. For example to check ccTLD versus
IP, we take the subset of users that have both an email address with a ccTLD
and a saved IP listed in the data. We then count the number of times the
both methods yield the same results. Similar cross-checking is performed
for all methods. The results are presented in Table 2.1. As the reader
Table 2.1: Matching rates of the different identification methods
IP ccTLD TZ SLD
IP 100% 89.16% 87.29% 51.83%
ccTLD 89.16% 100% 80.45% –
TZ 87.29% 80.45% 100% 56.45%
SLD 51.83% – 56.45% 100%
can see, ccTLD and IP match 89.16% of the time, while IP and TZ match
in 87.29% of all cases, and TZ and ccTLD match 80.45%. As previously
mentioned we expect SLD to be the weakest method. Thus, not surprisingly,
checking IP and TZ against SLD delivers matching rates of only 51.83%,
and 56.45% respectively.
Based on this analysis we combine all four methods as follows (see also
Figure 2.3): First, when possible, we identify users’ geographical location
Figure 2.3: Process of geographical identification
- - - -IP ccTLD TZ SLD
all data remaining remaining remaining
via GeoIP. The remaining users are then identified via their ccTLD, if pos-
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sible. The rest is then assigned to their country using the information
about the TZ. The remaining 283,028 users are then assigned to a coun-
try based on their SLD information. Using this procedure, we are able to
assign 1,315,263 users to specific countries (94% of our dataset). We also
compare our results with and without using our weakest method (SLD).
We find that the results do not materially differ.
As already mentioned, we are also interested in developers’ activity lev-
els. We use data about whether and how often user posted forum messages
in 2006 as an indicator of activity. The SRDA contains information about
the number of posted messages, stored in the Table ‘forum’. This table is
delivered by all the dumps from January 2006 until December 2006. The
information in the columns ‘msg_id’ and ‘posted_by’ of the Table ‘forum’
link each user to his or her posted forum messages. We use this informa-
tion to distinguish active developers (i.e. developers who posted at least
once in 2006) from non-active ones. Our user data also allows us to count
the total number of messages coming from each country. Tables 2.2 and 2.3
show the number of active developers and activity for the top 30 countries.
We present the results both with and without our SLD identification. The
number of active developers are highly correlated with the number of mes-
sages; the results with and without the SLD-identification are also highly
correlated (both about 0.99).
Weighting all these data by population 2006 (World Bank, 2007), we get
country specific data for the number of OSS developers per 1,000 inhabi-
tants, the number of active OSS developers per 1,000 inhabitants, and the
level of OSS activity (number of posted messages per 1,000 inhabitants).
Because we have information about the activity of each individual devel-
oper, our data offers more information about global OSS activities than any
previous non-survey study that we are aware of. The next section describes
these results.
2.4 Results: The World-Wide Allocation of OSS
Activities
In this section we present the results of our data mining and assignment
analysis. We first look at the differences between active and non-active
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Table 2.2: Active Developers, Top 30 Countries
without SLD
Rank Country Active
1 United States 85,485
2 Germany 23,267





















24 New Zealand 1,635
25 Israel 1,458
26 Argentina 1,456
27 Czech Republic 1,443
28 Mexico 1,401
29 Japan 1,331
30 South Africa 1,211
with SLD
Rank Country Active
1 United States 112,981
2 Germany 24,197





















24 New Zealand 1,635
25 Israel 1,467
26 Argentina 1,466
27 Czech Republic 1,443
28 Mexico 1,401
29 Japan 1,357
30 South Africa 1,216
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Table 2.3: Activity (Messages), Top 30 Countries
without SLD
Rank Country SumMsg
1 United States 7,734,231
2 Germany 1,807,233




















23 New Zealand 119,515
24 Hong Kong 116,515
25 Argentina 116,492
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developers. On average only 19.88% of all registered developers were ac-
tive in 2006 (first, second and third quantile shares of active developers
are 12.5%, 18.68%, and 23.53% respectively). These facts support the
idea that being a registered OSS developer is not the same thing as being
an active developer. Clearly it is more interesting to know where the ac-
tive developers live. In addition, focusinging on the number of developers
including the inactive ones could be misleading if such data is used for
country-specific research, policy advice, or for comparative studies analyz-
ing the impact of country-specific factors on OSS. We therefore focus on
OSS activities and active developers in what follows.
First we look at the share of activities that come from different regions.
Figure 2.4 shows the activity level per capita for six world regions. The
Figure 2.4: Activity Level (Messages per Inhabitants)
distribution of active developers per capita is not materially different. The
reason is that the average activity level by active developers of regions is
remarkably similar (15-20%), see Figure 2.5. Despite very different distri-
butions of active developers per capita and activity levels across regions,
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the average developer posts roughly the same number of messages all over
the world.
Figure 2.5: Average Activity of Active Developers
The remarkable similarity of the average active developer’s activity also
holds at the level of countries. To see this, compare Figure 2.6 and Figure
2.7. The two figures depict the worldwide allocation of active OSS devel-
opers and of the OSS activity-levels: the two maps look similar.
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 also show how OSS activities differ over the world.
Some countries display high degrees of activity and large numbers of active
developers per capita. However, many other countries show virtually no
active OSS developers. Figure 2.8 illustrates this unequal distribution with
a quantile plot of activity levels per countries.
OSS also seems to be a phenomenon of the developed world: in 2006
85% of all active developers live in one of the OECD countries and posted
88% of all messages. One might guess that OSS is a rich countries’ phe-
nomenon, i.e. is correlated with GDP. To explore this hypothesis, we divide
the number of active developers by each country’s per capita GDP (in pur-
chasing power parity) for 2006, data source is World Bank (2007). Figure
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Figure 2.6: World Map of Active OSS Developers
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Figure 2.7: World Map of OSS Activity-Levels
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Figure 2.8: Distribution of Activity Levels (Quantile Plot)
2.9 shows the results.3 Still the allocation is very unequal. Thus, the phe-
nomenon of OSS cannot be explained solely by GDP per capita.
We also analyze the impact of the internet. Internet access is obviously
a precondition for OSS in general since all OSS interactions take place on
the internet. Indeed, there is no way to become a registered SourceForge
developer without it. We use data from the International Telecommunica-
tion Union (2006) on the number of internet users, i.e. about the ‘internet-
population’ of each country. Figure 2.10 shows the number of active devel-
opers per internet user4 (the results for activity per internet user are quite
similar). This shows that adjusting for internet access leads to more even
distributions than adjusting for GDP or the unadjusted raw distributions.
Nevertheless, there remain differences. Thus, internet usage alone cannot
explain differences in world-wide OSS activities.
3The patterned areas are countries whose GDP per capita in 2006 is not available.
4The patterned areas are those countries with lack of data regarding the number of inter-
net users.
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Figure 2.9: World Map of Active OSS Developers weighted by GDP per
capita
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Figure 2.10: World Map of Active OSS Developers per Thousand Internet
Users
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2.5 Summary and Outlook
Software industry data typically ignore OSS activities. Reliable data that
distinguish between registered OSS developers, active OSS developers, and
OSS activity level can help to correct this. This chapter presents a more
complete picture. This will be useful for both, policy makers and businesses.
Our country data will also be useful for future cross-country studies and
research on the supply of OSS.
Analyzing IP address, email and time-zone from the SourceForge Re-
search Data Archive allows us to geographically identify 94% of all regis-
tered OSS developers in 2006. The information about the number of posted
messages provides a good proxy for activity of each developer. Based on
this we analyze the world-wide distribution of OSS activities. Geographic
origin seems to matter. The allocation of active OSS developers (and of
OSS activities) is geographically uneven. This still holds if one corrects
for population or per capita GDP. Adjusting for ‘internet-population’—i.e.
the number of internet users—makes some but not all of these differences
disappear.
Given that the worldwide distribution of OSS activities cannot be com-
pletely explained by GDP or number of internet users, the question arises
which further factors have an impact on OSS. Cultural and institutional fac-
tors are potential candidates. Analyzing this should also help to get a better
understanding of what OSS is about. Our country-specific data on the num-
ber of OSS developers, the number of active OSS developers, and the level
of OSS activity provide a good foundation for such research. In the next
chapter we undertake such an analysis and examine the impact of country-




3 Institutions, Culture, and Open
Source
3.1 Introduction∗
This chapter analyzes the influence of a country’s institutional and cul-
tural framework on the supply side of OSS. In this context we refer to
Williamson’s analytical framework (Williamson, 2000, see Figure 3.1) and
point out that, so far, economic research on OSS focus on level three and
four only. As the overview in Section 1.3 shows, the existing literature on
the economics of OSS deals with the intrinsic and extrinsic motives of the
OSS developers, the micro-level institutions like governance structures and
licenses, the the impact of OSS on competition and market outcome, and
the incentives and role of firms. Thus, with respect to OSS, there is still
lack of knowledge regarding the levels one and two, i.e. regarding the so-
called “embeddedness” (informal institutions, customs, traditions, norms,
religion) and the institutional environment (formal rules of the game, in
particular property rights). This study fills this gap, as we are interested
in the conditions for OSS activities on the level of society. We take into
consideration the microeconomics of OSS and search for the conditions for
these aspects. For this purpose, we perform a cross-country study analyz-
ing how the per capita number of a country’s OSS developers registered at
SourceForge is shaped by institutional and cultural factors. In particular,
we take into account aspects of the legal system and regulation, social capi-
tal, the openness to novelty, the degree of individualism/self-determination
of a society as well as its attitude toward competition, with some of these
measures based on principal component analysis.
∗This Chapter is based on von Engelhardt and Freytag (2010)
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Figure 3.1: Williamson’s four interrelated levels of social and institutional
analysis
(Source: Williamson, 2000, p 597)
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The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: In Section 3.2, we
discuss the theoretical foundations and derive the hypotheses for the em-
pirical study. In Section 3.3, we operationalize the variables and describe
the data and its sources. This data is used to perform the empirical assess-
ment in Section 3.4, where the regression results are presented. In Section
3.5 we compare and discuss the results before we end with a summary in
Section 3.6.
3.2 Theoretical Considerations and Hypotheses
As shown in the last chapter, countries differ in the number of OSS devel-
opers per capita as well as in the level of OSS activity. These differences
cannot be solely explained by GDP or access to the internet.
In general, cultural and institutional factors that belong to level one
and two of Williamson’s framework shape human interaction and there-
fore have an impact on the microeconomic level. Hence, in order to derive
hypotheses about the influence of institutional and cultural factors on OSS
developers and their activities, we will link insights about the microeco-
nomics of OSS with the level of institutional and cultural factors.
This is a relatively new approach. The only study (we are aware of) link-
ing cultural factors with the geographics of OSS developers is Ramanujam
(2007).1 Ramanujam uses data from Ghosh (2006) and Hofstede’s cultural
indicators to analyze how differences in national culture affect or influence
the participation in OSS. He links the geographical distribution of develop-
ers with the four dimensions of national cultures considered by Hofstede
(1991). Ramanujam states a positive correlation between the share of OSS
developers and ’Individualism’, whereas ’Power Distance’ and ’Uncertainty
Avoidance’ are negatively correlated each. However, the results should be
interpreted with care, as there is no control for aspects like number of
inhabitants, GDP, internet access, etc. Furthermore, with respect to OSS
1Ramanujam’s hypothesis is that “Cultural differences amongst the programmers from
different regions lead to measurable differences in their participation in the open source
movement. In other words national cultural differences influence the participation of
programmers in development of OSS” (Ramanujam, 2007, p 16). When interpreting his
results he gives some plausible explanations for his findings. Nevertheless, study seems
a bit vague with respect to theoretical foundation.
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contribution Ramanujam (2007) distinguishes only four regions, whereas
this study runs regressions with data from about 70 countries, and analyzes
several cultural and institutional factors including norms and attitudes.
3.2.1 The Role of Culture, Informal and Formal Institutions
Institutions define the incentive structure of a society and are therefore
the underlying determinants of economic performance. Human interaction
is structured and shaped by formal institutions (e.g., rules, laws, constitu-
tions) as well as by informal institutions (e.g., norms of behavior, conven-
tions, self-imposed codes of conduct). (North, 1994, p 359 f). According to
North, informal institutions belong to “the heritage called culture” (North,
1990, p 37). This is in line with Williamson’s framework, as his level 1
(“ebeddedness”) is characterized by the set of informal institutions, namely
customs, traditions, norms and religion (Williamson, 2000, see also 3.1).
Therefore some economists analyze culture in terms of informal institu-
tions like social conventions or individual beliefs like interpersonal trust or
(rational) cultural beliefs that are self-enforcing (Guiso et al., 2008; Greif,
1994, p 915; Myerson, 1991).
However, although informal institutions belong to the sphere of culture,
not everything belonging to culture is an (informal) institution. Although
culture shapes human interaction, some parts of culture are not institutions
by definition, as they lack of enforcement characteristics. Nevertheless, this
part of culture also affects economic behavior, as it is linked to individual
values and preferences. Research focusing on this aspect of culture can
be found in e.g. Rabin (1993) and (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, using the
concept of ‘identity’). Bowles (1998) treats preferences as cultural traits,
and Bisin and Verdier (2001) model intergenerational cultural transmission
as transmission of preferences, while Fernández and Fogli (2009) analyze
the impact of culture in terms of preferences and beliefs on women’s work
and fertility.
In addition, the different aspects and dimensions of culture can influence
each other, and there are also interdependencies between the sphere of cul-
ture and formal institutions. How culture influences the implementation
of formal rules was for example analyzed by Greif’s seminal article about
the impact of cultural beliefs on the introduction of different organizations
48
3 Institutions, Culture, and Open Source
(Greif, 1994). Other examples for research dealing with the interaction
of culture and (formal) institutions are Tabellini (2007, 2008a), the re-
search dealing with informal vs. formal institutions and the transition of
economics.
This discussion of the literature2 leads to two implications regarding the
role of culture:
1. Culture has an impact on economics, as it influences economic be-
havior either in forms of social conventions, in forms of beliefs, or in
forms of individual values and preferences.
2. Culture “embeds” and shapes lower-level institutions. This means
that certain cultural characteristics can foster or hinder the imple-
mentation and/or functioning of institutions.
3.2.2 The Phenomenon of OSS and Institutional and Cultural
Factors
Being a social-economic phenomenon, OSS development has several di-
mensions, which are interconnected and can overlap. First, OSS has simi-
larities to technical science and scientific culture: Its principle of openness
and reputation mechanism remind of open science. Many OSS develop-
ers are at universities. Historically the idea of OSS comes from software-
2Additionaly to the literature mentioned in the text there is a variety of research. The
following list of further examples is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to give
an impression of the range of research on culture and economics. An overview and
an introduction can be found in Fernández (2008), see also Guiso et al. (2006) for a
summary of research. A discussion about the concept of culture in economic research is
Heydemann (2008) vs. Nugent (2008), while Jackson (1993) discusses “culture, society
and economic theory”. Scholars like Svetozar Pejovich and Eckehard F. Rosenbaum have
analyzed the role of culture in the process of transition of (former) socialist economies
Pejovich (2003); Rosenbaum (2001). This is related to the interplay of on formal and
informal institutions like e.g. Williamson (2009) deals with. Tabellini (2008b) analyzes
norms and values on cooperation, taking into account (a) that individuals also value
the act of cooperating per se, and (b) the social embeddednes of the players (“within
a circle of socially connected individuals”). Henrich (2000) analyzes the impact of
culture on ultimatum game bargaining, and Alverson (1986) examines games that “play
people”. And Bénabou and Tirole (2006) connect beliefs and voting in a model with an
“American” and an “European” equilibrium in endogenously shared ideology.
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science and is rooted in scientific culture, implying the willingness to help
each other and to discuss problems in online-forums. Additionally, (open
source) software development is connected to the search for new solutions.
And OSS has a strong technical aspect: software can be seen as a logical ma-
chine, and is clearly connected to computers and the internet. Second, OSS
is a public good game, or collective action, being linked to complementary
assets on the individual level; in that sense, contribution to OSS is always
a means to an end. Either somebody (further) develops the code for own
purpose or receives utility from doing so. In the latter case OSS is a (glob-
ally coordinated) leisure activity, a task that is done for self-fulfillment and
self-determination. There are also extrinsic motives such as building repu-
tation signals or generating income with OSS business models, i.e. selling
complementary products like service or hardware. Third, OSS is a new in-
tellectual property right paradigm. The existence and success of OSS seem
to challenge the conventional wisdom about the proper role of intellectual
property rights. It is important to notice that the several OSS licenses (and
the OSS business models) rely on copyright law, and that the governance
of the different OSS projects is to some extend based on trademarks etc.
Another dimension of OSS is its entrepreneurial spirit: Beside the fact that
there exist a variety of OSS business models, OSS projects are set up or
supported by individuals who want to solve a problem or implement a new
feature. Thus OSS in general is based on the idea of individual initiative.
Clearly the openness of the code is a precondition here but a sense for
pragmatic solutions helps also.
For these aspects we develop hypotheses of how institutional or cultural
factors have an influence on OSS development. We break up the phe-
nomenon OSS into several elements, identify the more general, underlying
aspects, and then connect these with the institutional or cultural factor that
is or is not in favor of the particular aspect. It is important to notice that
these general aspects are not exclusively linked to OSS. For example: We
argue that OSS is an example of an individualistic, self-deterministic behav-
ior. In a society with a strong culture of individualism/self-determination,
we expect more individualistic, self-deterministic behavior. As OSS devel-
opment is such behavior, we expect to see more OSS. We thus argue that it
is the cultural spirit of a country that makes it more likely that individuals
choose certain tasks with specific characteristics, in our case develop OSS.
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3.2.3 The Hypotheses
This section derives the hypotheses. Before we discuss the relation of the
different institutional and cultural factors to OSS development in detail,
we first take into account the information and communications technolo-
gies (ICT) because of two reasons: First, the supply- and demand-side of
the ICT-sector are of importance for OSS. One extrinsic motive to develop
OSS is to build up reputation signals for the job market, and the size of such
jobs markets is linked to the supply side of ICT. Furthermore, some OSS ac-
tivities are connected to OSS business models. Here the potential size of
the demand-side is of importance. Second, internet access is a technical
and cultural precondition to participate in OSS. Without internet there is
no access to the online community of OSS developers. In addition, without
some internet experience, there are mental barriers to join the OSS commu-
nity which is rooted in the cyber-space culture (“hacker-culture”). Taking
this together our first hypothesis is:
H1: ICT is beneficial both for the number of OSS developers and the OSS
activity level.
Next we discuss the cultural and institutional factors. We first focus
on science: OSS development is a collaborative way of developing nov-
elty. The process of (open source) software development is a search for
new solutions, i.e. an innovative process as such. Thus, OSS development
can be described as “coordinating innovation” Kugler (2005). Additionally,
the rise of OSS is an innovation at the level of how to organize software
development, and some authors discuss it as a new intellectual property
paradigm (Maurer and Scotchmer, 2006) or regard OSS as an “intellectual
property revolution” (Pisano, 2006).
In this context we make use of the notion of culture that connects culture
with preferences and values: In societies that are more open to novelty,
in particular that are more open to new ideas, a higher share of people
would prefer new ideas. Such preferences are a good precondition for the
adoption of the OSS model of software development and also for active
participation, i.e. the search for new solutions. Therefore we expect the
following:
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H2: A preference for new ideas on the level of society has a positive impact
on the number of OSS developers as well as on the OSS activity level.
Another aspect is also related to science, i.e. the similarities to technical
science and scientific culture: OSS itself has a strong technical aspect. It
is a novelty from the ‘cyber space’, clearly connected to computers and the
internet and therefore to the technical aspect of scientific progress. Addi-
tionally, software development is an art to build a logical machine. Second,
historically the idea of OSS stems from software-science and is therefore
rooted in scientific culture. For example, the best known OSS license, the
GPL, was developed by Richard Stallman. Richard Stallman worked in the
MIT Artificial Intelligence Lab. When in the 1980s more and more software
became CSS Stallman started the GNU project in order to defend and foster
a ‘free’—in terms of ‘open’—culture of software development. This finally
led to the GPL licenses (see Section 1.2.1). Still today, the OSS commu-
nity has scientific-alike aspects: There is a culture of discussing problems
and helping each other in online-forums, and many OSS developers are at
universities. As for openness and the reputation mechanism, similarities to
open science can be observed (Dalle and David, 2005; Lerner and Tirole,
2002; Giuri et al., 2002).
We now argue that a positive attitude towards technical science and/or
scientific progress at all is in favor of OSS. Such a pro-science culture (in
terms of attitudes, i.e. preferences and values) may support the science-
alike formal and informal institutions of the OSS community. Based on
this, we state the following hypothesis:
H3: A positive attitude towards scientific progress has a positive impact on
the number of OSS developers and on the level of OSS activities.
Contributing to OSS can be a means to an end, because the developers di-
rectly receive utility from doing so. For example, Hars and Ou (2002) found
that “self-determination” was with about 80% agreement the strongest
intrinsic motive. Other authors report that “fun” and enjoyment of pro-
gramming work itself or of solving problems, and an intellectual challenge
are important motives for individuals to contribute to OSS (Lakhani and
Wolf, 2005; Hertel et al., 2003; Lakhani et al., 2002). Thus OSS seems to
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meet values and preferences which are connected to a culture of individu-
alism and self-determination. Here we have again the link between culture
and preferences: in a culture with a higher degree of individualism/self-
determination, one would expect that more people engage in individualis-
tic hobbies. As research on the intrinsic motives of OSS developers suggest
that OSS development is an activity that fits such preferences, we expect to
see an impact on OSS development:
H4: The degree of individualism/self-determination of a society has a pos-
itive impact on the number of OSS developers as well as on the OSS
activity level.
Although individual OSS contribution is a means to an end, linked to
(complementary) assets (i.e. intrinsic or extrinsic motives), the OSS devel-
opment process still is a public good game. This brings us to social capital,
which is related to ties between people. While some refer to the number of
ties only, others stress the features, strength or quality of such ties, which in-
cludes aspects like trust. Probably the most known (and widely accepted)
definition of “social capital” is by Putnam (1993b,a). Putnam states that
social capital “refers to features of social organization such as networks,
norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mu-
tual benefit” (Putnam, 1993a, p 67). Therefore measures of social capital
can take aspects like number of people somebody is (weakly) connected to,
but also aspects like social, i.e. interpersonal trust and social engagement
into account. We focus on interpersonal trust in this study.
Thus, the theoretical concept (or aspect) of culture we refer to in this
context is culture as beliefs, namely interpersonal trust.3 For our purpose it
is not relevant where this country-specific level of interpersonal trust comes
from (e.g. as result of a general ‘social’ game, or from several sub-games):
What matters is the implication of (ex ante) interpersonal trust on the be-
havior of individuals with respect to the international public good game
3In economics the notion of ‘social capital’ differs. While some refer to the number of
ties only, others stress the features, strength or quality of such ties, which includes
aspects like trust. Therefore measures of social capital used in the literature take into
account aspects like number of people somebody is (weakly) connected to, or social, i.e.
interpersonal trust and social engagement. We focus on interpersonal trust in this study.
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OSS. First, individuals with more trust will expect less free-rider behavior
and more reciprocal behavior. Thus, they are more likely to contribute to
OSS themselves. Second, the literature on public good problems indicates
that interpersonal trust has a positive impact on cooperation and recipro-
cate behavior (Yamagishi et al., 2005; de Cremer, 1999; Ostrom, 1998; Ya-
magishi and Yamagishi, 1994). Hence having more individuals with higher
interpersonal trust should yield more OSS contributions, more reciprocate
behavior etc. from that specific country. Such behavior is then stabilized:
the ex ante beliefs are supported by the outcome of the game as OSS is a
successful public good game. Voluntary code-contribution and reciprocity
is part of the OSS community culture (Ghosh et al., 2002b; Lakhani et al.,
2002). Therefore we expect the following:
H5: Social Capital in terms of interpersonal trust has a positive impact on
the number of OSS developers as well as on the OSS activity level.
So far, we have concentrated on intrinsic aspects (motives, preferences
beliefs). Now we turn to extrinsic motives and incentives. In particular
we will focus on aspects of OSS that are linked to the enforcement—the
enforcement mechanisms respectively—of particular institutions. We first
analyze an informal institution of OSS (the reputation mechanism) before
we discuss the impact of the protection of intellectual property rights.
Extrinsic motives of OSS developers are for example self-marketing, peer
recognition and reputation within the community (Hars and Ou, 2002;
Lakhani et al., 2002). Career aspects are directly linked to extrinsic mo-
tives like the improvement of programming skills, i.e. the investment in
human capital, and the aim to build up reputation signals for the job mar-
ket (Lakhani and Wolf, 2005; Hertel et al., 2003; Ghosh et al., 2002b; Hars
and Ou, 2002; Lakhani et al., 2002, in all cases these motive were stronger
than the motives related to peer recognition). We sum up these two sets of
motives as “reputation mechanism”. Such a reputation mechanism is an in-
centive structure based on the merit principle. In addition, the relevance of
such performance signals indicates competition, especially when it comes
to the job-market.
The reputation mechanism is an informal institution of the OSS com-
munity that has a peer-based (positive) enforcement mechanism. This en-
forcement mechanism itself is of interest with respect to the role of culture:
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Positive attitudes towards the merit principle and competition foster and
support such enforcement mechanisms of performance based reputation.
If more individuals will accept the idea of individual performance signals,
more peers will be willing to reward good contributions. Finally, more
agents will see the need for and have a preference for the achievement of
such signals. In a nutshell, we analyze how culture in terms of preferences
and values can foster or hinder the functioning of an institution, namely
the effectiveness of its enforcement mechanism. Thus, in a country with
a more positive attitude towards competition and the merit principle, it
is more likely to find software developers or students who engage in OSS
with the goal to send reputation signals (for “sportive” peer-competition as
well as for career aspects).
H6: A culture of positive attitudes toward competition and the merit prin-
ciple has a positive impact on the number of OSS developers as well
as on the OSS activity level.
We now turn to the enforcement of a formal institution, namely the de
facto protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs). OSS challenges the
traditional wisdom of the exclusive use of IPR, and is often seen as a new
IPR paradigm. So, at a first glance, the relationship between protection of
IPRs and OSS may not be clear. Some parts of the OSS movement, like the
GPL-founder Richard Stallman, argue against intellectual property while
others oppose this.4 However, in fact OSS licenses are real legal licenses,
since they define the scope of transferred rights and are based on copyright
law de Laat (2005). Especially Stallman’s GPL uses a so-called ‘Copyleft’-
principle which ensures that the licensed software stays “open”. Basically
4Some parts of the open source community argue in an anti intellectual property way.
The "Free Software Foundation" opposes the use of the term “intellectual property”,
and its president Richard Stallman refuses the idea of intellectual property, arguing
that because of moral reasons no one should be allowed to claim property rights on
information or knowledge. This view is opposed by figure like Eric S. Raymond, co-
founder of the Open Source Initiative. Raymond supports the idea of property right
claims, and hence also of intellectual property rights, but simply argues that proprietary
software (in the sense of CSS) is simply an inefficient way of developing software (see
Weber, 2004a). Others like e.g. Greg Perkins also point out that “Open Source depends
on the idea of the individual human right to private property” Perkins (1998).
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this is achieved via restricting the right to redistribute in the following way:
Any further developed software as well as any derived work must be li-
censed as a whole under the GPL. Thus, intellectual property law is used to
ensure that OSS stays OSS as the GPL is based on copyright (Gehring, 2006,
pp 62, 70). In addition there exist a variety of different OSS licenses differ-
ing in how they restrict the usage of the code. In particular firms ‘owning’
OSS projects make use of sophisticated licenses and dual-license strategies,
as it is crucial for them to define exactly what is exclusively owned and
what not.5 Obviously, such legal arrangements are only possible and ef-
fective if intellectual property rights are respected and such licenses can
be enforced.6 Furthermore, the OSS incentive and governance structures
are based on trademarks. Core developers of an OSS project control the
project by using passive control rights that are their exclusive rights to de-
cide whether to accept or reject contributions (see Section 4.3.3.2 in the
next chapter, see also McGowan, 2001; Wendel de Joode et al., 2003, p 20).
These passive control rights are enforced by using the concept of ownership
regarding the database in which the software is stored and the name—thus,
the trademark—of the project. This prevents cloning of projects and sup-
ports the signaling function of the project’s name. Here protection of IPRs
supports indirectly the OSS governance structures and the informal institu-
tion ’reputation’. Thus both, the non-commercial part of the OSS commu-
nity as well as the firms involved, benefit in practice from the possibility to
define and enforce IPRs. Therefore we state the following:
H7: The protection of intellectual property rights has a positive impact on
the number of OSS developers or on OSS activity level.
Finally we take into account a set of formal institutions: the degree of
regulation of economic activity and its impact on OSS development. We ar-
gue that more regulation is not in favor of OSS development and even hin-
ders it. In general, a high degree of regulation increases (transaction) costs
of entrepreneurial activities and individual initiatives. This depresses such
5For more details the different licenses see e.g. Lerner and Tirole (2005); for dual licenses
see Välimäki (2003).
6See e.g. Kumar (2006) on the GPL, for current examples of “the GPL in court” visit http:
//gpl-violations.org/.
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activities, and thus also OSS. As argued above, OSS has an entrepreneurial
spirit as it is based on the idea of individual initiatives and pragmatic prob-
lem solving. The opportunity to have access to and to flexibly use the code
(individualize, further develop, etc.), fosters additional entrepreneurial ac-
tivities. Hence OSS can be a precondition for OSS based start-ups, enable
firms to run OSS business models etc. Strong and distortive regulation of
economic activities in a country has a negative impact on doing business
and thus also on OSS by firms. Furthermore, in the long run strong regu-
lations can also affect the attitudes of the inhabitants negatively: It should
not only decrease the number of such activities but also the entrepreneurial
spirit in general. So the theoretic argument is that entrepreneurial attitudes
or spirit foster entrepreneurial activities. The “payoff” of such activities de-
pends on regulation. Thus high regulation increases transaction costs and
hence lowers the payoff. This finally leads to less entrepreneurial activ-
ities and in the long run also to less entrepreneurial spirit. Because of
its characteristics, OSS belongs to entrepreneurial activities, is based on
entrepreneurial spirit respectively. Thus we should see a negative impact
here:
H8: A high degree of intense economic regulation has a negative impact
on the number of OSS developers as well as on the OSS activity level.
In addition, some control variables are necessary. The data about the
geographic origin of OSS developers show that most OSS contributions
come from developed countries. Therefore, we control for GDP per capita.
Furthermore, we control for education, because studies like Ghosh et al.
(2002b) indicate that OSS developers are well-educated software engineers
or ICT students.
3.3 The Data
For information about the geographical origin of OSS developers registered
at SourceForge we make use of the same dataset as in chapter 2. Regarding
the institutional and cultural aspects we make use of date available from
different resources:
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3.3.1 Data on GDP, Education and ICT
The probability that a country’s inhabitant becomes an OSS developer rises
with the degree of economic and technical development, in the latter case
mainly with the access to the internet. We take into account the GDP ppp
(purchasing power parity) per capita for 2006. As a measure for education
we use the combined gross enrollment ratio for primary, secondary and
tertiary schools with a four-year lag. We took both from Norris (2009),
the original data source are World Bank (2007) and UNDP (2004). We
have to take into account aspects of ICT. However, worldwide data about
e.g. the number of software developers, size of the software sector or other
differentiated data about the ICT sector are poor. The best data available
refer to internet access.7 Thus we use the number of internet users per
inhabitants (“inet users”) as a proxy here. The data for this come from the
International Telecommunication Union (2006).
3.3.2 Data on Cultural Factors and Social Capital
One main source for our analysis is the World Values Survey (WVS) of-
fering a wide range of country-specific cultural data. It is often used in
cross-cultural research. We refer to this for our cultural variables about
using data from the waves of 1990, 1995/1998 and 1999/2000 from the
online-dataset at www.worldvaluessurvey.org (category `Online Data
Analysis’).
However, not all questions were asked in all countries, and additionally
not in all interviews. Thus we have to correct for that and eliminate all
those with too little overall coverage.8 Some of the questions have an
7At least for some countries, data about the share of employees working in the ICT sector
is available. But as internet access is a precondition for OSS, we want to have this in
our regression in any case. But with share of ICT employees and internet users we
clearly run into problems of multicollinearity here: each internet access must have been
installed by someone working in the ICT sector. Therefore we decided to leave this data
out and use internet usage only. We also decided not to use real prices of ICT because
of a lack of data.
8In case of questions that were not asked in 100% of all interviews in a country (but with
a sufficient high percentage) we additionally have to correct the percentage of answers,
as the numbers one receives from the WVS online-dataset always sum up with the “not
asked”- share to 100%.
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ordinal scale for the possible answer. Although it is very common to use the
mean of such answers, this is quite critical from a methodological point of
view, as in this case one treats ordinal scaled data like being on an interval
scale. It is better to choose a certain threshold, i.e. for example count
the percentage of answers with scale 4 or smaller. As we want to be able
to distinguish groups (here countries) from each other with respect to a
certain characteristics, a good way to find such a threshold is to “ask the
data”. Thus, we look at the direction the answers point to, choose those
of interest, and then set different plausible thresholds. In a next step we
compare the variance, and choose those with the higher variance, as this is
an indication by the data that we made the right cut in order to measure
the difference of the respective category. (If variances were close to each
other, we choose that threshold with the distribution closer to the normal
distribution). Whenever we refer to WVS data henceforth, they were, if
necessary, treated in the way just described.
3.3.2.1 Social Capital: Interpersonal Trust
Interpersonal trust is measured by the average percentage of respondents
saying ‘most people can be trusted’. (The question is “Generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very
careful in dealing with people?” Possible answers are “Most people can be
trusted” and “Can’t be too careful”). We label this “interpersonal trust”.
3.3.2.2 Degree of Individualism/Self-Determination
To measure the degree of individualism/self-determination is more compli-
cated. It is based on Hofstede’s definition of individualism, which “pertains
to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is
expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family”
(Hofstede, 1991, p 52). He developed the individualism index for 50 coun-
tries based on a world-wide survey of IBM employees that was carried out
during 1978-83. The questions the individualism index was built upon was
whether the job leaves sufficient time for personal and family life, consider-
able freedom to adopt own approaches, includes challenging work, offers
opportunities to improve and learn new skills, etc. (Hofstede, 1991, p 49
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ff). Hence, based on these categories, high scores in individualism indicate
the prevalence of individual interest in a society, i.e. in a sense that people
would like to (and can) “do what they want to do”. We use an updated
and further developed version of Hofstede’s measure, namely a merge of
ratings provided by Triandis’ and Hofstede’s scores (Suh et al., 1998, p 485;
Diener et al., 2000; Oishi, 2000).
Obviously the concept of ‘individualism’ in the tradition of Hofstede’s
definition should correlate with leisure time preferences, preferences for
independence and self responsibility etc. Here we can again make use of
the WVS data. Treating the data as described above lead to the following
categories for “leisure time” and “self-responsibility”:
• Leisure time: % of all respondents of a country saying “1 Very impor-
tant”. (Question asks how important leisure time is in ones life.)
• Self-responsibility: % of all respondents of a country ranging from 1
to 4. (Question asks to put oneself on a range 1 to 10 expression own
opinion, with 1 = People should take more responsibility to provide
for themselves, vs. 10 = The government should take more responsi-
bility to ensure that everyone is provided for.)
Additionally, the WVS data delivers the percentage of all respondents of
a country who mentioned that “feeling of responsibility” is an important
quality children shout learn at home. (They were given a list of qualities
that children can be encouraged to learn at home. They should choose up
to five they consider to be especially important.).
We want to have one single measure for the degree of individualism/self-
determination. Assume that a certain characteristic (like the degree of
individualism/self-determination) cannot be measured directly, but several
indicators for this characteristic are available. Then principal component
analysis (PCA) is a useful tool to identify the meaningful underlying vari-
able(s) and construct this based on the data available. In other words,
the PCA tries to find components that explain the maximum amount of
variance, reducing the dimension of the data and detecting the structure
in the relationships between variables. We construct a principal compo-
nent labeled “self-determ/indiv”, that consists of the individualism scores
mentioned above, “leisure time”, “self-responsibility” and whether a child
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should learn responsibility. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling
adequacy of “self-determ/indiv” is 0.683.
3.3.2.3 Attitudes Toward Competition and the Merit Principle
For the degree of positive attitudes toward competition and/or the merit
principle we are also able to construct a principal component, labeled “com-
petition/merit” consisting of variables from the WVS, measuring attitudes
towards income differences as incentives, whether competition is perceived
as good or harmful, and the importance to teach a child independence:
• Income differences as incentives: % of respondents of a country rang-
ing from 7 to 10 (Question asks to express own opinion, using a range
from 1 = Incomes should be made more equal, up to 10 = We need
larger income differences as incentives.)
• Competition is good: % of respondents of a country ranging from 1 to
2. (Question asks to range oneself according to opinion about “Com-
petition is good, it stimulates people to work hard and develop new
ideas”, vs. “Competition is harmful, it brings the worst in people”.
Range: 1 = Competition is good, 10 = Competition is harmful.)
• Importance to teach a child independence: % of all respondents of a
country who mentioned that “Independence” is an important quality
children shout learn at home. (They were given a list of qualities that
children can be encouraged to learn at home. They should choose up
to five they consider to be especially important.)
However, this component is problematic, as it has a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
measure of sampling adequacy of 0.517. Therefor we run regression with
and without competition/merit.9
9We also run regression with “Competition is a good thing” only. However the results were
quite similar.
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3.3.2.4 Attitudes towards Novelty (New Ideas and Scientific
Progress)
Fianlly, data on attitudes towards novelty, namely on a preference for new
ideas and scientific progress also come from the 1990, 1995/1998 and
1999/2000 waves of the World Values Survey. We apply the following:
• “prefer new ideas” is the % of all respondents of a country preferring
new ideas over old ones by ranging from 8 to 10. (The survey asks to
rate oneself on a scale about “Ideas stood test of time better” vs. “New
ideas better”, with 1= Ideas that stood test of time are generally best,
up to 10 = New ideas are generally better than old ones.)
• “science advance help” is the % of all respondents of a country say-
ing that scientific advances we are making will help mankind. (The
question is “In the long run, do you think the scientific advances we
are making will help or harm mankind?” Possible answers: 1 Will
help, 2 Will harm, 3 Some of each.)
3.3.3 Data on IPR Protection and Regulation
In order to evaluate the degree of regulation, we use the Economic Free-
dom of the World Index (Gwartney et al. 2008). The report offers an index
of regulation, called “Area 5: Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business”.
This index is built upon several sub-indices measuring credit market regu-
lations, labor market regulations, and business regulations (Gwartney et al.
2008, p 189ff). We use it in order to measure the degree of regulation in a
society in 2006, and denote this variable by “degree of regulation”.10
With respect to IPR, we use of one of the sub-indices of Gwartney et al.
(2008) Gwartney et al. (2006) belonging to the property right section: the
sub-index of the protection IPR (“2C Protection of intellectual property”)
for the year 2004, the latest IPR-data available. This IPR sub-index is based
on data from the Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Fo-
10The original measure is indexing de-regulation (the lower the degree of regulation the
higher the score). In order to avoid confusion we use an inverse version such that highly
regulated countries have high scores.
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rum.11 We denote this index by “IPR protection”. Another measure related
to IPR are the figures about the software piracy rates in 2006, taken from
the Fifth Global Software Piracy Study (Business Software Alliance, 2007).
3.4 Empirical Results
To test hypotheses H1 through H8, we run linear regression models (OLS),
varying the endogenous variable as well as the set of explanatory vari-
ables.12 The results appear quite robust and are displayed in Tables 3.1
through 3.3. All three tables are structured as follows: After the control
variables, the influence of the variables presenting hypotheses H1 through
H8 is shown. We present the three most representative models (for each
table equations I, II and III respectively), each with and without "compe-
tition/merit" (indicated by a and b). While other variables are skipped
in single models, social trust, internet users and IPR are used across the
board.13 We are able run regressions with up to 70 countries, and we are
able to distinguish with respect to the level of activities.
Table 3.1 presents the regression results for the number of OSS develop-
ers per 1,000 inhabitants including those localized using the information
about the SLD. In the Appendix A the reader can find the same regressions
for OSS developer data without those localized using the information about
the SLD. In a second step, we run regressions for the active OSS developers
per 100 inhabitants, again including those localized via SLD, see Table 3.2.
For the results without SLD see Appendix A. Finally, we analyze the OSS
activity level (Table 3.3). As usual we present the results with those located
via SLD while the other version can be found in the Appendix.
11Question: IPR protection “in your country is 1 = weak and not enforced, up to 7 = strong
and enforced”.
12In order to deal with possible heteroskedasticity we run the regressions with robust stan-
dard errors, i.e. heteroskedastic-consistent estimates. Furthermore, we check for pos-
sible problems with multicolinearity by looking at the pairwise correlations, and also
checking the Variance Inflation Factors.
13We present results with IPR protection only. We also run regressions with software piracy
rates. It turns out that the piracy rates are never significant, while the rest remains
basically the same, only regulation becomes insignificant.
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Table 3.1: OSS Developers per 1,000 inhabitants (with SLD)
Ia Ib IIa IIb IIIa IIIb
GDP -0.420 -0.389 0.982 0.827 -0.445 -0.430
(0.773) (0.788) (0.341) (0.455) (0.768) (0.773)
education 0.198 0.200 0.312 0.230 0.0557 0.0567
(0.636) (0.632) (0.386) (0.457) (0.890) (0.886)
inet users 1.372∗∗∗ 1.370∗∗∗ 1.016∗ 1.007∗ 1.539∗∗∗ 1.537∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.060) (0.054) (0.003) (0.003)
prefer new ideas 1.683 1.518 0.657 0.584
(0.555) (0.569) (0.827) (0.838)
science advance help 1.254∗∗ 1.220∗∗ 1.169∗∗ 1.154∗∗
(0.018) (0.025) (0.031) (0.039)
self-determ/indiv 1.168∗ 1.147∗∗ 0.573 0.685 1.229∗∗ 1.219∗∗
(0.051) (0.047) (0.290) (0.238) (0.046) (0.040)
intpersonal trust 1.168∗∗ 1.174∗∗ 0.650∗∗ 0.592∗ 1.162∗∗ 1.165∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.046) (0.071) (0.024) (0.023)
competition/merit -0.0676 0.337 -0.0310
(0.831) (0.269) (0.916)
IPR protection 0.373 0.375 0.368 0.356 0.512 0.513
(0.272) (0.256) (0.267) (0.287) (0.129) (0.122)
degree of regulation -1.048∗ -1.042∗ -0.852∗ -0.828
(0.091) (0.082) (0.085) (0.108)
_cons -0.988∗∗ -0.975∗∗ -0.318 -0.214 -1.159∗∗ -1.152∗∗
(0.038) (0.049) (0.328) (0.456) (0.017) (0.022)
N 60 60 70 70 60 60
adj. R2 0.815 0.818 0.785 0.784 0.805 0.809
d. of freedom 49 50 61 62 50 51
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note that GDP is per 100,000 inhabitants and inet users is per 10,000 inhabitants. Education
refers to the year 2002, while IPR protection refers to 2004. The measures self-determ/indiv and
competition/merit are based on principal component analysis.
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Table 3.2: Active OSS Developers per 100 Inhabitants (with SLD)
Ia Ib IIa IIb IIIa IIIb
GDP -1.358 -1.370 2.820 2.431 -1.415 -1.468
(0.660) (0.655) (0.258) (0.367) (0.660) (0.647)
education 0.499 0.499 0.535 0.330 0.166 0.162
(0.582) (0.577) (0.496) (0.622) (0.849) (0.848)
inet users 2.434∗∗ 2.435∗∗ 1.808 1.786 2.823∗∗ 2.829∗∗
(0.029) (0.027) (0.119) (0.110) (0.011) (0.010)
prefer new ideas 4.202 4.267 1.805 2.070
(0.480) (0.448) (0.774) (0.732)
science advance help 2.148∗∗ 2.161∗∗ 1.951∗ 2.006∗
(0.037) (0.039) (0.075) (0.072)
self-determ/indiv 2.702∗∗ 2.710∗∗ 1.283 1.565 2.845∗∗ 2.881∗∗
(0.036) (0.031) (0.285) (0.226) (0.031) (0.026)
intpersonal trust 2.594∗∗∗ 2.592∗∗∗ 1.214∗ 1.069 2.580∗∗ 2.570∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.060) (0.110) (0.017) (0.016)
competition/merit 0.0265 0.842 0.112
(0.970) (0.205) (0.862)
IPR protection 1.466∗ 1.465∗ 1.154 1.124 1.791∗∗ 1.788∗∗
(0.057) (0.053) (0.131) (0.148) (0.021) (0.020)
degree of regulation -2.450∗∗ -2.452∗∗ -2.024∗∗ -1.962∗
(0.044) (0.039) (0.033) (0.052)
_cons -2.024∗∗ -2.030∗ -0.631 -0.369 -2.425∗∗ -2.448∗∗
(0.048) (0.056) (0.357) (0.530) (0.022) (0.025)
N 60 60 70 70 60 60
adj. R2 0.829 0.832 0.802 0.799 0.817 0.820
d. of freedom 49 50 61 62 50 51
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note that GDP is per 100,000 inhabitants and inet users is per 10,000 inhabitants. Education
refers to the year 2002, while IPR protection refers to 2004. The measures self-determ/indiv and
competition/merit are based on principal component analysis.
65
3 Institutions, Culture, and Open Source
Table 3.3: OSS Activity Level: Messages per 10,000 Inhabitants (with SLD)
Ia Ib IIa IIb IIIa IIIb
GDP -1.696 -1.655 2.543 2.286 -1.731 -1.716
(0.365) (0.374) (0.245) (0.321) (0.359) (0.364)
education 0.571 0.573 0.471 0.336 0.363 0.364
(0.472) (0.468) (0.491) (0.582) (0.641) (0.636)
inet users 1.590∗ 1.587∗ 1.179 1.164 1.834∗∗ 1.832∗∗
(0.052) (0.052) (0.150) (0.139) (0.026) (0.025)
prefer new ideas 3.759 3.548 2.259 2.182
(0.411) (0.407) (0.633) (0.630)
science advance help 1.253∗ 1.210∗ 1.130 1.114
(0.066) (0.071) (0.111) (0.107)
self-determ/indiv 2.767∗∗∗ 2.740∗∗∗ 1.562∗ 1.748∗ 2.856∗∗∗ 2.846∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.088) (0.075) (0.006) (0.004)
intpersonal trust 2.662∗∗∗ 2.670∗∗∗ 1.346∗∗∗ 1.251∗∗ 2.653∗∗∗ 2.657∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.020) (0.001) (0.001)
competition/merit -0.0863 0.556 -0.0329
(0.895) (0.292) (0.957)
IPR protection 1.019∗ 1.022∗ 0.531 0.510 1.222∗∗ 1.223∗∗
(0.091) (0.081) (0.397) (0.429) (0.039) (0.036)
degree of regulation -1.533∗ -1.525∗ -1.234∗ -1.194
(0.094) (0.078) (0.067) (0.103)
_cons -1.587∗ -1.570∗ -0.538 -0.366 -1.838∗∗ -1.831∗∗
(0.070) (0.081) (0.356) (0.479) (0.042) (0.046)
N 60 60 70 70 60 60
adj. R2 0.842 0.845 0.809 0.808 0.836 0.839
d. of freedom 49 50 61 62 50 51
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note that GDP is per 100,000 inhabitants and inet users is per 10,000 inhabitants. Education
refers to the year 2002, while IPR protection refers to 2004. The measures self-determ/indiv and
competition/merit are based on principal component analysis.
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3.5 Comparison and Interpretation of the Results
In this section we compare and interpret the results of the different estima-
tion models. The control variables do not contribute to the explanation of
OSS activities. The evidence for the other variables is mixed, as the follow-
ing discussion of the variables in the order as introduced in the hypotheses
shows.
The share of internet users is positively correlated with OSS activities
and significant, which supports hypothesis 1. As already mentioned, this
can be interpreted with respect to two aspects. First, internet access is a
precondition for participating in OSS development. Second, the number of
internet users is a proxy for the size of the ICT sector, which has a positive
impact on the supply side of OSS via OSS reputation signals for ICT-job-
markets and the potential market size for OSS business models.
Surprisingly “prefer new ideas” is positively but not significantly corre-
lated with OSS activities. Thus, hypothesis 2 has to be rejected, as country-
wide openness to new ideas is not encouraging participation in OSS. In-
terestingly, this is different with respect to the attitude towards scientific
progress (hypothesis 3): A positive attitude towards scientific progress (sci-
ence advances help) is clearly significant with respect to the number of
developers. It is also significant with respect to active developers, and the
activity level where it has its lowest significance level. The preference for
new ideas and the attitude towards scientific progress measure different as-
pects (someone who likes new ideas can still be skeptical about the impact
of scientific progress). Nevertheless one might expect that it is the com-
bination of both that is beneficial for OSS. The argument would be that
openness to new ideas has to meet a preference for scientific aspects in or-
der to fit into the OSS community. Therefore, we also run regressions with
an interaction term, but this is never significant.
As for hypothesis 4, stating that the degree self-determination of a society
has a positive impact on the number of OSS developers as well as on the
OSS activity level, the number of (active) OSS developers at SourceForge is
indeed positively correlated with the degree of individualism. Interestingly
the significance level rises when it comes to the activity level (see Table 3.3).
This fits our expectations. OSS development can be a way of individualistic
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self-fulfillment. Therefore, it is highly plausible that societies with high
account of self-determination are experiencing a higher OSS activity level.
The number of OSS developers is positively correlated with the degree of
interpersonal trust. Therefore hypothesis 5 is not rejected, fitting also our
expectations. Again, despite the fact that this variable is highly significant
throughout all equations, it is interesting to notice that this factor is more
significant when applied to the activity level. In a society generating mutual
trust, private provision of public goods indeed seems more likely.
A culture of positive attitudes toward competition and the merit prin-
ciple is not relevant: the principal component “competition/merit” was
never significant (nor was the positive attitude towards competition solely).
Therefore hypothesis 6 has to be rejected. A possible explanation could be
that individualistic self-fulfillment aspects and self-determination are more
important on the level of culture.
How do IPRs affect OSS activities? In the regressions of model I and III
the number of active OSS developers and the level of activity both are pos-
itively correlated with the degree of protection of IPR. Hence, hypothesis
7 cannot be rejected. It seems that indeed the supply side of OSS benefits
from the security of IPRs. This is plausible if one remembers that, as al-
ready mentioned, OSS licenses are build upon copyright law, OSS projects
use trademark law, etc. OSS relies on the idea of IPR, although it uses this
institution in a new way. The deny of IPR as such might even harm the sup-
ply of OSS. We have to discuss an often mentioned objection in this context
here: The argument would be that in societies with a low de facto protec-
tion of IPRs there is not so much need for OSS, as one can get software for
free (or at least at low costs) anyway. This shall explain why we have more
OSS contribution when IPR protection is strong. Hence, this argument sees
OSS as a substitute for pirated software. However, this explanation is not
convincing because of various reasons. First, if OSS is a substitute for piracy
software we should see an effect of piracy rates. But piracy rates are never
significant (see footnote 13). Second, OSS is far more than just “cheap”
software: the key element of OSS is that one has access to the source code
and can thus further develop it etc. A pirated copy of proprietary software
(closed source software) is still just a copy of the binary code. Whereas the
source code is the human-readable recipe of software, the binary code is not
readable by humans. Thus piracy software cannot be a substitute for OSS
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as it is missing the source code. Finally, the objection mixes up demand-
and supply side arguments. The argument points to the demand-side, but
we analyze the supply side of OSS: the number of (active) developers and
the activity level.
In most regressions with regulation the variable has a negative sign and
is significant. Thus we find support for hypothesis 8. OSS activities obvi-
ously depend on regulations, exactly as other entrepreneurial activities and
individual initiatives are positively correlated with lower regulation, i.e. a
set of reasonable regulations.
Positive attitudes toward competition and the merit principle, protection
of IPRs, and less regulation are all aspects that relate to OSS and OSS
business models. One might argue that it is precisely the combination of
less regulation and a sense for competition, or less regulation and good IPR
protection, or even the combination of the three, that is in favor of business
and thus also of OSS business models. This could then affect the OSS
activities as well. Therefore we also run regressions with such interaction
terms. The results are clear: only the interaction term of IPR protection and
regulation is significant (positively) in some regressions. It has an impact
only if we examined the activity level and the active developers.
3.6 Summary
This chapter presents a cross-country study of how the relative number of
OSS developers and the OSS activities of a country depend on institutional
and cultural factors that belong to level one and two of Williamson’s frame-
work. For this purpose we break up the phenomenon OSS into several
elements, identifying more general, underlying aspects. We then connect
these aspects with institutional and cultural factors. In detail we have ex-
amples of the impact of culture in terms of values and preferences and in
forms of beliefs, and of how culture can foster or hinder the implementa-
tion and/or functioning of institutions. In addition we have examples of
how formal ‘level two’-institutions have an impact on the functioning of
lower-level formal and informal institutions (IPR protection) and on the
outcome, thus payoffs, of certain activities.
69
3 Institutions, Culture, and Open Source
We can assign 1.3 million OSS developers from SourceForge to their
countries, that equals 94% of the total at SourceForge in 2006. With the
posted messages we have a proxy for the activity of each developer. We
are able to run regressions with about 70 countries, as the data about the
cultural and institutional variables are not available for all the countries
existing.
Beside the fact that internet access is an important factor for the supply
side of OSS, our findings indicate that a positive attitude towards scientific
progress as well as a culture of self-determination/individualism is in favor
of OSS. The same is true for interpersonal trust. IPR protection is significant
in some regressions, always with a positive sign. And finally less market
regulation fosters OSS.
Our analysis shows that the non-equal geographical distribution of OSS
activities is not driven by aspects like GDP and education, and only partly
by internet access. It can mainly be explained by the differences in sev-
eral cultural and institutional factors. This underlines the importance of
these factors. Hence this study shows the impact of such factors on mi-
cro(economic) behavior, using the case of OSS development as a special
example. This can help to better understand the role such cultural and
institutional factors play. But it also improves the understanding of the
phenomenon OSS. Our findings support a view of OSS as being an en-
trepreneurial activity that relies on trust as well as on IPR protection. It has
a strong individualistic/self-deterministic aspect, combined with a spirit of
individual initiatives. The fact that OSS can be the basis of a business model
is also supported by our findings, as the results for market regulation and
IPR protection show. Finally, the fact that the supply side of OSS bene-
fits from the security of IPRs indicates that OSS is not anti-IPR but a new
IPR paradigm. This IPR regime coexists with CSS. In the next chapter we
therefore concentrate on the rationale for the open and the closed source
principle using a property rights approach.
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4 Intellectual Property Rights and
Ex-Post Transaction Costs
“If the main allocative function of property rights is the inter-
nalization of beneficial and harmful effects, then the emergence
of property rights can be understood best by their association
with the emergence of new or different beneficial and harmful
effects.”
h H. Demsetz, 1967, p 350
4.1 Introduction∗
In Chapter 3 we have seen that OSS activities are positively correlated with
the degree of protection of IPRs. OSS and CSS are both based on copyright
law. However, there is a difference in the scope of rights transfered by the
OSS vs. CSS licenses. Thus, OSS and CSS are different ownership concepts
with different IPR allocations and different modes of organization. In other
words: OSS and CSS represent different strategies for using the resource
software, i.e. its source code. Both have specific advantages and drawbacks
at the individual and firm level as well as for social welfare.
This chapter focus on these two different IPR regimes. We use a prop-
erty rights perspective to examine and explain the rationale for OS and
CS principles in a general way. Therefore, this chapter contributes to the
institutional literature on OSS,1 to the property rights theory in general
and to the literature on how the OS paradigm can be transferred to other
industries. The analysis of this chapter is a unique approach. The only
contribution that links the phenomenon of OSS to the concept of transac-
tion costs is Benkler (2002). Benkler refers to Demsetz’s explanation of
the emergence of property rights and Coase’s theory of the firm (Demsetz,
∗This Chapter is based on von Engelhardt (2008b)
1For example Weber (2004b); Brand and Schmid (2005); Gehring (2006), see Section
1.3.2 for details.
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1967; Coase, 1937). However, Benkler (2002)’s approach differs from the
analysis of the current chapter. First, he refers more generally to “commons
based peer production”. Second, Benkler sees the peer cooperations based
on commons without private property (or: in the “absence of property”).
In contrast to this, we will argue that OSS is based on private property,
although the amount of exclusive ownership is reduced. Third, Benkler fo-
cuses on the information problem of who is the best person for a given talk.
His main argument is that under certain circumstances peer production is
better suited than markets or hierarchies (firms) to assign the right “tal-
ent” to a task. This might explain why common based peer production is
successful. It does not necessarily explain why individuals choose this. The
theoretical framework developed in this chapter focuses on why rational in-
dividuals choose both, OSS and CSS. Based on a property rights approach
the rationale for both IPR paradigms is discussed. The argument is that OS
and CS regimes coexist because both are second-best solutions.
Property rights theory tends to concentrate on negative external effects,
i.e. scarce resources. Probably the best known examples are the “tragedy
of the commons” (Hardin, 1968) and the “tragedy of the anti-commons”
(Heller, 1998). This focus can be traced back to Demsetz’ seminal article.
Although he mentions the “internalization of external costs and benefits”
(Demsetz, 1967, p 349, emphasis added) he focuses entirely on negative
externalities. By contrast, this chapter considers a non-scarce and even anti-
scarce resource. Furthermore, some property rights regarding the non- and
anti-rival applications of the resource ‘source code’ are de facto not separa-
ble because of ex-post transaction costs and the economic characteristics of
software. In this case, it may be rational to adopt both OS and CS.
Section 4.2.1 introduces our analytical framework. Section 4.2.2 ex-
plains how the economic characteristics of software make source code a
non-scarce and even anti-scarce resource. We will see, that neither non-
rivalry nor anti-rivalry alone can explain the dichotomy between OSS and
CSS. This is because a perfect market would lead to an optimal allocation
of non- and anti-rival applications. Section 4.2.3 defines the optimal allo-
cation of property rights and the corresponding licensee agreements. Fol-
lowing Coase we then ask what kind of transaction cost problems limit
market transactions such that this leads to the coexistence of CSS and
OSS. We show in 4.3.1 that the OSS-CSS phenomenon cannot be explained
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by limited internalizability of some positive effects but because of ex post
transaction costs however, some property rights are de facto non separable.
This leads to a control problem, i.e. a de facto dilution of exclusive owner-
ship. CS and OS present two different solutions of this problem. Whereas
CSS maximizes control and exclusive ownership, OSS minimizes it (Section
4.3.2).
4.2 Intellectual Property Rights and a Non- and
Anti-Scarce Resource
4.2.1 The Analytical Framework
This section introduces the notation and definitions used in this chapter.2
We use set theory to define an economic resource and its subsets. Based on
this we define the terms ‘scarce’, ‘non-scarce’ and ‘anti-scarce’.
4.2.1.1 An Economic Resource
Resources can be generally defined in terms of a technically meaningful set
of certain elements. Source code in particular can be defined in terms of
code lines. We therefor describe a given source code as a set X . X can
be split up into subsets of code lines and there exists a set of all subsets
P(X ) = {A | A⊆ X }.
Let y = f (Z , ·) denote the Z ∈ P(X ) used in application y. The ‘use’
f (Z , ·) is one of several possible transformations of Z , either by itself (y =
f (Z)) or in conjunction with other code lines. For example, y = f (Z ,W )
would be an application of the combined code line sets Z and W . This can
be rewritten as y = f (V ) with V = {Z ∪W} 6= ;.
For technical reasons, applications do not exist for all Z . Here the trivial
example is Z = ; ∈ P(X ). Hence, there exists a set of technically non-
meaningful subsets of X : U(X ) = {Z ∈ P(X ) | ∄ y = f (Z , ·)}. And finally:
2Although this analytical framework was developed to analyze ‘source code’, it can be
applied to any economic resource.
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Definition 4.2.1. The set of technically meaningful subsets of X is
X (X ) = {P(X ) \U(X )}= {Z ∈ P(X ) | ∃ y = f (Z , ·)}. (4.1)
Note that Z can have multiple applications, i.e. there can exist several Z ∈
X with ∃!y = (y1, . . . , yn), y i = f (Z , ·), n≥ 2.
Definition 4.2.1 makes it possible to define a corresponding set of appli-
cations for each X which we denote by Y :
Definition 4.2.2. The corresponding set of applications of X is
Y (X ) = {y | y = f (Z , ·), Z ∈ X (X )}. (4.2)
As previously mentioned, y = f (Z , ·) indicates that Z might be but does not
necessarily have to be combined with other code lines. Therefore, a more
general notation is y = f (Z , ·) ∈ { f (Z), f (V )} with V = {Z ∪W} 6= ; and
Z ∈ X (X ). This yields the following general notation for the corresponding
set of applications: Y (X ) = { f (Z), f (V )}= Y (Z)∪ Y (V ).
4.2.1.2 Definition of Scarce, Non- and Anti-Scarce
A scarce resource is a resource with rivalry in use. Formally, scarcity occurs
if the use of Z ∈ X for any application y̆ ∈ Y̆ leads to rivalry in use.
Definition 4.2.3. X is called a scarce resource with respect to Y̆ ⊆ Y if
∀ y̆ = f (Z , ·) |

Y new(X new)⊂ Y (X )

. (4.3)
A non-scarce resource is a resource that is non-rival in use, i.e. a public
or club/toll good. In this case, the use of Z ∈ X for any application ỹ ∈ Ỹ
does not lead to rivalry in use.
Definition 4.2.4. X is called a non-scarce resource with respect to Ỹ ⊆ Y if
∀ ỹ = f (Z , ·) |

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An anti-scarce resource is a resource with anti-rivalry in use, i.e. the more
the resource is used the higher is its value. This happens because use in-
creases the set of applications.3 Thus, a resource is anti-scarce, if the use
of Z ∈ X for any application ŷ ∈ Ŷ leads to anti-rivalry in use.
Definition 4.2.5. X is called an anti-scarce resource with respect to Ŷ ⊆ Y ,
if
∀ ŷ = f (Z , ·) |

Y new(X new)⊃ Y (X )

. (4.5)
4.2.2 The Resource Software
4.2.2.1 The Economic Characteristics of Software
Software has specific economic characteristics. This can be summarized as
follows (for more details see von Engelhardt, 2008a):
• Software is a digital good and therefore (re)combinable: software
products are “cumulative and emergent—new digital goods that arise
from merging antecedents have features absent from the original,
parent digital goods” (Quah, 2003, p 19). We will define the terms
recombinable and combinable as follows: Let S(X ) denote the set of
all permutations of X , and S ∈ S(X ) denote one permutation of X . X
is called recombinable if ∃S 6= X s.t. ∃ y = f (S). Of course, it is unre-
alistic to think that one can build new software simply by rearranging
code lines. In most cases, all or parts of the given source code will
have to be combined with other code lines.
Definition 4.2.6. Z ∈ X is called combinable with respect to W , if
∃W 6= ; s.t. ∃ y = f (V ), V = {Z ∪W} 6= ;. (4.6)
• Software is aspatial, i.e. infinitely expansible and therefore nonrival.
Once software is produced, it can be reproduced without any loss of
quality at negligible costs. On the other hand, it has high develop-
ment and pre-launch testing costs (first copy costs). These combina-
tion of high sunk costs and low marginal costs leads to a subadditive
cost function.
3Note that the term “applications” captures both qualitative and quantitative changes in
the resource.
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• Software is a network good with direct and indirect network effects.4
Network effects are intimately connected with complementarity which
“means that consumers in these markets are shopping for systems [...]
rather than individual products” (Shy, 2001, p 2, emphasis original).
Furthermore, modularity plays an important role (Weber, 2004b, pp
172 ff; Langlois, 2002, pp 22 f). Compatibility is a necessary condi-
tion for ‘complementarity’ and ‘modularity’.
• Compatibility and combinability are necessary (but not sufficient)
conditions for yet another software characteristic: cumulativeness. If
X is combinable and V is compatible to X , then X can be cumulative.
X is cumulative if V itself is part of the new X new.
Definition 4.2.7. X is called cumulative with respect to W , if
∃W 6= ; s.t.









Z , V ⊆ X new

(4.7)
• Software is an information good because its source code is informa-
tion, i.e. a human-readable recipe. But software differs from other in-
formation goods: some consumers do not care about the information
but merely about its capabilities.5 This explains why the software is
an information good that can be sold in a state users cannot read the
information. CSS is typically distributed in machine-readable binary
codes that leave the information ‘closed’.
4.2.2.2 Software as a Non- and Anti-Scarce Ressource
Because of softare’s economic characteristics, a source code is a non-scarce
resource. Obviously there is no rivalry in consumption. However there is
also no rivalry in production:
4Software is designed to process data. Hence, it must exchange data with other software
(applications, operating system) and/or hardware. This requires compatibility and leads
to network effects. Two different types of network effects play a role: (1) the installed
base effect, i.e. utility increases with the total number of users; (2) the personal network
effect (von Westarp, 2003), in which users adopt based on the adoptions in the personal
network.
5For example, the vast majority of people who use software to receive and send emails
have no desire to read the source code.
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(i) Because of near-zero reproduction costs, the first copy X is a non-
scarce resource for producing n + 1 copies. Since X can be copied
without any loss of quality is y := ‘copying’ | Y new = Y .
(ii) Because it is combinable and does not deteriorate, any given source
code X is a non-scarce resource for further software development.
The code X , or parts of it, can be used as input to develop first-copies
of new software products:6 y = f (V ) | Y new = Y .
(iii) Since software is an information good, any given source code X is
a non-scarce resource for knowledge spillovers, i.e. transfering ideas
and learning. Source code is a list of programming solutions. Ex-
isting code may contain several solutions that would be useful in a
new software project. Such a ‘transfer of ideas and concepts’ is even
possible from one programming language to another. Additionally, a
software engineer can improve his or her programming skills from
reading a source code (learning). Hence, for all applications y that
transfer ideas or imply learning is y = f (Z) | Y new = Y .
In addition of being a non-scarce resource software can sometimes dis-
play anti-rivalry7 in use, making it an anti-scarce resource
(iv) Because of standards and network effects, software is a network good
(e.g. see White et al., 2005; Kooths et al., 2003; Gröhn, 1999; Gandal,
1994). If X is a network good for a set of ‘network applications’
ynw ∈ Y , then the following holds: ∀ynw | Y new ⊃ Y . This means that
X is an anti-scarce resource with respect to ynw , see the definition
4.2.5, p 75.
This is true for all network goods. One intuitive example is a network
of telephone lines. If more users plug into to the network, more
applications (telephone connections) are possible.
6Because of this there are whole catalogs of complete elements of programs (Gröhn, 1999,
p 5) and a distinct programming approach—the so-called component-based software
engineering—emerged. This approach also includes the re-use of software components
across producers (Romberg, 2003, pp 253 ff.).
7Compare the following also with Weber (2004b, pp 153 ff.), where one can find similar
thoughts. Weber uses the term ‘antirivalness’.
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(v) Because of cumulativeness, the use of a source code dislays anti-
rivalry: If X is cumulative with respect to any W ∈ W, then X is
an anti-scarce resource with respect to W.
Proof: From cumulativeness (definition 4.2.7, p 76) we obtain
∀W ∈W |

















(y c /∈ Y )∧ (y c ∈ Y new)

⇒∀y c = f (V ) |
 
Y new(X new)⊃ Y (X )

,
which is identical to the definition of anti-scarcity (definition 4.2.5, p
75).
If a software engineer further develops a module—e.g. because of
own needs—others can benefit from this improvement provided that
the new piece of source code is still compatible and the new ‘module’
is implemented in users’ software systems. Thus, a source code is a
potential input for further software development. The new output
again is (potential) input for further software-development, and so
on.
4.2.3 Optimal Allocation and Optimal Licenses
We will now discuss IPRs for a non- and anti-scarce resources in a world
without transaction costs. Since this chapter focuses on software (source
code), IPR allocation is defined by licenses. Software is traditionally pro-
tected by copyright law (Graham and Somaya, 2004, p 269). The copy-
right-based license agreements define the transfer of the rights. We will
see that there exists an optimal allocation of rights regarding non- and anti-
rival applications, i.e. optimal licenses can be defined.
Defining IPRs for non-rival applications refers to the private provision of
a good without rivalry in use, i.e. a club good. Standard microeconomics
teaches that a commodity without rivalry in use should be supplied if the
sum over each individual’s willingness to pay (WTP)equals or exceeds the
total costs (C), i.e. if
∑m
j=1 WTPj ≥ C , with m agents.
Let us assume, that there are a finite number of applications y i ∈ Y ,
i = [1 . . . n], each of which is traded in a different market. We also assume
that
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(i) the owner of the resource can discriminate in price, such that each
agent pays an individual price for the application i denoted by pi
j
and
(ii) each of the n markets is a contestable market, such that the incum-






pij = C , p
i
j ≤W T P ij . (4.8)
This private provision of the resource clearly maximizes welfare.
Optimal provision is also possible for the the rights to use the anti-rival
applications. It is well-known in network theory that ownership can inter-
nalize network effects. Provided that it is possible to price every single plug-
in, network effects can perfectly be internalized by dynamic pricing, i.e. by
individual price discrimination that takes into acount the marginal benefits
of adoption (Liebowitz and Margolis, 2002, 1994; Katz and Shapiro, 1994).
Since optimal internalization requires perfect price discrimination with re-
spect to adoption, each adoption must be traded separately. This can be
applied to any kind of positive feedback mechanism, i.e. to all anti-rival ap-
plications. We therefore conclude that welfare maximizing allocations are
achievable whenever the source code owner can perfectly price discrimi-
nate.
Consider n markets where y is (the applications) are traded and m agents
pay pi
j
≥ 0 for each y i ∈ Y . A price pi
j
= 0 implies that agent j has a zero
WTP for application i and does not buy it.9 Thus, a license agreement is
optimal if it transfers a set of IPRs to agent j that includes all applications
for which the agent would pay a positive price. Recall that X denotes the
resource, and Y denotes the corresponding set of applications, with y i ∈ Y .
8Assuming perfect contestable markets in context of software my be problematic. How-
ever, the argument does not change in the presence of market power. While the mo-
nopolist or oligopolist gains an extra profit, perfect price discrimination ensures that
welfare is maximized in this case also.
9In principle, one could also allow for ‘negative prices’, thus pi
j
< 0. This would imply that
the agent gets paid for activities that yield cumulative benefits, for example. However,
we restrict the analysis to p ≥ 0 for ease of exposition.
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Furthermore, let us denote10 an IPR by h, and a set of IPRs by h j Then the
condition for an optimal license is formally given by
h j : X → {y i | pij > 0}. (4.9)






j , . . . , p
n
j ) · 1
T , (4.10)
where 1T is the transpose of the one-vector.
Based on the foregoing, we see that it is possible to derive the welfare
maximal allocation of non- and anti-rival applications. Furthermore, a per-
fect market with perfect price-discrimination would lead to this allocation.
Based on this, optimal licensee agreements can be defined. This would lead
to an optimal allocation of IPRs.
4.3 The Role of Transaction Costs
In a world with complete information and knowledge rational individuals
would trade each single y ∈ Y . However, transaction costs lead to incom-
plete information and/or knowledge. This explains why property rights are
defined and bundled in license agreements which are then traded. If agents
only know Y ′
i
⊂ Y it makes sense to trade ‘rules’ (i.e. licenses) rather than
single applications. Incomplete knowledge changes the neoclassical stan-
dard market game into a Bayesian market game where agents define, trade
and price the rights based on their subjective expectations of Y . And there
exist Such rights often enable an innovator to appropriate at least some of
the created benefits from a new use of a resource. This provides incentives
to search for innovative usage, and can lead to competition as a discovery
procedure (von Hayek, 1978).
The question that remains is: why does OS software establish? Which
problem of internalization leads to the dichotomy between OSS and CSS?
10We use a simplified right notation based on set theory. See Appendix B for a more detailed
definitions and notation.
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4.3.1 Incomplete Information, Transaction Costs and Limits
of Internalizability
Some transaction costs limit the internalizability of software’s positive ex-
ternal effects. However, we will see that such limits cannot explain the
coexistence of OSS and CSS. We start by exploring network effects and
cumulative effects that produce anti-rivalry.
As already mentioned before, property rights can internalize network
effects. In principle this proposition still holds in a world with transaction
costs, because a new member increases the value of the network once and
only once at the moment of joining. As this ‘plug-in’ is connected to a right
(the right to join the network) and be thus be priced dynamically.
Internalizing positive externalities from the cumulative effects described
in item (v) (p 78) is more complicated. Consider a developer who writes a
certain piece of source code. Suppose further that several users have access
to this code and want to use it as an input for cumulative work. Perfect
internalization requires that the developer can charge each user every time
he or she uses the source code as input or changes it. Obviously, transaction
costs inhibit this internalization, especially for (very) small improvements
and minor changes. This is particularly true for software that is developed
cumulatively developed in a series of small steps.
The knowledge spillovers described in (iii) (p 77) also cannot be per-
fectly internalized. The moment of ‘adoption’ that causes knowledge spill-
overs is hard to observe, and also neither the date nor the frequency of
future value creation is known. The value of the ‘adoption’ is also hard to
evaluate, particularly when the benefits consist of increased skills that may
improve future performance.
Thus, while network effects can be internalized, cumulative effects and
knowledge spillovers cannot because the positive external effects of knowl-
edge spillovers and cumulative effects are hard to observe and measure.
This lack of internalizability leads to too little of the relevant activity as the
social benefit is greater than the private benefit. However, the degree of
this ‘market failure’ is limited. Since individuals can usually form subjec-
tive expectations of future benefits they gain from, for example, consuming
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reference books.11 So this phenomenon cannot solely explain the coexis-
tence OSS and CSS because it is not unique to software markets. Lack of
internalizability exists in many other markets where we do not observe OS
and CS licenses existing side by side.
4.3.2 Ex-Post Transaction Costs and the Problem of Not
Separable Rights
4.3.2.1 The Problem
Obviously no one would claim non-enforceable rights. Suppose than some
rights are enforceable only if they are bundled. This can happen when
rights are formally separable but cannot be enforced in practice if they are
unbundled. The reason are ex post transaction costs.
Consider a software-related example in which IPRs are separable. Soft-
ware can be distributed in machine-readable copy-protected versions that
let users use the code without copying or changing.12 More generally,
Software-IPRs are separable if the applications covered by the right do not
require access to the source code. This is true for the applications described
in item (i) (n+1 copies) and (iv) (network effects).
Before discussing applications that require access to the source code, we
first define non-separable rights. Denote a right which was transferred to
agent j by h j. Let D j = D j(X ) be the set of applications the right holder j
is de facto able to do. The right h j is not separable if the following holds.
Applying the right h j to the resource X yields the set of applications covered
by this right Y h
j
(what j is legally allowed to do). Now, there exist at least
one application y which j is de facto able to do (y ∈ D j) but which is not
covered by the right h j: y /∈ Y hj .
Definition 4.3.1. A right is not separable, if
h j : X −→ Y hj ⊂ D j ⇒ ∃y ∈ D j | y /∈ Y hj . (4.11)
11One can argue that a price of such books includes the expected future gains from knowl-
edge spillovers.
12The existence of so-called pirated software shows that legal and technical copy protection
is imperfect. Nevertheless, the existence of CS business models shows that enforcement
is reasonably effective.
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The applications described in item (ii) (source code as input, p 77), (iii)
(knowledge spillover, p 77), and (v) (cumulativeness, p 78) require access
to the source code. This implies that the corresponding IPRs are de facto
not separable. If one trades single non-separable rights one has to grant
access to the source code which leads to a club of source code users. This can
affect other rights as the source code may be is used in ways not authorized
by the transferred single rights. Club owners normally offer the right to use
(usus) the club-good and retain the right to recover the usus from members
who do not comply with the rules. Here, however, is a de facto ‘dilution
of the property rights’ (Picot et al., 2005, p 47). Formally the original
source code owner can still retain all rights except the usus. As a practical
matter, his rights are diluted because of transaction costs. As the number
of club members increase, control costs rise so hat it is no longer possible
to stop members from using the source code for unauthorized purposes or
reselling it. More formally, transaction costs are a function of the number
of members (m): T C = f (m) with ∂ T C/∂m> 0. Assuming that the resource
owner first trades with the agent offering the highest price, the m agents
are arranged their willingness to pay, returns (R(m)) are a concave function
of club members.13 Figure 4.1 depicts this situation. The optimal number
of members corresponds to the dotted line. If the marginal transaction
costs are high the optimal m can be small and even zero.
Control costs ceteris paribus decrease as the contract becomes less spe-
cific, see Figure 4.2. Transaction costs (TC) decrease with less specificity
and approach to zero in the limit where every possible application is autho-
rized so that it is unnecessary to control.14 The question remains whether
a market for such unspecific licenses can establish and be stable.
The set of realizeable applications (Y tc
i
) of an agent determines her will-
ingness to pay for a completely unspecific contract. The source code owner
could therefore perfectly price discriminate if he would know each Y tc
i
. The
problem of course is that the resource owner does have this information.
Agents have an incentive to claim that their Y tc
i
is smaller than it really is in
order to obtain a smaller price. The owner of the source code might know—
13The argument also holds, if all agents have the same willingness to pay so that R(m) is
linear.
14Note that the argument holds regardless of the transaction cost curve is convex or linear.
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Figure 4.1: Transaction Costs and Limits of Size (Members)
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Y
Figure 4.2: Transaction Costs and Specification of Contract
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or at least have an approximate idea about—the average set of realizeable
and tradeable applications Ȳ tc
i
respectively. He could thus charge an ‘aver-





not to pay this price and drop out the market. This, however, increases the
average set of applications and therefore the average price. Again, some
agents will drop out the market. This yields an adverse selection process.
We have argued above that because of ex-post transaction costs, IPRs
that imply access to source code are de facto not separable. This inhibits
the optimal allocation of the IPRs since selling of non-separable IPRs is
limited. If one wants to transfer non-separable rights, the whole bundle has
to be transferred. Such a non-specific license cannot be sold, but implies
low-to-zero transaction costs.
4.3.2.2 Implications for Licensing: The Case of CSS vs. OSS
Licenses
A software license transfers a set of rights to the user. As usually (see e.g.
Furubotn and Richter, 2005), we distinguish between usus (the right to use
a resource), abusus (the right to change a resource) , usus fructus (the right
to retain the revenues generated by the resource) and the alientation right
(the right to transfer rights of the resource). Existing software licenses can
be classified by the scope of transferred rights (see also Hawkins, 2004, p
107; Böhnlein, 2003, p 19 ff and Nüttgens and Tesei, 2000, p 11): Böhnlein,
2003
• CSS licenses are exclusive because they are based on the principle
of ‘closeness’. The code is ‘closed’, and the user (licensee) typically
receives only the usus and a (perhaps restricted) usus fructus from
the licensor. The alienation right is not transferred or restricted (see
Table 4.1).
• OSS licenses are inclusive since they are based on the principle of
‘openness’. The licensor in principle transfers the whole set of rights
to anybody who wants it (see Table 4.1). However, licenses differ in
the scope of transferred rights. Liberal OSS licenses—like the BSD15
15BSD stands for ‘Berkeley Software Distribution’.
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license—do not restrict the use of the software and the source code
in any way. Restricted OSS licenses—like the GPL16—restrict users’
alienation rights, since the right to redistribute is limited: Any fur-
ther developed software as well any derived work must be licensed
as a whole under the same type of license, if this new code is further
transferred. Hence, it is not true that OSS frees software from prop-
erty law, indeed e.g. the GPL is based on copyright. An OSS license is
a contract that offers everyone all possible rights except for possible
restrictions of the alienation right, which must be considered only at
the time of redistribution.
Table 4.1: The Transfer of Rights of CSS and OSS Licenses
Usus Usus Fructus Abusus Alienation Right
CSS + + - (-)
OSS (restricted license) + + + (+)
OSS (liberal license) + + + +
The coexistence of OSS and CSS licenses can be explained by the the-
ory of non-separable rights: CSS licenses are based on exclusive owner-
ship. Only the separable IPRs are traded, and access to the source code is
blocked. Conversely, OSS licenses offer the complete set of rights, which
is technically mirrored by the access to the source code. Both types of li-
cense imply a particular way to organize production and hence governance
structure.
The question remains whether it is rational to deliberately forgo some
exclusive rights by choosing an OSS license. The next section discusses this
issue for non- and anti-scarce resources.
4.3.2.3 On the Rationality Not to Claim all Rights
In some cases the source code owner may be able to forgo some exclusive
rights without incurring any real costs. After all, real costs of forgoing
rights are (only) the lost revenues from the subset of rights that one could
16The GPL, the ‘GNU General Public License’, is the most famous OSS license.
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actually have sold. Let Y tci ⊂ Y denote the set of applications an agent i
can realize and/or trade Here the superscript tc indicates that the set is
bounded by transaction costs. The subscript i indicates that the set also
depends on individual ‘factors’, like the access certain resources. Thus for
example, a student’s Y tc
i
for a certain source code will usually be smaller
than Microsoft’s Y tc
i
for the same code.
We start by defining the role of IPRs for non-scarce resources. Irrational
envy and stinginess apart, each agent i should always be willing to forgo
those rights where not claiming cause no real costs. This holds if the rights
neither belong to Y tc
i
nor indirectly affect the value of rights y tc ∈ Y tc
i
.
Formally, this is defined by h : X −→
¦
ỹ /∈ Ỹ tc
i
| (∄ y tc ∈ Y tc
i
| ǫ ≤ 0)
©
with ǫ
as the cross-price elasticity of y tc ∈ Y tc
i
regarding ỹ .
All other rights should be claimed. This leads to the definition of the
optimal exclusive IPRs for a non-scarce resource:
Definition 4.3.2. For a non-scarce resource, the rights h that should be
claimed are given by
h: X −→ Ỹ hi =

{ ỹ tci ∈ Ỹ
tc
i } ∪ { ỹ /∈ Ỹ
tc

















This says that exclusive IPRs for a non-scarce resource should be defined
so as to protect (a) all applications agent i can realize and/or trade, and (b)
all applications that are substitutes to any y tc
i
We now discuss ant-scarce applications. The argument for the feedback-
effects is basically the same. The only difference is that it can now be
rational not to claim IPRs in some { ŷ /∈ Ŷ tc
i
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, where the benefits from feedback effects exceed the
costs. Because of definition 4.2.5 (anti-scarcity, p 75) we know that ∀ ŷ |
 
Y new ⊃ Y

, ⇒ ∃Y+ = {Y new \ Y }, ⇒ ŷ → Y+. This leads to the following
definition of optimal exclusive IPRs for an anti-scarce resource:
Definition 4.3.3. In case of an anti-scarce resource, the rights h that should
be claimed are
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Given that some rights are non-separable and that it may sometimes be
rationale not to claim all rights in a non- and anti-scarce resource, both
CSS and OSS licenses are rational. The above definition of optimal defined
IPRs for non- and anti-scarce applications mus therefore be qualified by
the caveat that some rights must remain bundled. Based on this, it may be
rational either to exclusively retain such a bundle of rights, or to forgo the
exclusive claim by choosing OSS. This corresponds to a decision between
two second-best solutions since the first-best allocation (see Section 4.2.3)
cannot be realized.
Thus, OSS is a rational choice, where the lost of exclusive rights either
causes no real costs or the (expected) benefits17 from anti-rival applications
exceeds real costs. Such benefits are more likely where
• the set Ŷ tc
i
is small, and motives like reputation (Lerner and Tirole,
2002), hobby reasons etc. play a substantial role.
• the number of agents is large so that their code use yields significant
cumulative effects.
• agents are able to realize profits by selling goods that are complemen-
tary to the software.





0 is less likely.
4.3.3 Two Solutions: OSS and CSS
Because ex-post transaction costs lead to non-separable rights, individuals
cannot reach first-best IPR-allocation. We have seen that OSS and CSS li-
censees are two pragmatic solutions to this problem. The reasons not to
claim all rights, and—based on this—the individual rationality for OSS or
CSS were explained. Based on the analysis above, we now discuss the
assets and drawbacks of the two different institutional arrangements that
arise from OSS and CSS principles, taking social welfare aspects into ac-
count.
17We do not discuss how, why, and when ‘coordination’ (thus contribution) is a equilibrium
strategy in such OSS-games. For the purpose of this chapter it is sufficient to note that
OSS actually does exist.
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4.3.3.1 The Principle of CSS
In case of CSS, only separable rights are traded. As these rights are sold in
markets the effects of any applications covered by this rights are in principle
internalized.
Of course, also CSS code is used by more than one individual having
access to the source code. Here, the solution to the ‘dilution-of-control’-
problem is to add a governance structure that ensures control based on
exclusive ownership, i.e. build a ‘firm’. This means that the CSS business
strategy is based on maximizing exclusive rights. Firm governance struc-
ture permits software creation through the coordinated effort of employed
developers. This makes direct control possible so that the required input
resources—mainly human capital—are used in an efficient way.
Naturally, there are some hierarchy costs. Because developing software
sometimes involves finding solutions developer effort may not be directly
observable from output for a problem, one may not be able to conclude
directly from the output the effort of the developer. Instead software must
be developed in an principal-agent-structure where the principal defines
certain aims and assembles a programmer team, but can only imperfectly
observe the effort and/or performance of these agents, because of monitor-
ing costs (von Engelhardt and Pasche, 2004, p 9). These and other hier-
archy costs limit the size of a firm. For this reason, firms cannot include
everybody who could potentially contribute. More specifically, it is impos-
sible to write employment contracts with everyone who could theoretically
contribute cumulative activities. This means that CSS firms cannot acquire
all available human capital because search, bargaining and enforcement
costs are too high. Other kinds of contract based relationships are similarly
limited (see p 83) Thus, CSS firms canot reach the theoretically optimal
number of agents who could generate positive effects.
Of course, positive effects are internalized within a CSS firm. The firm
owner can write employment contracts to ensure that he owns not only X
but also X new.18 Furthermore the benefits of knowledge spillovers can also
be internalized so long as the employee work for the firm.
18Such employment contracts contain a paragraph to ensure that all the possible copyrights
are transferred to the company. Thus at the end of the day the employees do not own
any IPRs concerning the source code.
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However, the set of beneficiaries of the positive effects that require access
to the source code remains suboptimally small. Because CSS is only sold in
machine-readable forms (binary code), no one outside the firm has access
to the source code. This is different from the way copyright protection (and
IPR in general) usually works. Normally, IPRs balance ex-ante incentives
to produce by ex-post disclosure of the information (Cowan and Harison,
2001; Quah, 2003, pp 16 f, 19 ff).19 In case of software, the problem of
non-separable rights makes this impossible.
4.3.3.2 The Principle of OSS
OSS licenses are non-specific cooperation contracts designed to attract a
large number of club members, who can then realize benefits from knowl-
edge spillover and cumulative feedback effects. Since OSS licenses are not
limited in time,this cooperation has potentially infinite duration. Anyone
can access and use the source code at any time provided that possible legal
constraints (e.g. see the GPL) are considered.
This implies that OSS maximizes the number of individuals who can cre-
ate positive effects. OSS institutions reinforce and to some extend even
guarantee these cumulative effects. For example licenses like the GPL
force agents to contribute improvements back to the community. Similarly
hacker ethics and community norms that support reciprocal behavior also
foster cumulative effects. Breaking these rules can lead to informal sanc-
tions in which community members stop cooperation or migrate to other
projects (Osterloh et al., 2001, p 16 f). OSS’s ability to involve very large
numbers of participants is, however at least partially offset by underpro-
19Intellectual property law is defined such that it protects the tradeable, hence private in-
ternalizeable effects, but forgoes the rights for the not internalizeable effects. Patents
do not protect the idea itself but its application in form of machine, method or mat-
ter (Besen and Raskind, 1991, p 12). The right to be a temporary monopolist of a
novel technical solution is bundled with the constraint to disclosure the information
that stands behind it: the technological solution has to be described in the patent speci-
fication. Similarly, copyright does not protect the idea itself—the pure information—but
its expression. Thus, with e.g. a copyright protected book the author earns money from
its publication which is a disclosure of the ideas (or: information). With increasing sales
figures, the author earns more money and the ideas of—the information within—that
book diffuse.
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vision since the benefits of participating (the positive effects) are insuffi-
ciently internalized.
OSS licenses also maximize the number of potential beneficiaries, as they
permit everyone to use the source code. Of course, restricted licenses like
the GPL limit this since CSS producers cannot use GPL-protected code as
inputs. However, CSS producers can still read GPL-protected code and
learn from it.
OSS licenses transfer the complete set of rights to everyone. This alloca-
tion of IPRs makes it impossible to divide by rights of the code consumers
from producers, or software developers from coordinators. Instead every-
one holds the complete set of rights of the source code.20 OSS projects are
clear structured, they are typically organized according to an ‘onion layer’
model (Jensen and Scacchi, 2007; Crowston et al., 2006; Wendel de Joode
et al., 2003, pp 18,19). The first, outmost layer consists of passive users.
In the second layer consists of active users who write bug-reports, test new
pre-releases. Layer by layer, the degree of involvement and responsibility
increases, see also Figure 1.1, p 13. Community rules govern how partici-
pants can move from the outermost layer into the core of the project based
on their proven skills and reliability. At the core, so-called core developers
oversee the design and evolution of the project. The core developers have
certain privileges that enable them to control the evolution of the project.
This control is enforced through passive control rights, i.e. the exclusive
right to decide whether or not to accept contributions (McGowan, 2001;
Wendel de Joode et al., 2003, p 20). These passive control rights are en-
forced through exclusive ownership of the database in which the software
is stored and legal control of the project’s trademarked name.21 This pre-
vents cloning of projects and protects the signaling function of the project’s
name.
Despite these pasive control rights and further governance mechanism
(see de Laat, 2007) it is reasonable to think that OSS projects have higher
coordination costs than CSS firms. Openness and in particular, inclusive
20Restricted OSS licensees limit the alienation right for everyone, so all hold the same
amount of limited alienation right.
21For example, Linux is a trademark of Linus Torvalds, Apache is a trademark of The Apache
Software Foundation, KDE and K Desktop Environment logo are registered trademarks
of KDE e.V.
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licenses can lead to coordination problems like forking22 or failure to agree
on standards. Additionally, OSS governance principles emphasize consen-
sus (Brand and Schmid, 2005), which creates a danger of ‘never ending’
discussions and other consensus finding costs.
4.3.3.3 The Coexistence of OSS and CSS
OSS and CSS have complementary strength and drawbacks: OSS has weak-
nesses where CSS has strengths, and vice versa. This is true on both the
individual and social levels.
Thus, the coexistence of OSS and CSS can be explained by the fact that
different individuals with different sets of tradeable rights and resources
need different institutions. Furthermore, the coexistence of OSS and CSS
also promote social welfare. On the one hand, CSS is better in using the
acquired resources efficiently namely via direct control internalizing the
positive effects. This makes CSS a particularly efficient vehicle for develop-
ing user-friendly innovations e.g. plug-and-play, easy installation routines
and ‘nice’ graphical user interfaces. CSS also has important advantages
for radical innovations because it can internalize benefits from paradigm
changes. On the other hand, OSS integrates more human capital and cre-
ates spillovers for more individuals. This gives it significant competitive
advantage for developing incremental technical and user innovations (von
Hippel and von Krogh, 2003; von Hippel, 2005).
These effects could complement each other. For this case, coexisting
OSS and CSS institutions would be welfare optimal, see for example von
Engelhardt and Swaminathan (2008). The conditions under which this
‘optimal’ OSS-CSS mix occurs is beyond the scope of this chapter.
4.4 Summary and Outlook
Based on the example of software, the present chapter examines the ratio-
nale for OS and CS from a property rights perspective. Our findings can be
summarized as follows:
22Forking occurs when projects split into multiple incompatible projects because of partici-
pants’ divergent goals.
92
4 Intellectual Property Rights and Ex-Post Transaction Costs
1.) The economic characteristics of software, i.e. a source code, make it
a non-scarce and anti-scarce resource. Absent transaction costs it is
possible to define and trade licenses that optimally allocate IPRs of
non- and anti-rival applications.
2.) Some IPRs are non-separable because of ex-post transaction costs. In
particular, IPRs that require access to source code cannot be unbun-
dled. This means that the first-best allocation of IPRs that would yield
an optimal source code usage cannot be realized. For this reason a
first-best realization of contracts is not feasible.
3.) Because of transaction costs, the set of individuals who can contract
with one another without a de facto dilution of ownership (i.e. the
‘club of source code users’) is limited. This limits detailed contract-
ing. Non-specific licenses have lower transaction costs and can reach
more individuals.
4.) It is rational to forgo some rights in a non- and anti-scarce resource
where (a) no real costs are incurred, (b) feedback mechanisms de-
liver benefits that exceed the real costs, or (c) both. The net-benefits
(payoff) from feedback mechanisms are ceteris paribus higher where
more profits can be earned by selling goods and services that are com-
plementary to the software. Of course, this is true for non-separable
rights as well.
5.) Rights that cannot be separated must stay are bundled. Economic
agents must therefore choose whether or not exclusively assert own-
ership over the entire bundle or not. CSS only trades the separa-
ble rights. Here, production takes place in firms based on exclusive
ownership of the source code. OSS minimizes these ownership re-
strictions in favor of unspecific contracts that permit the transfer of
bundled rights.
6.) Based on this we can derive a more general statement regarding OS
and CS principles. OS and CS principles are likely to occur and be suc-
cessful if the following holds. There exist an anti-scarce resource23
23Non-scarcity is of less importance here. The crucial point for the dynamics of OSS devel-
opment are the feedback-effects, the cumulative effects.
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where some property rights covering anti-scarce applications are non-
separable. Here agents have to choose whether to keep the entire
bundled rights (CS principle) or forgo them (OS principle). In case
of the latter, control mechanisms can be based on exclusively hold
trademarks and community norms.
Both OS and CS are rational choices. Agents will usually decide based
on the individual costs and benefits of each alternative depending on
the individual’s set of tradeable applications/rights, expected feed-
back effects, individual resources and the ability to earn profits from
complementary products.
7.) From a social welfare perspective OS and CS (software) are both
second-best arrangements each of which offers specific benefits and
drawbacks. The CS principle benefits from direct (monetary) incen-
tives and control, but has limited scope (size) because of transaction
costs. OSS benefits from spillovers and takes advantage of human
capital that CSS firms cannot acquire. However, this same openness
can also lead to coordination costs (consensus finding), free riding,
underprovision, and forking. Since both IPR regimes are imperfect,
the coexistence of OS and CS can be welfare optimal.
The analysis presented in this chapter also suggests some further re-
search questions: How do the ‘passive control rights’ in detail work and
are they efficient? This might be analyzed with a formal model of passive
control. The rationale for OS and CS principles is developed based on the
example of software. What can this framework tell about e.g. the case of
OS biotechnology? Under which conditions is an OS-CS mix welfare op-
timal? Will such optimal mixes occur, and/or be stable? How can firms’
decisions between OS- and CS-based business models be analyzed in a sim-
ple way? The next two chapters deal with some of these questions. We
will focus on the strategic nature of OS vs. CS business models and analyze
welfare of industries with OS and CS firms.
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5.1 Introduction∗
Over the last years, more and more firms have begun to use OS-based busi-
ness models and develop OS software. In a recent article, Deshpande and
Riehle (2008) use automated web searches to compile a worldwide cen-
sus of OS projects (Figure 5.1). Within their representative sample they
report exponential growth from about 500 projects in 2001 to 4,500 in
2007. Strikingly, much of this growth appears to be commercially moti-
vated, i.e. depends on substantial backing from corporations that expect
to see a dollars-and-cents return on their investment. Within this category,
the great majority of projects involve a shared code base that no single
company owns or controls.1 Each company then extracts benefits by selling
complementary products that use this shared code. In practice, these prod-
ucts are very diverse and can include physical hardware (e.g. servers, cell
phones), software (applications programs) and services (education, cus-
tomization services) (Riehle, personal communication).
This chapter focus on the incentives of profit-oriented firms developing
OS vs. CS code. Unlike traditional joint venture partners, OS collabora-
tors have no formal obligation to contribute any particular level of effort
to these projects. Instead, companies must continuously balance the cost-
savings from shared code development against the risk that they will make
their competitors’ products more desirable. This is true not just for OSS but
for all of OS business models. We explore the first general differentiated
∗This Chapter is based on von Engelhardt (2010)
1Survey research has similarly detected a secular shift in OS motivations away from
hobbyist-based production to a culture dominated by paid professionals working on
company time (Ghosh et al., 2002a,b).
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Figure 5.1: Total Number of Open Source Projects
(Source: Deshpande and Riehle, 2008)
Cournot model in which firms invest in shared OS or private CS code to
increase the quality (and profitability) of bundles containing a proprietary
good. We discuss the role of OS license-type and the strategic nature of OS
vs. CS business models
5.2 Previous Research and the Contribution of this
Chapter
Contrary to the rich empirical research,2 there is less theoretical work on
OS vs. CS business models, mostly limited to duopoly cases:
Baake and Wichmann (2004) analyze a duopoly-model where firms that
can publish parts of their software as OS. Publishing code leads to posi-
tive spillovers i.e. reduce the firms’ coding costs, but induce higher coding
expenditures and thus decreases the firms’ profits if their programs are sub-
2See the literature overview in Section 1.3.4.
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stitutes. Additionally, it encourages entry and increases the expenditures
required to deter entry. They find that both firms invest in OS to increase
the quality and profitability of their respective CS products. However, each
company must also increase the quality of its CS product to retain its cus-
tomers. This effect is even stronger when the CS products compete with
OS code and/or companies deliberately keep CS quality (and development
costs) high to deter entry. Though intriguing, these results are limited to
the duopoly case. Baake and Wichmann also make the very special as-
sumption that OS costs rise faster than CS costs. Verani (2006) presents
a Bertrand-duopoly model in which companies invest in either OS or CS
software and then build products that use it. She finds that firms invest
more when their products are substitutes, and that this effort is greater
when OS software is used. Schmidtke (2006) analyzes OS business models
in a non-differentiated Cournot oligopoly. Firms produce a homogeneous
private good (e.g. a computer server) and invest in the quality of a homo-
geneous public good (OS software). He finds that increasing the number
of firms in the market promotes welfare. The effects on each firm’s output,
prices, and profits depend on the slope of the marginal costs of software
development.
Henkel’s 2006 “Jukebox Mode of Innovation” uses a duopoly model to ex-
plore the case of embedded Linux. Crucially, Henkel assumes that all tech-
nologies are developed in-house without shared production of any kind;
firms can, however, share costs by disclosing completed technologies to
one another. Given this set-up, Henkel finds that each OS firm concen-
trates on developing whichever technology is most valuable to its business
and copies the other technology from its rival. This creates a dynamic in
which each company specializes in and controls the technology it values
most so that total industry technology spending is biased upward. Henkel
finds that OS industries deliver more technology and higher profits pro-
vided that firms do not compete too strongly with one another. However,
these advantages disappear where both firms’ products receive the same
quality-increment from each technology. In this case, OS firms are reluc-
tant to make their competitors stronger and therefore invest less than CS
firms. Furthermore, firms are most likely to choose OS business models
when competition is low, and each firm’s technology needs are different.
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Finally, two recent papers, Llanes and de Elejalde (2009) and Casadesus-
Masanell and Llanes (2009), provide models in the tradition of Hotelling’s
model. Both models feature a continuum of consumers value the available
products diferent, i.e. have heterogeneous tastes. Furthermore, each con-
sumer buys just one package (bundle) or nothing. In Casadesus-Masanell
and Llanes (2009) consumers consume software and a complementary ser-
vice. The software is further segmented into a core program which con-
sumers can use as a free-standing unit, and extensions which are valueless
without the core unit. They then examine how firms decide whether to
develop one or both software components as OS or CS. Three cases are
considered here: a monopoly, a firm vs. non-profit OS project, and duopoly.
They find, inter alia, that firms are more willing to open modules when
(a) consumer demand for the complementary good is strong, and (b) the
quality of OS software is boosted by exogenous user innovation at no cost.
Llanes and de Elejalde (2009) similarly consider a model in which each firm
sells packages consisting of a primary good (which can be OS or CS) and
a complementary private good. Consumers have idiosyncratic preferences
so that they usually favor one firm’s private good over others. However,
rival firms can overcome this preference by investing in a technology that
simultaneously increases the quality of both the primary good and also the
complement. Llanes and DeElejalde present a two stage model in which a
predetermined number of firms (a) decide whether to produce OS or CS in
the primary good, and then (b) simultaneously decide the quality/price of
the bundle thats they will offer to consumers. They find that when most
of the bundle’s value comes from the primary good OS firms find it hard
to appropriate profits from their investment in an open complement. This
leads to outcomes in which a small number of firms choose CS and capture
most of the market by delivering high quality code; the other firms become
OS and deliver comparatively low quality code at a low price. However,
this situation changes where consumers value the complement roughly as
much as the primary. In this case, the cost advantage of code-sharing domi-
nates so that all firms choose to become OS even though a hypothetical CS
firm would produce higher quality software. This (theoretical) CS quality
advantage reflects OS firms’ limited ability to recover quality gains from
consumers. The advantage disappears in cases where most of the bundle’s
value comes from the complementary good.
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Despite these contributions much remains to be done. In particular, there
is still no simple but general theoretical analysis of the necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for OS production by profit seeking firms, and for the
coexistence of firms with CS- versus OS-based business models (mixed in-
dustry). The model of this chapter aims to fill this gap. We provide a
general analysis of the economics of OS vs. CS business models. This anal-
ysis includes strategic aspects, the role of OS license types, impacts of the
non-commercial community (e.g. the hobbyists), and industry equilibria.
Because we use a general oligopoly model, we are able to adress a broad
range of possible situations from duopoly with completely separated mar-
kets to perfect competition (infinite number of firms, perfect substitutes).
Although the model is inspired by, and refers to, software, it analyzes the
‘economics of commercial open source’ in a general way, and can be readily
applied to other examples like ‘OS biology’.
As already mentioned, OS business models combine commonly devel-
oped code with individually produced and sold complements. For this rea-
son, the underlying strategic logic corresponds to a R&D cooperation with-
out explicit contracts. In order to analyze the economics of such contract-
free collaborations, we develop an oligopoly model where firms can do OS,
or CS, or both. This places our model in tradition of (non-)cooperative
R&D models, most prominently represented by the work of d’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988). But different to the cases analyzed by research on
(non)-cooperative R&D (e.g. see de Bondt (1997) for an overview) firms’
choices between OS and CS determine whether ‘spillovers’ exists or not.
However, note that regardless of whether CS or OS (or a mix) is chosen,
firms’ actions are always non-cooperative.
Contract-free OS collaborations can include firms from different markets.
For example, several firms use Linux for many different products (see Sec-
tion 1.2.3). It is therefore important to build a model that allows for hor-
izontal product differentiation. Our the model is thus based on the theory
of differentiated oligopoly/duopoly proposed by Dixit (1979) and further
developed e.g. by Singh and Vives (1984) and Häckner (2000).
We will also analyze the impact of an important institution on the game:
the OS license. Different OS projects use different types of licenses (see
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also Section 4.3.2.2). For example, so-called public licenses, like the BSD3
license, do not restrict the use of the software and the source code in any
way and thus allows developers to use OS code as input for CS code devel-
opment. We will call these liberal licenses. Other licenses are more restric-
tive. One famous example is the GPL4. This license claims that any further
developed software as well any derived work must also be licensed as a
whole under the same license. This type of clause is designed to ensure
that OS code stays ‘open’. We will call licenses that prohibit OS-CS mixed
code restricted licenses.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.3 intro-
duces the basic model. Since the model is a two-stage game we will solve
it by backward induction Section 5.4 solves stage two and Section 5.5 an-
alyzes firms’ stage one OS and CS decisions for both liberal and restricted
OS licenses. Section 5.6 focus on mixed industries. We calculate the equi-
librium ratios of CS and OS firms assuming free entry and exit. Section 5.7
summarizes our findings and provides directions for further research.
5.3 Firms and Closed Source vs. Open Source
Business Models: The Basic Model Setup
In many markets, software is sold bundled with complementary products
like service (maintenance, individualizing) or hardware. Here firms make
money with business models that are based on CS or OS, mixed CS-OS
code. The basic principle of open source business models is therefore to
develop OS code together with other firms or community members, and
then earn revenue with selling the (bundled) complements. This means
combining a public good and a private good. It also means combining
non-cooperative R&D (OS firms do not have an explicit contract with each
other) with oligopolistic competition where products can be vertically dif-
ferentiated (quality) and horizontally differentiated.
Consider, therefore, a market with n ≥ 2 firms. One arbitrary firm is
denoted by i, with i ∈ N = {1,2, . . . , n}. Each firm i ∈ N produces some
3BSD stands for Berkeley Software Distribution
4The GPL (GNU General Public License) is the most popular OS license.
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quantity of a horizontal differentiated product, and develops complemen-
tary software. Depending on the OS license this software is OS or CS code,
or, in case of liberal licenses, an OS-CS mix. The software and product are
then sold as bundle qi. Firm i’s software determines the quality of its bun-
dle qi, i.e. differences in software lead to vertical product differentiation.
We therefore need a utility function that enables us to take into account
horizontal and vertical product differentiation. There are two common ap-
proaches in the literature. One version proposed by Sutton (1997, p 618)
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A second version introduced by Dixit (1979) for the duopoly case and gen-
eralized by Häckner (2000) and Hsu and Wang (2005) to the oligopoly
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In both cases, I is the composite good with its price normalized to one.
The parameter γ ∈ [0,1] is an inverse measure of the horizontal product
differentiation i.e., γ indicates the (horizontal) substitutability between the
different products with γ= 1 for perfect substitutes. The parameters αi and
vi each represent the quality level of the bundle, such that vertical product
differentiation is expressed by different αs and vs. In practice both types of
utility function lead to similar results in our model.5 We will use the second
one, i.e. function (5.2) in what follows.
We consider a two-stage game that combines competition in quantities
with quality-competition/cooperation. This means that firms make separa-
ble decisions about both quantity and quality (via software). As we will
show, the decision to develop OS instead of CS code amounts to a decision
to cooperate on quality instead of competition.
5See p 103 including the footnote 8.
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1.) In stage one, firms decide whether and how much to invest in soft-
ware development. Hence, they choose their optimal amount of OS
or CS. Since software determines quality, stage one represents a qual-
ity decision. We analyze stage one under both liberal and restricted
licenses.
2.) In stage two oligopolistic competition takes place. The firms produce
their ‘stage two’-products,6 bundle it with their ‘stage one’-software,
and compete à la Cournot. This means, in stage two profit-maximizing
quantities are defined.
The game will be solved by backward induction. We start in the next
section by solving stage two. We then analyze stage one in Section 5.5.
5.4 Stage Two: Quantity Decisions
Stage two features oligopolistic quantity competition between firms, where
product-bundles are horizontally and vertically differentiated. Without loss
of generality, we normalize the marginal cost of the ‘stage two’-product
to zero. Fixed costs of ‘stage two’-products are given by C .7 Firms seek
maxqi πi = piqi − ci − C , where pi = αi − qi − γ
∑
j 6=i q j is the inverse
demand function derived from the utility function (5.2), and ci are the
software development costs incurred in stage one.
The resulting equilibrium prices and quantities of this differentiated oli-
gopoly are given by:


















6Note that the ‘stage two’-product can be non-shared software. The bundle then consists
of ‘stage one’-software plus ‘stage two’-software. For example a ‘Premium Version’ of
the ‘stage one’-software. For simplicity we will reserve the word ‘software’ for stage one
code whether or not the stage two product also consists of software.
7If the ‘stage two’-product is also software, C represents the software development costs,
i.e. the so-called first copy costs of this ‘stage-two’-software. See also footnote 6, p 102
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This revenue function closely resembles the revenue function we would
achieve by using the utility function V (function (5.1), p 101).8
We have introduced the variables θ and h because they will be conve-
nient for interpreting our results later on. As already mentioned the model
combines quantity competition (Cournot) with quality competition/coop-
eration. The measure h = 2 + γ(n − 1) indicates the degree of quantity
competition, and depends on the number of competitors weighted by the
degree of substitution. (The expression 2+ γ(n− 1) is the typical denomi-
nator of differentiated Cournot model.) Second, θ = γ/(2−γ) indicates how
much differences in quality affect each firm’s revenue. For this reason, θ
indicates degree of quality competition and hence measures the incentive
to compete rather than to cooperate on quality. Together h and θ allow
us to separates the effects of a change of γ. For example, dγ > 0 has (a)
a negative impact on revenues, since a firm’s revenue ceteris paribus de-
crease with an increase in h, and (b) a positive impact on a firm’s revenue
provided that the firm has an advantage in quality.
5.5 Stage One: Quality Decisions
Firm i’s ‘stage one’-software has a direct impact on the quality of the bundle,
i.e. on αi. Let αi = β + x i. The parameter β > 0 captures the ‘stage
two’-product’s quality (e.g. the quality of the hardware of a mobile phone).
8 On p 633 Deroian and Gannon (2006) derive a revenue function based on the utility
function (5.1) given by 2S

ui (σ(n− 2) + 4)−σ
∑
j 6=i u j
2
(4−σ)−2 (σ (n− 1) + 4)−2,
in their notation. Considering this expression our notation requires us to replace σ by
2γ and replace ui by αi . The result only differs from the revenue function of our model
by the term ½S. Deroian & Gannon denote with S the number of consumers. Since S
represents the size of the market the two expressions differ solely in the level of returns.
(If we normalize S = 2, the two revenue functions become equal.) The fact that the two
utility functions lead to similar outcomes has been noted by for example Symeonidis
(2003, p 42, Appendix A).
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Furthermore, x i is the software firm i can use for its bundle. For the sake of
simplicity, the impact of ‘stage one’-software (x i) on αi is modeled linearly
with an upper boundary αi ∈ [0, ᾱ] that yields a cutoff
_
x (Figure 5.2). This
feature is needed to ensure that software development cannot shift αi, and
hence demand, to infinity.9





In line with the literature, we assume that software development faces
increasing marginal costs as the code base becomes more complex. Since
software is in some sense a ‘logical machine’, and the more sophisticated
a software program becomes, the more complex the whole system gets.
Modern software development is far more than just writing lines of code,
and also consists of finding and fixing mistakes (bugs). Hence the costs
of software development consists not only of code-writing but also of bug-
avoiding (ex-post designing, coordination and control), bug-finding and
bug-fixing costs. Since complexity of modern software rises non-linearly
we expect marginal costs to increase (see also von Engelhardt, 2008a, p 14
ff).
9The quality function we use can be interpreted as an approximation to a logistic function.
Since we assume that firms never develop more that
_
x , the quality function can also be
interpreted as an approximation to an inverse U-shaped function.
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We therefore use a function that reflects the conventional computer sci-
ence wisdom (Brooks’ Law) that software costs scale quadratically (Brooks,
1982). Let φ > 0 denote the slope of the marginal costs, and x denote the
software code,10 then the total costs are given by c(x) = 1
2
·φ · x2. The total
costs are independent of whether the code is OS or CS. (Clearly, OS firms
share the total costs.) Thus, OS has no inherent cost advantage over CS.
This assumption seems justified given scholars’ rudimentary knowledge of
this subject (Koch, 2004; Asundi, 2005).11 A firm that develops CS code
bears the total costs of xcs
i








that develops OS code is able to share costs with other OS developing firms
or members of the community. Depending on its own contribution (xos
i
),
the firm bears only a fraction k of the total OS costs. Let X os denote the total
OS code. Since the firm bears only that fraction that is caused by its own de-
velopment xos
i
, i.e. k = xosi /X os, its costs are ci(x
os
i





All other costs, (1− k) · c(X os), are borne by the other OS developing firms
and members of the community. Furthermore, this latter holds indepen-
dently whether the firm develops only OS or mixes OS and CS code. This
implies that the cost function of a firm i that develop OS and CS code is























In summary code development has both benefits (positive impact on αi ,
and hence revenues) and costs. Clearly, a firm’s decision to develop OS
rather than CS code will affect these costs and benefits. The OS method
is a collaborative way of developing and using coded, digital goods. While
the principle of CS is based on private costs and benefits, the OS principle
implies sharing of both costs and benefits:
• Costs: OS code is jointly developed code. This implies cost sharing,
including complexity costs. (It follows that the marginal costs of OS
development are smaller than the marginal costs of CS.)
• Benefits: OS code is jointly used. This implies benefit sharing since all
firms who use the OS code benefit from its impact on quality. Choos-
10Note that this notation captures qualitative and quantitative aspects of the software.
Thus, a higher value of x indicates ‘more’ and ‘better’ functions.
11Some commentators have argued that OS is inherently cheaper to develop than CS soft-
ware (Raymond, 1998). The current model could be readily extended to cover such
scenarios if and when they are confirmed.
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ing to develop OS code therefor implies a decision to cooperate rather
than to compete on quality. For CS code the opposite holds.
These two aspects determine whether OS or CS is more attractive. They
are also strongly influenced by an important institution: the type of OS
license. We will see that this institutional difference matters, especially in
cases where firms are the only potential OS contributors so that no (non-
commercial) OS community exists.
5.5.1 Liberal vs. Restricted OS Licenses
We distinguish two types of OS licenses. Liberal licenses permit to mix OS
with CS code. Restricted licenses prohibit any mixing of OS and CS code at
the level of ‘stage one’-software:12
• Liberal licenses let firms mix OS and CS code. Thus, αi is given by



























• Restricted licenses force firms to choose between OS and CS. This sep-
arates firms into OS firms and CS firms. Denote the number of OS
firms by z and the number of CS firms by r so that r+z = n Similarly






if i ∈ R (CS firm)
β + xos
i
+ X os−i if i ∈ Z (OS firm),
(5.6)

















if i ∈ Z (OS firm).
(5.7)
12The prohibition to mix affects stage one! Bundling OS software with ‘stage two’-CS
software is possible.
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Firms maximize profits πi = pi · qi − ci − C with respect to xosi and/or
xcs
i
. Firms operating under liberal licenses decide their optimal investment
for both OS and CS code. The resulting reaction functions for firm i’s OS









































Because of the liberal licenses firm i’s OS and CS are substitutes i.e. ∂ Rcsi /∂ xosi <
0 and ∂ Rosi /∂ xcsi < 0, with |∂ Rcsi /∂ xosi | ≥ |∂ Rosi /∂ xcsi |.
We obtain the following reaction functions for the OS firms and the CS





























φh2 − (1+ rθ)2
. (5.11)
Regarding the second order conditions (SOCs), the following holds: The
SOC for CS development is the same for liberal and restricted licenses and
given by φ > φcssoc with φ
cs
soc =
2(1+(n−1)θ )2/h2. The SOC for OS development
is given by φ > φossoc with for liberal licenses φ
os
soc =
2/h2, and for restricted
licenses φossoc = 2(1+rθ )
2
/h2. This implies that φcssoc > φ
os
soc. As usually done,
we assume in the following that each of the SOCs is fulfilled. (Otherwise
“more code’ is always better so hat firms’ output would reach the cutoff
_
x)
5.5.2 The Strategic Nature of CS Decisions and OS Decisions
Bulow et al. (1985) introduced the concept of strategic complements and
substitutes. Decisions of players are strategic substitutes if they mutually
inhibit one another. Decisions are strategic complements if the reverse is
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true. We will see that OS and CS differ from another along this dimension.
We will express this with the elasticities. CS decisions are strategic sub-
stitutes since optimal CS development always decreases when other firms
supply more code: Ecscs = ∂ x
cs
i /∂ xcsj · xcsj /xcsi < 0. However, optimal OS reaction
to other player’s OS output can either be positive or a negative. If the slope
of the marginal costs φ is below a certain threshold, decisions about OS
are decisions in strategic substitutes, i.e. Eosos = ∂ x
os
i /∂ xosj · xosj /xosi > 0. This
also holds for OS code contributed by non-commercial members of the OS
community. We will call such contributions ‘community-code’ and denote it
with xosnc, with “nc” for “non-commercial”. Of course, E
os
nc =
∂ xos/∂ xosnc · xosnc/xos
can also be greater than zero. Finally, the positive feedbacks between the
OS players can be very strong. In particular, ∂ Rosi /∂ xosj > 1 leads to a sym-
metric Nash-equilibrium where the OS developing firms together develop
the cutoff
_
x . These results can be formally stated as follows:
Proposition 5.5.1. CS decisions are strategic substitutes: E cscs < 0.
Proof. Given the second order condition is fulfilled, then it is true that
∂ Rcs
i /∂ xcsj < 0, which also implies E
cs
cs < 0.
Proposition 5.5.2. OS decisions are strategic substitutes (Eosos < 0, E
os
nc < 0)
if and only if φ > 2 ·φossoc, otherwise strategic complements (Eosos > 0, Eosnc > 0).
Proof. If the SOC is fulfilled, ∂ Rosi /∂ xosj < 0 and ∂ R
os
i /∂ xosnc < 0 are true only
for φ > 2φossoc, otherwise is ∂ R
os
i /∂ xosj > 0 and ∂ R
os
i /∂ xosnc > 0. Thus E
os
os < 0,
Eosnc < 0 for φ > 2 ·φossoc. Otherwise Eosos > 0, Eosnc > 0.
Proposition 5.5.3. For φ < φos_
x
there exists a symmetric Nash-equilibrium
of OS development such that X os =
_
x.







= n/(n+1) · 2φossoc in the case of liberal licenses, and (b) φos_x = z/(z+1) ·
2φossoc in the case of restricted licenses. This means that ∂ R
os
i /∂ xosj > 1 for
all φ < φos_
x
, i.e. that OS players react positive to each other with a factor
greater than one. Intuitively, the positive strategic interplay of OS is so
strong that the players push each other to an upper corner solution equi-
librium where the total OS code development reaches the cutoff X os =
_
x .
Symmetry implies that each OS firms in this Nash-equilibrium develops the
same fraction of
_
x . See also Figure C.2 in Appendix C
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Proposition 5.5.3 has the following intuition: If φ < φossoc then develop-
ing more OS code is always better regardless of what the other OS play-
ers do. The reason is the relatively low slope of the marginal costs. For




developing more OS code is still better but now because
of what the other OS players do. This positive feedback among players cre-
ates strong incentives to cooperate and shifts the ‘more OS code is always
better’ region upwards. Analyzing this boundary provides insight into the
strategic interaction among OS firms. Depending on the type of license,
φos_
x
is equal n/(n+1) · 4/h2 or z/(z+1) · 4(1+rθ )2/h2. Recall that h = 2+ (n− 1)γ
and θ = γ/(2−γ) where θ indicates the incentives to compete on quality. If
licenses are restricted then the OS firms cooperate on quality among each
other but compete on quality with CS firms. Therefore an increase of γ—
which implies an increase of θ—has a positive impact on the incentives to
develop more OS software through the term (1+ rθ)2. At the same time,
dγ > 0 implies dh > 0 and thus reduces incentives to develop more OS
simply because of increased competition. Finally the total number of firms
in the industry has an ambiguous impact on incentives to develop OS soft-
ware. On the one hand an increase in n and z yields dh> 0. On the other
hand, if more firms develop OS code then then each individual firm has to
contribute less to reach any given level of total OS output. This is expressed
by n/(n+1), and z/(z+1) respectively.
For X os =
_
x our model’s results depend on the exogenously given
_
x . We
therefore concentrate on situations where φ is high enough to ensure that
total OS code does not reach the cutoff in what follows.
5.5.3 OS and CS in Case of Liberal Licenses
In this section we analyze the case of liberal licenses. In this context, the
community-code plays the following role. Since liberal license permit mixed
OS-CS code, code from the non-commercial OS community (xosnc) directly
impacts on both OS and CS development by firms. If there is enough
community-code, firms do not develop any further software since they re-
ceive everything needed “for free”. Recall that in case of liberal licenses
all firms can develop OS code. Here xosnc also has a second effect. If the
firms’ markets are sufficiently separated they develop OS code whether or
not community-code exists. For high θ however, firms will only produce OS
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code if xosnc exceeds some threshold As we will see, firms contribute OS code
only if θ < 1/(n+1) for the case of xosnc = 0. The reason is that for θ < 1/(n+1)
quality competition is low. Since the substitutability (γ) is low, the firms’
markets are sufficiently separated so that incentives to compete on quality
are weak which makes quality cooperation more attractive. On the other
hand, incentives to compete on quality are higher when θ > 1/(n+1). In
this case firms will only participate in shared OS development if volunteers
supply enough xosnc > 0. Given enough community-code the cost-sharing
benefits of OS development are strong enough to ensure firm participation
when θ > 1/(n+1).13 However, the positive effect of xosnc on commercial OS
is limited. When θ > 1/(n−1), firms never develop OS code. Thus for large
numbers of firms there are virtually no situations where firms produce OS
code under liberal licenses, whether or not xosnc > 0 (see also Section 5.6.1).
These results can be formally stated as follows:
Proposition 5.5.4. A symmetric Nash-equilibrium exists in which firms only
develop CS (x cs∗ > 0, xos∗ = 0) if and only if the conditions xosnc < β(1+(n−1)θ )/η
and xosnc <
β2θ (n−1)/η are fulfilled, where η = 1
2
φh2 − (1+ (n− 1)θ).
Proof. If all firms develop only CS code, then xos
i
= 0∀i ∈ N and therefore
the symmetric solution of the CS reaction functions—see (5.8)—is given
by
xcs∗ =
β (1+ (n− 1)θ)
1
2
φh2 − (1+ (n− 1)θ)
− xosnc.
Here, xcs∗ is greater zero only if xosnc < β(1+(n−1)θ )/η.
14 Moreover, the op-
timal amount of OS must be zero to ensure that (xos = 0, xcs > 0) is
an equilibrium. Setting the symmetric solution obtained from OS reac-
tion function (5.9) with X cs−i = (n− 1) · xcs
∗ and xcs
i
= xcs∗ equal to zero
delivers the boundary xosnc = β2θ (n−1)/η. For values below this boundary
optimal OS is zero. Taking these conditions together we conclude that a
Nash-equilibrium with xcs∗ > 0, xos∗ = 0 only exists for xosnc that satisfy
xosnc <
β(1+(n−1)θ )/η and xosnc < β2θ (n−1)/η.
13In some sense the non-commercial community resembles a firm that develops code but
does not compete with the other firms. This ‘firm’ has an ‘individual’ γ = 1, and thus
θ = 0. Thus this ‘firm’ depresses the average θ so that it is again below the threshold.
14Otherwise firms do not develop CS as there is no incentive to do so because enough code
is delivered by the non-commercial community.
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Proposition 5.5.5. A symmetric Nash-equilibrium exists in which firms only







, where η = 1
2
φh2 − (1+ (n− 1)θ).
Proof. If all firms develop only OS, then xcs
i
= 0∀i ∈ N and the symmetric

















First, xos∗ has to be greater zero. If φ < 2φossoc (strategic complements)
then xcs∗ > 0 ∀xosnc. Otherwise xos







the optimal amount of CS must be zero to ensure that (xos > 0, xcs = 0)
is an equilibrium. Setting the symmetric solution obtained from the CS
reaction function (5.8) with X os−i = (n − 1) · xos∗ + xosnc and xosi = xos
∗
equal to zero delivers the boundary xosnc = β((n+1)θ−1)(n−1)/η. Taking both
conditions together we find that a Nash-equilibrium with xcs∗ = 0, xos∗ > 0







Notice that in both cases code-output falls when quantity competition
(h) increases. Hence ∂ xcs/∂ h < 0 and ∂ xos/∂ h < 0. The reason is that strong
quantity competition limits the appropriability of quality investments in
any case. Furthermore, while CS output reacts to the degree of quality
competition (∂ xcs/∂ θ > 0), the OS-only case does not depend on θ . The
reason is that OS firms cooperate on quality: they avoid quality competition
through code-sharing. Finally, the OS function also reflects the cost-sharing





Proposition 5.5.6. A symmetric Nash-equilibrium exists in which the firms
develop OS and CS (x cs∗ > 0, xos∗ > 0) if and only if β((n+1)θ−1)(n−1)/η <
xosnc <
β2θ (n−1)/η, where η = 1
2
φh2 − (1+ (n− 1)θ).
Proof. Optimal CS and OS output are given by the reaction functions (5.8)
and (5.9). Furthermore, symmetry guaranties that ∀i: xos
i
= xos and
15If xosnc exceeds this level, then there is so much community code that firms do not have
any incentives to develop any further code.
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xcs
i
= xcs in equilibrium. Reciprocal substitution then leads to the following
solutions for (5.8) and (5.9):
xcs∗ =
β (1− (n+ 1)θ)
1
2












Using the non-negativity constraints xcs∗>0 and xos∗>0 we arrive at the




Proposition 5.5.7. If θ > 1/(n−1) any software development by firms is en-
tirely CS.
Proof. For the case θ > 1/(n−1) we find that β((n+1)θ−1)(n−1)/η > β2θ (n−1)/η.
This means that there is no equilibrium for xcs∗ > 0, xos∗ > 0 (see propo-







, where η = 1
2
φh2 − (1+ (n− 1)θ). This yields that an equi-
librium with xcs∗ = 0, xos∗ > 0 cannot exist for θ > 1/(n−1) (see propo-
sition 5.5.5). Finally, θ > 1/(n−1) implies that β(1+(n−1)θ )/η < β2θ (n−1)/η.
This means that an equilibrium exists with xcs∗ > 0, xos∗ = 0 if xosnc <
β(1+(n−1)θ )/η since both conditions of proposition 5.5.4 are fulfilled.
Proposition 5.5.8. In the case where the non-commercial community sup-
plies zero code (xosnc = 0) firms only develop OS if θ < 1/(n+1).
Proof. For xosnc = 0 the upper conditions of both equilibria with OS, i.e.
xcs∗ = 0, xos∗ > 0 and xcs∗ > 0, xos∗ > 0, are met. With xosnc = 0 the lower
boundary of both types of equilibria with OS are the same (compare 5.5.5
with 5.5.6) and yield the condition β(n−1) ((n+ 1)θ − 1)< 0. This is met
if and only if θ < 1/(n+1).
The impact of xosnc can be summarized as follows. For CS-only (x
cs∗ >
0, xos∗ = 0) and OS-only (xcs∗ = 0, xos∗ > 0) Nash-equilibria the following
holds: Except where OS decisions are strategic complements (φ < 2φossoc),
xosnc crowds out firm-developed code. In both cases firms substitute the
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is different for the CS-OS equilibrium (xcs∗ > 0, xos∗ > 0). Here is both
a crowding-out and a crowding-in, since ∂ xcs∗/∂ xosnc > 0 and ∂ x
os∗/∂ xosnc < 0
with ∂ xcs∗/∂ xosnc = −∂ xos
∗
/∂ xosnc. Additionally, assumed 1/(n+1) < θ < 1/(n−1),
an equilibrium in which firms develop OS code only exists only if xosnc >
β((n+1)θ−1)(n−1)/η. Otherwise, only CS code exists since the incentives to
cooperate are too low. For θ > 1/(n−1) no firms develop OS software at all,
regardless of xosnc.
5.5.4 OS and CS in Case of Restricted Licenses
In the case of restricted licenses we must analyze (a) how much software
CS firms (i ∈ R) and OS firms (i ∈ Z) develop in equilibrium, and (b) the
number of CS and OS firms that coexist in the industry in equilibrium. We
will examine the latter in Section 5.6.2. Here we derive xcs∗ and xos∗ for
industries containing any arbitrary number of CS and OS firms.
The symmetric solution of (5.10) delivers the symmetric Nash-equilibri-
um regarding the interaction among the CS firms, thus optimal CS output








h2φ − (1+ (n− 1)θ) (1+ zθ)
for all X os < β/zθ , otherwise xcs = 0. Similarly, the symmetric solution for
(5.11) leads to the symmetric Nash-equilibrium of the interaction among

















φh2 (1+ z)− z (1+ rθ)2
for all
∑






xosnc/(1+rθ )θ , otherwise xos = 0.16
16As mentioned above we focus on cases where φ > φos_
x
. In the case of φ < φos_
x
multible
equilibria exist, see Appendix C.
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Because of symmetry we can replace X os = zxos + xosnc and
∑
xcs = r xcs.
For convenience we also rewrite the denominator of xcs and xcs with ψ
























As before, we analyze the impact of quantity competition and quality
competition on OS and CS output seperately. In the case where no CS
firms exist (r = 0 and thus n = z) OS is again only affected by the degree
of quantity competition (h) with ∂ xos/∂ h < 0. If the OS firms face CS com-
petitors, however, they must also compete with the CS firms on quality. On
the other hand, CS firms compete on quality whether or not OS firms exist.
More formally: for z = 0 we have ∂ xcs/∂ θ > 0 and ∂ xcs/∂ h< 0.
We now analyze the interactions between the CS- and OS firms. It turns
out that CS is a strategic substitute to OS and vice versa.
Proposition 5.5.9. For CS development, OS code is a strategic substitute, i.e.
E
cs




∂ xcs/∂ xos · xcs/xos < 0 and Ecsnc = ∂ x
cs/∂ xosnc · xosnc/xcs < 0.





∂ xos/∂ xcs · xcs/xos < 0 for all χ > 0. (The case where χ < 0, i.e.
OS firms produce the cutoff is adressed in the Appendix C.)
Solving (5.12) and (5.13) yield the Nash-equilibria where firms simul-
taneous choose OS and CS for indusries containing any arbitrary number
of OS and CS firms. The solutions include equilibria where only OS firms
develop software, only CS firms develop software, and where both OS and
CS firms develop software. These results can be formally stated as follows:
Proposition 5.5.11. A Nash-equilibrium exists in which only CS firms de-
velop software (x cs∗> 0, xos∗= 0) in the case where
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• OS decisions are strategic complements or relatively weak strategic subs-
titutes (Eosnc > −E csncEoscs ) if and only if xosnc < β/zθ and also xosnc < β (1+ rθ )κ/µ,
or
• OS decisions are relatively strong strategic substitutes (Eosnc < −E csncEoscs ),









(1+ (n− 1)θ) [ 1
4
h2φ (1+ zθ)− (1+ rθ) (1+ θn)] .
Proof. In the case where only CS firms develop software (xos∗ = 0) CS








h2φ − (1+ (n− 1)θ) (1+ zθ)
.










xosnc/(1+rθ )θ . Inserting here the above expression for xcs∗ and
solving for xosnc yields x
os
nc <
βκ/µ if µ > 0 and xosnc > βκ/µ otherwise. For












/(1+rθ )rθ . This
expression can be rewritten as Eosnc > −EcsncEoscs .
We interpret proposition 5.5.11 is as follows. First, there must be CS de-
velopment. Recall that Ecsnc < 0, i.e. OS software from the non-commercial
community has a negative impact on CS output. Thus, it must be that xosnc <
β/zθ , otherwise xosnc completely suppresses code-development by CS firms
regardless how much OS code firms produce. Second, the CS firms must
develop enough CS to completely suppress OS code development by firms.
Suppose that xosnc = 0. In such a case x
cs∗ supresses commercial OS code if
r xcs∗> β/θ . This condition is fulfilled where the marginal costs of software-
development rise relatively slowly, i.e. where φ < φcssoc· (1+ nθ )/(1+ (n− 1)θ ).
Where the marginal costs rise faster, the cost-sharing aspect of OS guaran-
tees that OS firms always develop some code. Suppose now that xosnc > 0.
Here we have to take into account that xosnc has direct and indirect impact
on xos. The direct effect of xosnc on x
os is expressed by Eosnc and can be pos-
itive or negative. The indirect effect occurs because xosnc affect x
cs which
in turn determine xos. Here xosnc has a positive impact on x
os because xosnc
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decreases xcs (Ecsnc < 0), and this has a positive impact on x
os (Eoscs < 0).
The overall effect is positive where OS decisions are only weak strategic
substitutes or even strategic complements. This means that the amount
of xosnc must be bounded for x
os = 0. But if xosnc strongly crowds out firm-
OSS (Eosnc < −EcsncEoscs ) it suppresses firm-OS. (Where OS decisions are very
strong strategic substitutes firm-OS is suppressed even for xosnc = 0. The
formal condition is: β(1+rθ )κ/µ < 0).
Proposition 5.5.12. A Nash-equilibrium exists in which only OS firms de-
velop software (x cs∗= 0, xos∗> 0) where

















with σ = χ − z2θ (1+ rθ)












First, xos∗ has to be greater zero. If OS decisions are strategic substitutes,







decisions are strategic complements, xos∗ > 0 ∀xosnc. Second, since xcs
∗
must be zero, we obtain from (5.12) the condition zxos∗+ xosnc > β/zθ . This




Proposition 5.5.12 is straightforward. Any xosnc fosters OS development
by firms if OS decisions are strategic complements. When OS decisions
are strategic substitutes, xosnc crowds out firm OS. Furthermore, total OS
(X os) must be greater than β/zθ to ensure that the CS firms do not de-
velop code. This condition requires sufficient community-code in cases
17If xosnc exceeds this level, then there is so much community-code that the OS firms do not
have any incentives to develop own code.
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where commercial code output is insufficient. The condition is met without
community-code only if the marginal costs of software-development rise
relatively slowly. OS firms jointly produce enough code to completely sup-




0 and the condition is fulfilled ∀xosnc.
Proposition 5.5.13. A Nash-equilibrium exists in which both types of firm
develop software (x cs∗ > 0, xos∗ > 0)
(a) for Eoscs E
cs
os < 1 where
• OS decisions are strategic complements or relatively weak strategic subs-
titutes (Eosnc > −E csncEoscs ), if and only if β(1+rθ )κ/µ< xosnc < βσ/14 h2φθ ,
• OS decisions are relatively strong strategic substitutes (Eosnc < −E csncEoscs ),
if and only if xosnc <
βσ/1
4
h2φθ and also xosnc <
β(1+rθ )κ/µ,
(b) for Eoscs E
cs
os > 1 where
• OS decisions are strategic complements or relatively weak strategic subs-
titutes (Eosnc > −E csncEoscs ), if and only if βσ/14 h2φθ < xosnc < β(1+rθ )κ/µ ,
• OS decisions are relatively strong strategic substitutes (Eosnc < −E csncEoscs ),
if and only if xosnc >
βσ/1
4
h2φθ and also xosnc >
β(1+rθ )κ/µ,
with σ = χ − z2θ (1+ rθ), and κ= 1
2





h2φ− (1+ rθ)2]− (1+ (n− 1)θ) [ 1
4
h2φ (1+ zθ)− (1+ rθ) (1+ θn)] .
Proof. The simultaneous solution of (5.12) and (5.13) is given by




ψχ − (1+ θ r)θ2r (1+ (n− 1)θ) z2 , (5.14)
and
xos∗ =
κβ (1+ θ r)−µxosnc
ψχ − (1+ θ r)θ2rz2 (1+ (n− 1)θ)
. (5.15)
The denominator of both expressions is greater zero if and only if Eoscs E
cs
os >
1.18 First, consider the case where Eoscs E
cs
os > 1. If the denominator is
18Notice that we have defined the elasticities with respect to (5.12) and (5.13). Thus
the symmetry of OS firms, and of CS firms, each was taken into account. Namely the
derivatives are ∂ xcs/∂ xos = −(1+(n−1)θ )z2θ/ψ and ∂ xos/∂ xcs = −(1+rθ ) rθ/ψ.
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positive, then xcs and xos are positive if the numerators have positive
signs. Then xcs∗ > 0 leads to the condition xosnc < βσ/
1
4
h2φθ . The condi-
tion for xos∗ > 0 depends on whether µ > 0 or not. Where µ > 0 we
know that Eosnc < −EcsncEoscs which implies that the condition for xos
∗ > 0 is
xosnc <





os < 1. If the denominator is negative, then x
cs and xos are both posi-
tive if the numerators have negative signs. This reverses the unequal signs
of the conditions.
The logic behind proposition 5.5.13 is the following. OS and CS are
linear functions of each other. Furthermore, OS and CS react on each other
as strategic substitutes (see propositions 5.5.9 and 5.5.10). For this reason
a Nash-equilibrium exists with (xcs∗ > 0, xos∗ > 0) if and only if either
(a) neither (xcs∗ > 0, xos∗ = 0) nor (xcs∗ = 0, xos∗ > 0) exist, or (b) both
(xcs∗> 0, xos∗= 0) and (xcs∗= 0, xos∗> 0) exist. Figure 5.3 illustrates this
logic with a symmetric example of decisions in strategic substitutes. The
















left hand side has only one equilibrium, the inner solution y∗1 > 0, y
∗
2 > 0.
The right hand side has three equilibria. The inner solution (y∗1 > 0, y
∗
2 > 0)
and the two corner solutions y∗1 > 0, y
∗
2 = 0 and y
∗
1 = 0, y
∗
2 > 0. This
implies that a Nash-equilibrium exists in our model where both types of
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firms develop code if (a) neither proposition 5.5.11 nor 5.5.12 are fulfilled,
or (b) proposition 5.5.11 and 5.5.12 are fulfilled simultaneously. Together
with the non-negativity conditions this leads to the conditions of the above
proposition.
This section has analyzed code production equilibria for restricted li-
censes. For pure OS industries (r = 0) we have seen that firms develop
OS code unless there is enough community code. For xosnc = 0 firms always
produce OS code, see (5.13). Also in mixed OS/CS industries with xosnc = 0
commercial OS can exist.
5.6 Mixed Industries
This section analyzes mixed industries, i.e. industries where firms develop
OS and CS. Of course, we have to distinguish whether the OS license is
liberal or restricted:
5.6.1 Liberal Licenses: OS and CS Development
With liberal licenses all firms can develop OS and CS code. Recall, however,
that quality competition (θ) has a strongly negative impact on commercial
OS production. This means that firms develop only CS code for all θ >
1/(n−1) (proposition 5.5.7). Absent community-code (xosnc = 0) moreover,
firms do not develop OS code for θ > 1/(n+1) (proposition 5.5.8). This im-
plies that mixed industries can only exist in the range 1/(n+1) < θ < 1/(n−1)
for appropriate non-zero values of xosnc. Mixed industries can however, exist
for θ < 1/(n+1) even without non-commercial OS development.
Since θ = γ/(2−γ), the conditions θ < 1/(n+1) and θ < 1/(n−1) are equiva-
lent to γ < 2/(n+2) and γ < 2/n. Figure 5.4 provides a graphical impression
of these two conditions. Except for very very concentrated (small n) indus-
tries, markets must be very separated (high horizontal product differenti-
ation) for commercial OS to occur. For example, in the case of a n = 10
industry the two conditions for the horizontal degree of substitution are
γ < 0.16̄6 (always commercial OS) and γ < 0.2 (only enough xosnc ensures
that firms develop OS). In the case of a n= 100 industry the two conditions
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also if xosnc = 0




No OS by Firms
Must be enough community-code
to ensure that firms also develop OS.
are γ < 0.0196 and γ < 0.02 respectively. Finally, limn→∞ 2/(n+2) = 0 and
limn→∞ 2/(n) = 0.
5.6.2 Restricted Licenses: Equilibrium of OS and CS Firms
This subsection analyzes the ratio of OS to CS firms, assumed free entry
and exit. In the interest of generality, we do not postulate a specific entry
process. For this we also ignore possible historical events that could give
rise to lock in.19 We analyze the condition for a stable mixed industry that
resists further entry by OS and CS firms. A n-firm industry with z OS firms
and r CS firms is an equilibrium if the incumbents earn profits πi ≥ 0 and
19The question of possible lock-ins, strategic OS-versus-CS decision of incumbents etc. is
analyzed in the next chapter.
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additional OS or CS entrant would earn negative profits. This condition is
met where πi = 0∀i ∈ N . This condition is both sufficient and necessary
for large n.20 We therefor define stability in terms of the the zero-profit
condition21
πi∈Z = pi∈Z · qi∈Z − ci∈Z − C = πi∈R = pi∈R · qi∈R− ci∈R − C = 0. (5.16)
We also concentrate on Nash-equilibria where both types of firm develop
code: (xcs∗ > 0, xos∗ > 0). The reason is the following: If there is no
community-code (xosnc = 0), then equilibria with (x
cs∗ > 0, xos∗ = 0) and
(xcs∗= 0, xos∗> 0) violate the zero-profit condition. The following lemmas
5.6.1 and 5.6.2 confirm these statements (we normalize β to β = 1 without
loss of generality).
Lemma 5.6.1. Given a Nash-equilibrium where only the CS firms develop
software (x cs∗ > 0, xos∗ = 0), CS firms earn higher profits than OS firms
provided that β = 1 and xosnc = 0.
Proof by contradiction. Profits for xcs > 0, xos = 0 are πi∈Z = (1−rθ x
cs)2/h2
and πi∈R = (1+x
cs(1+zθ ))2/h2 − xcs2φ/2 for β = 1 and xosnc = 0. There are two
necessary conditions for πi∈Z > πi∈R:
(a) OSS-firms achieve positive prices if and only if xcs < 1/rθ .
(b) πi∈Z > πi∈R implies that x
cs > 4(1+nθ )/[φh2+2(r2θ 2−(1+zθ )2)].
Conditions (a) and (b) are simultaneously fulfilled if and only if φ >
2(1+nθ )2/h2. Inserting β = 1 and xosnc = 0 into proposition 5.5.11 leads to
the condition φ < 2(1+nθ )(1+(n−1)θ )/h2. But 2(1+nθ )2/h2 > 2(1+nθ )(1+(n−1)θ )/h2.
This shows that (a) and (b) can only be simultaneously fulfilled, i.e. that
πi∈Z > πi∈R, if and only if a Nash-equilibrium with x
cs∗> 0, and xos∗= 0
does not exist.
20For small n the sufficient and necessary condition is: πi ≥ 0∀i ∈ N , πe < 0 with e /∈ N
is either a CS or an OS entrant. For n 7→ ∞ the sufficient and necessary conditions
converge to πi = 0.
21A discussion of πi > 0∀i ∈ N , πe < 0 with e /∈ N is either a CS or an OS entrant can be
found in Chapter 6.
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Lemma 5.6.2. Given a Nash-equilibrium where only OS firms develop soft-
ware (x cs∗= 0, xos∗> 0), OS firms earn higher profits than CS firms provided
that β = 1 and xosnc = 0.
Proof by contradiction. Profits for xcs = 0, xos > 0 are given by πi∈Z =
(1+(1+rθ )zxos)2/h2−1/2φzxos2 and πi∈R = (1−z2θ xos)
2
/h2 for β = 1 and xosnc = 0.
There are two necessary conditions for πi∈Z < πi∈R:
(a) CSS firms charge positive prices. This is true if and only if the con-
dition xos < 1/(z2θ ) is met.
(b) πi∈Z < πi∈R implies that x
os > 4(1+nθ )/[φh2+2z(z2θ 2−(1+rθ )2)].
Conditions (a) and (b) are simultaneously fulfilled if and only if φ >
2z(1+nθ )2/h2. Inserting β = 1 and xosnc = 0 into proposition 5.5.12 yields
the condition φ < 2z/1+z · 2(1+nθ )(1+rθ )/h2. But at the same time 2z(1+nθ )2/h2
> 2z/(1+z)·2(1+nθ )(1+rθ )/h2. We therefore conclude that (a) and (b) are simul-
taneously fulfilled, i.e. that πi∈Z < πi∈R, if and only if a Nash-equilibrium
with xcs∗= 0, xos∗> 0 does not exist.
Lemma 5.6.2 also holds when community code is present. Lemma 5.6.2
has to be modified only slightly. Given sufficiently large amounts of com-
munity code, OS firms can survive in the market without contributing any
code at all. Allegorically spoken, OS firms find themselves in “Cockaigne”,
the land of plenty, and get all code they need “for free”. We will ignore this
trivial case in what follows.
Our zero-profit condition (5.16) leads to
pi∈Z · qi∈Z − ci∈Z = pi∈R · qi∈R − ci∈R.
We use this condition to calculate mixed industries equilibria numerically.
Figure 5.5 depicts the typical example of an industry with n = 100 firms.
The solid line is the outcome for φ = 2, β = 1, and xosnc = 0. (x
os
nc was set
equal zero to ensure that OS firms never find themselves in “Cockaigne”.
The impact of xosnc > 0 is explained below.) As the reader can confirm by in-
spection, the proportion of CS firms decreases when the products produced
in stage two are close substitutes. Figure 5.6 shows the total market share
of OS and CS products (bundles). For industries with with a low degree
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of horizontal product differentiation (large γ), CS-based products have a
bigger market share than OS-based products. For γ close to one, 80% or
more of the products are based on CS, while less than half of the firms in
the market are CS firms. In other words: a few ‘big’ CS firms compete with
many ‘small’ OS firms. Furthermore, CS firms offer higher quality (more
code per bundle). Changing the parameters φ and β changes the propor-
tion of OS firms and their market share. However, CS firms still offer higher
quality. Figures 5.5 and 5.6 depict the impact of differing φ and β on OS
firm proportion and market share.
The dotted line represents the case of φ = 5, i.e. when the marginal costs
of software development increases more steeply. As result, the number of
OS firms in the industry and their market share is higher. The reason for
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Figure 5.6: Marketshare of OS- vs. CS-based Products











this is that high φ makes software development more costly as costs in-
crease more steeply. This makes OS’s cost-sharing and quality-cooperation
benefits more attractive.
The dashed line represents a lower quality stage two product, e.g. mobile
phones with less hardware features (we have set β = 0.8). Recall, that the
quality of the bundles (αi = β+ x i) directly affects demand: pi = αi− qi−
γ
∑
j 6=i q j . Thus, a lower β means that the complementary private good is
less important for generating revenues. This makes the software-decision
more important. As one would expect, fewer firms choose OS business
models in this scenario. On the other hand, the remaining OS firms have
a stronger incentive to develop code because of quality competition with
the CS firms. This explains why the market share of OS-based products is
higher for large γ than in the β = 1 case. Here the OS firms produce more
code (offer higher quality) than they would do in the β = 1 case.
Finally the impact of community-code can be analyzed with numerical
examples. The effect is straightforward: xosnc > 0 makes OS business models
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more attractive. This increases the number of OS firms in the industry
along with their total and individual market share. Furthermore, firms
stop developing OS code even for small xosnc if the products becomes close
substitutes. In these cases OS firms survive in the market without own code
development. Here, OS firms do not contribute to the OS software but just
use it.
5.7 Summary and Outlook
The chapter uses a general model to analyze the economics of open versus
closed source business models. In stage one firms develop software, as OS
or CS code, or as a mix of OS and CS code. In stage two firms bundle this
‘stage one’-software with complementary products (hardware, service, or
proprietary software) and compete. Competition in stage two is modeled as
oligopolistic competition. We allow for horizontal product differentiation.
Furthermore, firm i’s software developed in stage one affects quality and
hence increase consumers’ willingness to pay for qi. This yields vertical
product differentiation. Using this framework we have shown:
• General two-stage models that combine aspects of non-cooperative
R&D with the theory of differentiated oligopolies provide a convinc-
ing explanation of why firms adopt OS business models. Specifically,
OS enables firms to cooperate on quality and therefore avoid quality
competition.
• If licenses allow a direct mix of OS with CS code, firms only develop
OS where the degree of quality competition is low. Otherwise a public
good dilemma occurs: firms use OS code if exists but only produce
CS code. On the other hand, restricted licenses ensure commercial
OS output.
• Each firm’s CS output is always a strategic substitute for every other
firms’ CS code. However, firm’s OS output can be a strategic comple-
ment to other firms’ OS code.
• Assuming free entry and restricted OS licenses, mixed industries (OS
and CS firms) equilibria exist. Here OS firms offer lower quality than
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their CS rivals. Where the products are close substitutes, CS-based
products have the larger market share.
The chapter does not calculate welfare. However, the fact that the OS
firms are the low-quality providers in industry equilibrium provides a first
hint that there are too many OS firms in the market compared to social
optimum. The chapter is also not explicit about how entry occurs and
thus ignores possible historical events like lock-ins. Finally, incumbents’
OS versus CS strategic choices are not analyzed. It is therefore possible
for industries to become stuck in pure rather than mixed equilibria. These
issues are analyzed in Chapter 6.
Finally, the chapter only consider firms’ simple economic incentives. So-
cial interactions and community norms are not taken into account. It is well
known, that the OS community pays attention to what firms do and expect
at least some kind of contribution from the firms. Thus, such community
norms can ensure that firms that fail to contribute will be sanctioned as
community members stop cooperating or migrate to other projects (see
also Section 4.3.3.2). This suggests that firms may contribute OS code
more often than the model predicts. However, it still holds that our sim-
ple Cournot logic provides a complete explanation of why firms contribute
to OS. this is particularly true for OS business models in industries where
there is no non-commercial community. Our model also underscores the
importance of formal institutions, here: the type of OS license.
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Source: Does It Really Improve
Social Welfare?
6.1 Introduction∗
The last chapter has analyzed the strategic nature of OS vs. CS business
models, including the role of OS licenses. In the present chapter we focus
on welfare and discuss possible government interventions. Today, many
governments support OSS and are in favor of the OS principle in general.
The OS principle seems to be an alternative to the traditional incentive
schemes like copyright-based CS, patents, prizes, grants, contract research,
etc. The emergence of OS methods for producing software in the 1990s sur-
prised and delighted observers. OS seemed to avoid CS software’s worse
feature—charging consumers a royalty for information that could theoret-
ically be distributed at zero cost. This made it natural to ask whether OS
could drastically improve welfare compared to CS. At first, this was only
an intuition. Early explanations of OS were either ad hoc (”altruism”) or
downright mysterious (e.g. a post-modern ”gift economy,” see Raymond,
1998). Absent a clear model of OS, no one could really be certain how
much software the new incentive could deliver, let alone whether social
welfare would best be served by OS, CS, or some mix of the two.
The past decade has seen considerable progress. Following Lerner and
Tirole (2002)’s seminal article, economists showed that real world OS col-
laborations rely on many different incentives such as education, signaling,
and reputation (see Section 1.3.1). Furthermore, they constructed detailed
mathematical models of each mechanism (Maurer and Scotchmer, 2004).
The problem for policymakers was that the new models—despite a family
∗This Chapter is based on von Engelhardt and Maurer (2010)
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resemblance—were all different and sometimes yielded contradictory in-
sights. Worse, their predictive power was limited. Saying that certain OS
projects were driven by a desire for reputation was one thing. Saying how
much desire actually existed, let alone how much software it would gener-
ate, was another. Furthermore, the existence of multiple, competing mod-
els was disabling for policymakers. Government interventions that made
sense for one set of open source incentives were likely to be irrelevant or
even counterproductive for others.
The situation today is much improved. The reason is that the OS phe-
nomenon has itself become more uniform. More and more firms have
begun to engage in OSS development. As already mentioned in the last
chapter’s introduction, much of the last years’ growth in OSS projects is
commercially motivated. The number of companies in these OS communi-
ties typically ranges from a few dozen to many thousands. The following
examples provide some idea of this range: The Lamp Stack software suite
(see Section 1.2.3) is an example for small communities. Here, develop-
ment is supported by a relatively small number of corporations. In 2001,
IBM opened its Eclipse development tool and created an independent foun-
dation to manage further OS development in 2003. Eclipse is an example
for mid-size communities as 115 companies had joined the foundation as
of 2006. Thousands of programmers developed the Linux code base so that
they could develop custom software solutions for clients. This is an exam-
ple for large communities. Many firms, ranging from large cooperations
to small and medium sized enterprises, use Linux as basis for their busi-
ness model (e.g. distributors, embedded software, etc., see Section 1.2.3).
Therefore this chapter makes use of the last chapter’s model of how firms
decide how much OSS and CSS to produce. We analyze welfare implica-
tions of these decisions, and possible government options for improving
these outcomes.
Like earlier contributions, we find that the amount of OS produced re-
flects a balance between OS firms’ ability to share costs and CS firms’
greater ability to appropriate benefits to consumers. Depending on this
balance, Pure-OS industries may or may not be welfare-superior to Pure-
CS industries while Mixed-OS/CS industries are almost always welfare-
superior to both. Unlike earlier contributions, our general model lets us
systematically explore these competing effects for arbitrary combinations
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of substitutability between competing proprietary products, and numbers
of competing OS and CS firms.
Crucially, we find that OS firms hardly ever realize the full welfare bene-
fits of cost sharing. The reason is that OS firms (unlike CS firms) share all
software so that no firm can offer better quality than any other firm. This
leads to a quality cartel effect not seen in earlier models that drastically
suppresses of OS code production. Paradoxically, then, we find that OS
firms deliver relatively modest welfare gains unless and until CS firms are
present in sufficient numbers to enforce quality competition. We also use
our model to calculate which OS:CS firm ratios are stable against entry. We
find that (a) many Pure-OS and Pure-CS markets are stable so that welfare-
improving mixed OS/CS markets never arise, and (b) stable OS/CS mixed
markets hardly ever contain enough CS firms to enforce optimal quality
competition.
Understanding these effects matters. Most national governments already
purchase large amounts of OS software and this spending is often explicitly
justified as an attempt to promote OS over traditional CS code production
models. We show below that such interventions can actually decrease social
welfare. More generally, we use our model to evaluate welfare effects for a
wide spectrum of possible interventions including taxation, direct funding
of OS-development, and government procurement preferences.
The balance of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 describes
how various governments support OS development and set incentives to
promote OS companies. Section 6.3.1 analyses the profit-maximizing out-
put for arbitrary numbers of firms operating in Pure-CS, Pure-OS, and
mixed OS/CS industries, and then shows how specific output decisions
translate—through costs incurred and quality delivered to consumers—into
net welfare. Section 6.4 identifies the conditions under which industries
endowed with an initial mix of OS and CS firms are stable against entry.
Crucially, it finds that few, if any of these equilibria are welfare-optimal.
Section 6.5 examines several strategies that government could potentially
use to intervene in these markets. Section 6.6 discusses the generality of
these results and the extent to which more complicated models could lead
to different conclusions. Finally, Section 6.7 presents a brief conclusion.
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6.2 Background: Government Interventions
Governments are plainly intrigued with OS and have repeatedly flirted with
various schemes to promote it. Probably the most comprehensive survey
of existing and proposed initiatives is found in CSIS (2008). It reports
that governments have experimented with a wide variety of incentives to
promote OS companies. These include:
Procurement Preferences. Governments purchase large amounts of soft-
ware and can potentially use these purchases to promote OS over CS
and vice versa. At least sixteen countries have considered mandatory
polices that would require government agencies and/or state-owned
companies to purchase OS solutions whenever possible.1 Softer ver-
sions of these proposals speak of ”preferences” for OS when its per-
formance is comparable to CS. To date, at least ten national gov-
ernments have adopted some version of these proposals2 along with
many state and local governments. High government adoption rates
of OS in still other countries (e.g. France) suggests that unofficial
preferences also exist.
Tax Incentives. Singapore offers tax breaks to firms that use LINUX oper-
ating systems.
Government Funding. Hong Kong offers funding for companies that adopt
or use OS. Israel offers grants of up to $100,000 to start-up com-
panies that use and develop OS. Governments have also funded a
variety of institutes, projects, and private-public collaborations to de-
velop3 and facilitate user adoption4 of OS software.
1Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Ukraine,
Finland, Portugal, Peru, and Venezuela.
2Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, Malyasia, the Netherlands, Peru, South Africa, Spain,
and Venezuela,. Conversely, the UK, Canada, Germany and Slovenia have said that they
will choose between OS and CS solely on the technical merits.
3China, Finland, Japan, South Korea, France, India, Slovakia, Spain, Thailand, Venezuela,
Vietnam
4China, Czechoslovakia, Israel, South Africa, Taiwan, Cambodia, South Korea, Japan,
Netherlands, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam.
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Grants Policy. Government research grants to academia and industry fre-
quently require dissemination plans when software is produced. OS
is by far the easiest way to meet these obligations. More formally, the
United Kingdom has adopted a “default position” that government-
funded software should be released under OS licenses (CSIS, 2008).
While scholars have occasionally explored the case for such interventions
(e.g. Schmidt and Schnitzer, 2003), their welfare analyses have generally
focused on the impact of government policy on OS collaborations driven by
altruism, reputation, signaling, and other traditional incentives. Not sur-
prisingly, these studies usually assumed that government spending could
do little to influence OS code production. This assumption clearly needs
to be revisited in an era when commercial incentives dominate OS produc-
tion. Similarly, government policy in recent years has increasingly evolved
from simple OS-promotion schemes to “a search for business models that
can profitably blend open and proprietary processes and products.” (CSIS,
2008) However, earlier articles say relatively little about how the two sec-
tors interact or how these interactions can be managed to improve welfare.
We fill this gap by exploring how various government interventions includ-
ing taxation, funding, and purchasing preferences influence output (and
indirectly, welfare) for a very general commercial models in which OS and
CS firms interact with one another.
6.3 A Simple Commercial OS Model: Calculating
Output and Welfare
The analysis makes use of the model developed in the last chapter. There-
fore we will refer to the reaction functions etc. presented in Chapter 5.
However, in the current chapter we focus on the case of restricted OS li-
censes. The reason is that if OS licenses are liberal, commercial OS de-
velopment exists only for a small set of parameter constellations (low n
and/or low γ), see Figure 5.4 in Section 5.6.1. Furthermore, the sake of
simplicity we have normalized β to one.5 Finally, as we concentrate on
5Values different than β = 1 do not change the results qualitatively. However, for β > 1
OS becomes more attractive.
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commercial OS, we abstract from a non-commercial OS community. Thus,
like in Section 5.6.2, we set xosnc = 0.
While Chapter 5 focus on the strategic interactions, we will now deepen
the analysis of OS and CS code output. This is the basis of understanding
the welfare effects in Section 6.3.2. For now, we treat the number of OS
and CS firms as a free parameter without asking whether they represent
equilibrium outcomes in real markets. (We will return to this question in
Section 6.4)
6.3.1 How Much OS and CS Software Does the Market
Supply?
6.3.1.1 A Pure-CS Industry
Consider first an industry in which no OS firms exist. How much CS is
produced? In general, the answer depends on firms’ strategic interactions,
i.e. on how Firm A reacts to Firm B’s decision to produce code. In a Pure-CS












φh2 − (1+ (n− 1)θ)2
. (6.1)
Recall that here firms’ software development decisions are strategic sub-
stitutes. The size of this effect depends on θ , i.e. the extent to which firms
compete on quality. Furthermore, an industry composed of n identical firms





h2φ − 1− (n− 1)θ
(6.2)
As before—see Section 5.5.4—CS code development is suppressed by in-
tense quantity competition, i.e. the presence of h in the denominator. Con-
versely, quality competition—(n− 1)θ—increases equilibrium code-output
by making the numerator larger and denominator smaller.
6Compare this to (5.12), but note that in (5.12) is ψ= 1
2
h2φ− (1+ (n− 1)θ ) (1+ zθ ).
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As this is useful for understanding the welfare discussion later on, we
now discuss the impact of γ and n. Both h and θ depend on the sub-
stitutability (γ) of the ‘stage two’-products, while h also depends on the
number of competitors (n). The net effect of an increase of n is straightfor-
ward: it decreases equilibrium code-output. However, changes in γ have a
positive impact on both quantity competition and quality competition. Be-
cause quality and quantity competition exert opposing effects on CS output
the net effect is more complicated. Figure 6.1 plots closed source (xcs)
production as a function of γ.
For low-to-moderate values of γ the amount of CS code produced is
mainly determined by quantity competition (h), i.e. firms’ ability to extract
extra profits when quality increases. This ability is highest when products
have no substitutes (γ = 0 yields h = hmin = 2) so that each firm can set
monopoly prices unconstrained by competition. It steadily erodes as substi-
tutability (γ)—and hence h—increases.
There is also a second effect determined by θ . For very large γ prod-
ucts are nearly identical so that even small quality differences can lead to
large swings demand for or against a particular bundle. This makes quality
competition extremely important. Specifically, CS firms find themselves in
a kind of Arms Race or Prisoner’s Dilemma in which each firm invests in
quality to prevent every other firm from taking its business. This drives
industry profits toward zero. This effect becomes so large for γ larger than
∼ 0.9 that software production in a Pure-CS industry actually starts to rise
again.7
Result 1. Software output in Pure-CS industries is suppressed by quantity
competition but boosted by quality competition. Specifically, output fall as
the number of competing firms (n) and/or product substitutability (γ) in-
creases, hence h increases. However, at high γ quality competition (high θ)
between firms actually increase output by creating an Arms Race dynamic
in which each firm invests in quality to keep rivals from taking its business.
7Firms do not, of course, invest to the point where they would earn negative profits. For
this reason, the effect is stronger in concentrated (small n) industries where firms pos-







/2(n−2). This point is located at γ = 0.8956 for n = 4 and is higher
for all other n. For large n software production only starts to rise near n= 1.
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6.3.1.2 A Pure-OS Industry
Now consider the opposite case where no firms produce CS. Compared to
CS industries, OS introduces two new effects. First, firms share cost. This
means that the average per-firm development costs are lower for OS com-
pared to CS firms. Second, OS firms share all software. This means that
a firm’s decision to invest in OS software not only makes its own bundles
more attractive but also—contrary to the CS case—strengthens its competi-
tors. Furthermore, the existence of shared software guarantees that no
OS firm can offer better quality than any other OS firm. This suppression
of quality competition implies that firms in Pure-OS industries always earn
higher profits than firms in Pure-CS industries for a given number of incum-
bents. The same logic also implies that more firms will enter Pure-OS than
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Pure-CS industries. Ceteris paribus we therefore expect Pure-OS industries
to have more incumbents when free entry is present.















Crucially—and unlike the Pure-CS case, see (6.1)—Firm B’s decision to
produce software no longer depends on quality competition (θ) from other
firms.8 It does, however, depend on cost-sharing. This leads to several
important differences from the CS case.
• Strategic Complements vs. Substitutes: For CS Firms, increased soft-
ware output by Firm B always suppresses software for Firm A. By
contrast, as mentioned in Section 5.5.2, the result for OS firms is am-
biguous. OS implies code- and cost-sharing. The net result is that
firm decisions sometimes become strategic complements, i.e. that
Firm B’s decision to develop more software can cause Firm A to in-
crease its code output and vice versa. This occurs when the marginal
cost of software production increases slowly (low φ ) or competition
is modest (low h). More formally, OS investments become strategic
complements in our model when h2φ < 4, see proposition 5.5.2.
• Quality Cartel: We have seen that quality competition among CS
firms leads to Arms Races at high γ in which firms continue to in-
vest in software until rising marginal costs wipe out any profits that
could have been earned from increased demand. By contrast, OS
firms do not compete on quality. This means that they face no Arms
Race, so that code output is suppressed to levels slightly below those
that would be expected under a formal ”quality cartel” charged with
setting output to whatever level maximizes total industry profit.9
8See also the short note on this in Section 5.5.4.
9The difference stems from the fact that individual OS firms cannot recover the positive
impact that their software investment confers on the profits of every other OS firm. A for-
mal quality cartel would internalize this externality. For more details see the Appendix
D.1
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As before, output decisions by n identical firms lead to a Nash equilib-





φh2 (1+ n)− n
(6.4)





φh2 (1+ n)− n
(6.5)
except in those cases where OS development would exceed the cutoff, i.e.
deliver more code than society can use.11 This leads to a third fundamental
difference between the Pure-OS and Pure-CS models:
• Quantity Competition and Cost-Sharing. As in the Pure-CS case, the
amount of software produced in Pure-OS industries depends nega-
tively on quantity competition and is greatest at low γ, see Figure
6.1. Now, however, there is a second effect. Because of shared devel-
opment costs, Pure-OS industries are able to offer more software per
bundle than Pure-CS industries as long as γ < 2/(n+2).
• Quantity vs. Quality Competition. We have seen that quality compe-
tition gradually replaces quantity competition as the most important
factor in determining CS output at high γ. Pure-OS industries, how-
ever, are able to suppress quality competition through code-sharing
(quality cartel). This explains why Pure-CS industries deliver more
software than Pure-OS industries in our model for γ > 2/(n+2) (see
Figure 6.1) or, equivalently, h> 4− 3γ.
The balance between quantity competition and cost-sharing is superfi-
cially consistent with Llanes and de Elejalde (2009) and Henkel (2006)’s
findings that OS business models are most profitable where quantity com-
petition is low so that cost-sharing dominates. However, these earlier anal-
yses are incomplete to the extent that they fail to consider the suppression
10Compare this to (5.13), but note that in (5.13) is χ = 1
4
φh2 (1+ z)− z (1+ rθ )2.
11As before in Chapter 5 we focus on cases where OS development does not exceed the
cutoff.
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of quality competition in Pure-OS industries. This latter effect systemati-
cally reduces the amount of OS output that would otherwise be expected
from a simple balance of appropriability and cost-sharing.
Result 2. Cost-sharing allows Pure-OS industries to produce more software
than Pure-CS industries so long as quantity competition is modest. How-
ever, production falls steeply as greater product substitutability (γ) leads to
increased quantity competition between firms. Unlike CS firms, OS firms
do not compete on quality (the ‘quality cartel effect’). For this reason a
Pure-OS industries offer less software per bundle than Pure-CS industries
for γ > 2/(n+2).
6.3.1.3 A Mixed OS/CS Industry
Finally, consider the case where both OS and CS firms exist. As before, CS
firms still react to CS firms and OS firms still react to OS firms. With β = 1










(1+ rθ) (1− θ r xcs)
χ
(6.7)
where z is the number of OS-firms and r is the number of CS-firms so that
n = r + z. Like in Chapter 5, for convenience we replace the denominator
of xcs and xos with ψ and χ.13 Now, however, CS firms also react to OS
firms and vice versa. The overall Nash-equilibrium is thus a simultaneous
solution of these two functions.
As before, CS firms react to increased software development by other
firms as a strategic substitute. Since OS firms compete with CS firms on
quality, they also see increases in CS production as strategic substitutes.
This is represented by −θ r xcs in the numerator of (6.7). The situation re-
garding the strategic interaction among OS firms is different. The presence
12As before, we exclude cases where OS would exceed the cutoff, i.e. deliver more code
than society can use. Formally, we restrcit our analysis to φ > 4 · z/(z+1) · (1+rθ )2/h2.
13ψ= 1
2
h2φ− (1+ (n− 1)θ ) (1+ zθ ) and χ = 1
4
φh2 (1+ z)− z (1+ rθ )2.
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of CS firms prevents OS firms from cartelizing around a low level of quality.
Instead, OS firms must compete on quality against these CS outsiders to
the cartel. This makes the ability to share costs more valuable to OS firms.
Ceteris paribus, this increases OS output and increases the strategic comple-
ments effect among OS firms. This explains why OS-investments are strate-
gic complements for h2φ < 4 in Pure-OS industries but h2φ < 4(1+ rθ)2
for mixed OS/CS industries (see also proposition 5.5.2).
Because of these interactions, the detailed behavior of a mixed OS/CS
industry depends on the ratio of OS to CS firms. Figure 6.2 parameterizes
this as the proportion of OS firms ω = z/n and shows how much software
consumers receive per bundle in the typical example where γ = 0.5 and
n = 100. Where OS firms are a small minority (ω ∼ a few percent), they















X os = z · xos
Proportion of OS Firms (ω = z/100)
xcs
2%
face strong quality competition from CS firms. This encourages them to
use their cost-sharing advantage to produce large amounts of OS software.
Increased opportunities for cost sharing continue to dominate diminished
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quality competition until the proportion of OS firms reaches ω ∼ 0.08.
Thereafter, however, the declining number of CS firms suppresses quality
competition so that OS code production falls. For large ω the OS quality
cartel is so strong that OS firms produce very little code.
Because CS firms do not share costs, they cannot possibly match the max-
imum potential software output that OS firms can achieve. Furthermore,
as already mentioned, CS firms react to OS development as a strategic sub-
stitute. As long as OS production is high, therefore, CS firms will specialize
in selling low-quality bundles at a low price. The situation is reversed as
OS productions declines. As a result, CS firms replace OS firms as the in-
dustry’s high-quality, high-priced providers above ω ∼ 50 %.
Result 3. Quality competition from CS firms in mixed OS/CS industries
mitigates the quality cartel effect that suppresses production in Pure-OS
industries. As a result, OS-software production for suitably chosen OS:CS
ratios is dramatically higher than that found in otherwise comparable Pure-
CS or Pure-OS industries. If the OS:CS ratio is low, OS firms are the indus-
try’s high-quality, high-priced providers. This situation is reversed when
the industry hosts many OS firms and only a few CS firms.
6.3.2 Welfare Implications
We now know how much software a Pure-OS, Pure-CS, or Mixed-OS/CS
industry produces. This allows us to calculate firm profits and consumer
utility, which in turn enables us to analyze welfare. More specifically, pro-
ducer surplus is given by total industry profits and consumer surplus for dif-


























6.3.2.1 Pure-OS vs. Pure-CS
We begin by comparing welfare under a Pure-OS regime against a Pure-
CS case. For convenience, we focus on the difference in welfare between
a Pure-OS and a Pure-CS world. Prices and quantities of Pure-OS and
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Pure-CS are given by q = p = (1+nxos)/h and q = p = (1+xcs)/h respectively.
The difference in welfare between a Pure-OS and a Pure-CS world (Wn =



















Note that the welfare difference consists of two components. The first
reflects the quality difference and the second term represents the cost dif-
ference between a Pure-OS and a Pure-CS world. (For more details on the
welfare functions see Appendix D.2)
We start by examining welfare at γ = 2/(2+n) where, as we have already
seen, Pure-OS and Pure-CS systems produce the same amounts of code
(see Figure 6.1) so that the quality difference between firms’ ‘stage two’-
products is zero. Here, the remaining cost difference term makes OS wel-
fare superior. This is because OS firms can share code whereas each CS
firm must create its own code base de novo. This wasteful duplication of
effort is variously described as “business stealing” or “me-too products” in
the literature (Henkel and von Hippel, 2005).
OS’s welfare-superiority diminishes for small values of γ. This is because
Pure-OS industries produce much more code (see Figure 6.1) and therefore
incur higher costs. However, the effect is never large enough to overcome
the quality and cost-sharing advantages associated with OS. For this reason,
Pure-OS industries remain preferable to Pure-CS industries in our model for
all γ less than 2/(2+n). Significantly, this statement does not depend on φ
and therefore holds regardless of detailed assumptions (e.g. Brooks’ Law)
about how quickly the marginal cost of software production rises.
The situation is more ambiguous for γ larger than 2/(2+n). At first OS’s
welfare-superiority erodes with increasing γ because of the greater code
production associated with Pure-CS industries (see Figure 6.1). For γ >
2/(2+n) Pure-CS delivers higher quality. For moderate large γ this effect
dominates the cost advantages of shared OS production so that CS also
delivers superior welfare. On the other hand, we have seen that code out-
put in Pure-CS industries increases sharply for very large values of γ. This
can produce such large cost increases that a Pure-OS industry is once again
welfare-superior.
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Figure 6.3 summarizes these results for a representative numerical exam-
ple in which we have set φ = 2.14 (We solve Wn = 0 for n, with φ = 2 and
Wn, x
cs and X os given by (6.9), (6.2) and (6.5) respectively. The result is
plotted in Figure 6.3.) Note in particular that OS is welfare-dominant in
highly concentrated industries (low values of n), for limited substitutability
(low values of γ), and situations where both n and γ are moderate. More
concisely, OS is welfare-superior where h = 2 + (n − 1)γ is small. Fur-
thermore, OS is also welfare-dominant for very high values of γ. Pure OS
are thus superior both for low quantity competition and very high quality
competition.








Pure OS is Welfare Superior
Pure CS is Welfare Superior
Number of Firms (n)
14Our results do not change significantly for values different than φ = 2, see Appendix D.3
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Result 4. We find (a) that Pure-OS industries are welfare superior to Pure-
CS industries for low values of quantity competition, (b) that Pure-CS in-
dustries are welfare-superior to Pure-OS industries for high values of quan-
tity competition, and (c) that Pure-CS industries again become welfare-
superior to Pure-OS industries when competing products are very close
substitutes so that quality competition is intense.
6.3.2.2 Mixed OS/CS-Industries
We now extend our welfare analysis to include arbitrary mixes of OS and
CS firms where the proportion of firms creating OS is given by ω = z/n.
We want to know whether Mixed OS/CS, Pure-CS, or Pure-OS industries
generate more welfare. We therefore use (6.8) to calculate welfare for
each pair (ω, γ), and compare this against our results for Pure-OS and
Pure-CS industries. (For more details on the welfare function see Appendix
A.3). Figure 6.4 depicts our results for industries containing n= 100 firms,
φ = 2. (We plot the welfare of Pure-CS, Pure-OS and Mixed OS/CS with
φ = 2 and n = 100 depending on ω and γ. The topview of the resulting
3-D plots yields Figure 6.4.)
Figure 6.4 contains four distinct regions. The largest region consists of
mixed states that are welfare-superior to the corresponding Pure-OS or
Pure-CS state. Furthermore, readers can confirm by inspection that such
welfare-superior mixed states exist for all values of γ. Thus, provided that
ω (the proportion of OS-firms) can be suitably chosen mixed industries are
the better choice. While we have depicted this situation for the special case
of n = 100, this statement is in fact generally true for all large n, while for
very concentrated industries (small n) the situation can differ (For some
low value of γ welfare-superior mixed states might not exist as Pure-OS is
superior for all ω. See Figure D.2 and Figure D.3 in Appendix D.4).
In practice, of course, policymakers may have no direct control over the
proportion of OS-firms (ω) in the market. In this case, pure states will
sometimes offer higher welfare than mixed ones. This is reflected in the
two smallest regions of the graph which are, in effect, much-shrunken
versions of the Pure-OS and Pure-CS states depicted in Figure 6.3. First,
consider the high ω region where OS firms greatly outnumber CS firms.
Here, Pure-CS states are welfare-superior to mixed states for the same rea-
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Figure 6.4: Welfare-Comparison of Pure vs. Mixed Cases (n= 100,φ = 2)
Mix of OS and CS firms better




CS-only better than mix


























sons that they dominate Pure-OS states. This region shrinks and eventually
disappears as industry becomes more concentrated so that OS firms can ap-
propriate value despite high γ. (see Figure D.2 and Figure D.3 in Appendix
D.4). Second, Pure-OS is welfare-superior to mixed states in low ω/low γ
cases where CS firms greatly outnumber OS firms and products have low
substitutability. Here, OS firms can recover their investments even without
intellectual property protection. As a result, cost-sharing dominates the
welfare analysis so that Pure-OS states become superior. This region grows
for concentrated (low n) markets until OS firms can recoup their invest-
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ments even for moderate γ. The result is a drastically simplified graph in
which the welfare-dominant regions are either Mixed-OS/CS or Pure-OS
states (Figure D.3, Appendix D.4).
Finally, consider the lower right-hand corner of Figure 6.4. Here, only
pure states are possible because (a) strong competition limits OS firms’
ability to appropriate profits from improved products, and (b) the small
number of OS firms limits the savings otherwise available from shared de-
velopment. This means that the profit-maximizing investment for OS-firms
facing CS-competition is to produce no software at all.15 As a result, the
only meaningful choice is between Pure-CS and Pure-OS-states. Here, the
Pure-CS state turns out to be welfare-superior (see Figure 6.3 for the case
of n = 100).16 This region also disappears for highly concentrated indus-
tries where competition is weak (Figure D.3, Appendix D.4).
Welfare also differs within the mixed regions. For example, welfare in
an n = 100 industry with γ = 0.5 reaches its maximum when OS-firms
account for 20 % of all firms: While producer surplus reaches its maximum
atω = 99 %, consumer surplus has an inverse U-shape with its peak atω =
18 %. The shape of consumer surplus is driven by the quality of the bundles
available in the market and is maximized at a reasonable mix of high a
few quality high-priced OS-bundles and many low-quality, low-priced CS-
bundles. Thus, total welfare is maximized at a point where the OS firms
select the much higher output levels when quality competition is supplied
by a relatively high number of CS firms.
Result 5. Except for highly concentrated industries (low n), suitably-cho-
sen mixed industries are always welfare-superior to Pure-OS or Pure-CS
industries. These mixed states are usually welfare-superior because they
feature enough OS firms to efficiently share costs and enough CS firms
to provide quality competition. However, Pure-OS industries can still be
welfare-superior to Mixed-OS/CS states where industry concentration is
high.
15There is also a miniscule region where OS-firms develop code and CS-development is
driven to zero. The area is located near the mixed cases border.
16Pure-OS is superior in a small number of cases where γ is very close to one.
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6.4 Stable Outcomes in Case of Free Entry
We now know which situations (Pure-OS, Pure-CS, Mixed OS/CS) provide
the most welfare. Here, we explore the extent to which markets actu-
ally deliver these outcomes. Except for Baake and Wichmann (2004) and
Schmidtke (2006), previous contributions start from the assumption that
industry size is fixed (Casadesus-Masanell and Llanes, 2009; Llanes and
de Elejalde, 2009; Henkel, 2006, e.g.).17 Absent compelling empirical ev-
idence, however, ignoring entry seems artificial. Furthermore, the propor-
tion of OS-firms (ω = z/n) and welfare implications of these models depend
on initial assumptions about the number of firms. Leaving industry size a
free parameter limits their predictive power.
We adopt a different approach. Specifically, we use our very general
model to systematically identify and evaluate the specific combinations of
incumbents (n) and the proportion of OS-firms (ω) that we expect to find
in real markets. More specifically, we assume that industries will continue
to evolve under entry until additional OS and CS can no longer earn a
positive profit by entering the market.
Section 6.4.1 assumes that a Mixed-OS/CS industry already exists and
asks which proportions of OS-firms generate stable market equilibria (i.e. ,
resist further entry by OS and CS-firms). Significantly, we find that these
proportions are systematically different from the target proportions that
would be needed to maximize welfare. Section 6.4.2 then shows how indus-
tries can be locked into Pure-OS and Pure-CS states so that the transition
to welfare-improving mixed industries never occurs.
6.4.1 The OS:CS Ratio in Equilibrium
In order to be stable, an arbitrary mix of CS and OS firms must satisfy the
following conditions: (a) incumbent OS firms a earn profit ≥ 0, (b) incum-
bent CS firms likewise earn a profit ≥ 0, and (c) would-be additional OS
and CS firms cannot earn a profit ≥ 0 by entering the market. We start by
analyzing the case in which the total number of firms is large. Because such
17Schmidtke (2006) likewise considers entry in the special case of duopoly incumbents.
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markets are highly competitive, we expect each firm’s (economic) profit to
be identically zero. We thus make us of the zero-profits condition (5.16):
πi∈Z = pi∈Z · qi∈Z − ci∈Z − C = πi∈R = pi∈R · qi∈R− ci∈R − C = 0.
Significantly, the necessary condition pi∈Z ·qi∈Z − ci∈Z = pi∈R ·qi∈R− ci∈R
depends solely on γ, omega, n and φ . Figure 6.5 displays the (γ, ω) pairs
needed to ensure stability for a market containing n = 100 firms where
φ = 2. (We solve the necessary condition, with n= 100, for γ and plot the
results of φ = 2 and φ = 5. Taking into account that xos, xcs ≥ 0 yields
Figure 6.5.)































Readers can confirm by inspection that the proportion of OS-firms (a)
increases in φ, i.e. is higher where marginal costs increase steeply, and
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(b) decreases in γ, i.e. declines in industries where ‘stage two’-products are
close substitutes so that competition is high. The relatively large proportion
of OS firms for most parameters occurs because any arbitrary number of
OS firms is almost always more profitable than an equivalent number of CS
firms in our model. This result is dramatically different from Llanes and
de Elejalde (2009), who find that OS firms are only more profitable than
CS firms when cost-sharing dominates appropriability. We attribute this
difference to quality cartel effects which systematically boosts OS profits in
our model.
Despite this, CS firms still sell more bundles (i.e., have larger market
share) than OS firms. Furthermore, as markets become more competitive
(large γ), the average CS firm’s market share grows while the average OS
firm’s market share shrinks. For γ = 1 the total number of bundles contain-
ing CS code greatly exceeds those containing OS code (see also Chapter
5). This result is strongly reminiscent of many industries (e.g. cell phones)
where most consumers use products containing CS software even though
OS firms greatly outnumber CS firms.
We have already seen that our model lets us calculate the welfare-optimal
mix of OS and CS firms. Superimposing this plot on Figure 6.6 we see our
stability condition (solid line) requires far more OS firms than the number
needed to optimize welfare (dash-dotted line). (The market outcome is
calculated as for Figure 6.5. To obtain the welfare optimal share of the
n = 100 , φ = 2 case, we solve ∂W/∂ω = 0 for γ. Taking into account that
xos, xcs ≥ 0 and πi∈Z , πi∈R = 0 yields Figure 6.6.) This dramatic mismatch
between the OS:CS ratio expected in equilibrium and the desired welfare-
optimizing ratio is a central result of this article and poses an important
challenge to policymakers.
The situation for concentrated (small n) industries is conceptually similar
but more complicated. Since the number of CS and OS firms is always an
integer,18 the number of possible CS/OS ratios that can actually be realized
in practice is small—for example, there are just four choices (0, 2/4, 3/4, 1)
in a four-firm industry.19 Thus, the stable OS:CS ratio predicted by our
18Of course this condition holds even for large n. Nevertheless, it can usually be neglected
unless n is small.
19Since OS only generates cost savings when there are two or more firms to share code, the
1/3 solution is economically indistinguishable from the case of three CS firms.
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Figure 6.6: Mixed Industry with n = 100 - Welfare Optimality vs. Market
Outcome (φ = 2)
Gap between market outcome and






























zero-profits analysis splits into two stable equilibria. For example in a four
firm industry with γ = 0.95 our single predicted equilibrium at 0.69 can
be realized by possible equilibria at 0.5 and also at 0.75. The 0.5 result
improves welfare compared to our zero-profits calculation (0.69) while the
0.75 result makes it worse.
Result 6. Mixed OS/CS industries are only stable against entry when in-
cumbents earn zero (or, for concentrated industries, very limited) profit.
Using this criterion, we find that there are typically far more OS than CS
firms in mixed industries. In particular, the number of OS firms is very
much greater than the number required to maximize welfare. CS firms, on
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the other hand, tend to have larger market shares than OS firms and this is
especially true where firms’ products are close substitutes (large γ).
6.4.2 Pure States and the Danger of Lock-In
We have seen that welfare optimality requires mixed OS/CS states. Sup-
pose, though, that a particular industry starts off in a Pure OS- or CS-state.
In this case, welfare improvements are bounded unless the industry can
transition to a mixed state. Here, we explore the various circumstances
under which industries can become locked in against such transitions.
6.4.2.1 Pure OS
Suppose incumbents’ profits in a Pure-OS industry are zero so that further
OS entry is impossible. Our model allows us to calculate whether a CS
entrant would earn a non-negative profit. Figure 6.7 displays this infor-
mation for industries with different numbers of OS incumbents. (The zero
profit condition for the z OS incumbents, πn=zi∈Z = 0, yields the correspond-
ing stage two costs Cn=z = pi∈Z qi∈Z − ci∈Z . CS-entry occurs only if the
entrant’s profits πn=z+1
i∈R = pi∈Rqi∈R−ci∈R−Cn=z are greater than zero. Solv-
ing πn=z+1
i∈R = 0 for γ yields the boundary plotted in Figure 6.7.) This figure
shows that industries can indeed be locked into a Pure-OS state that sup-
presses welfare. This only happens, however, where substitutability and/or
the number of OS incumbents is small.
6.4.2.2 Pure CS
The case for OS firms’ entry into a CS market is more subtle. Consider a
Pure-CS industry in which incumbents’ profits are zero. As before, we as-
sume that this Pure-CS case is unstable if OS firms can earn a non-negative
profit by entering. Since OS only confers economic benefits when firms
are able to share costs, however, two or more firms must enter the market
to reach a stable outcome. We therefore consider the case where two OS
companies are (a) willing to enter the market, and (b) would earn a profit
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if both did so.20 Then the first OS firm will not enter the market unless
it knows that the second firm will also enter immediately afterward. This
means, by induction, that it will enter if and only if the second firm is as-
sured of earning a profit. But this is exactly what the GPL license does.
By making its own code GPL, the first entrant commits to the specific OS
regime that allows the second entrant to earn a profit. We therefore con-
clude that there is no fundamental reason why Pure-CS states cannot tran-
sition to Mixed-OS/CS states so long as GPL-like commitment strategies
exist. (For an alternative motivation of OS-entry see Appendix D.5)
The stability of the Pure-CS state depends on whether the two OS en-
trants can earn non-negative profits. Figure 6.8 depicts this situation. (The
zero profit condition for the r CS incumbents, πn=ri∈R = 0, yields the corre-
20Our argument does conceptually not depend on this assumption and holds equally for
“two or more” OS-entrants.
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sponding stage two costs Cn=r = pi∈Rqi∈R − ci∈R. OS-entry occurs only if
the profits of each of the two entrants πn=r+2
i∈Z = pi∈Z qi∈Z − ci∈Z − Cn=r are
greater than zero. Solving πn=r+2
i∈Z = 0 for γ yields the boundary plotted
in Figure 6.8.) While the Pure-CS state is unstable for most parameters, it
is stable for (a) the concentrated, low n industries, most characteristic of
Silicon Valley, and (b) industries whose products that are close substitutes.





































6.4.2.3 Strategic CS Adoption by Incumbents
The preceding analyses make no assumptions about why a particular indus-
try should find itself in a Pure-OS or Pure-CS state. Here we show that firms
in some concentrated industries can deliberately stabilize their industry in
a Pure-CS state. Readers should note that this strategy is only available to
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incumbents operating inside the ”No OS-Entry” regions of Figure 6.8. Out-
side these regions, OS firms can enter no matter what incumbents decide.
We explore this phenomenon by inserting a new stage 0 into our model.
In this extension, incumbents decide whether to adopt OS or CS in stage 0a
and e entrants decide whether or not to enter in stage 0b. The model then
proceeds as before through stage one (incumbents and entrants calculate
how much OS and CS software to develop) and stage two (firms develop
a complementary product at cost C and decide how much to supply). As
before, we define equilibria by the condition that new entrants would earn
negative profit. In general, we expect incumbents to strategically adopt CS
over OS whenever doing so will (a) block OS entrants, (b) block additional
CS entrants, and (c) produce greater profits than incumbents would earn
in a world where open source entry occurred.
To see how this extended model works, consider the example of a highly
concentrated (n = 4) and differentiated (γ = 0.3) industry in the case
where C = 0.1055. Absent entry, firms can earn profits of about 0.062 by
adopting OS and nearly 0.023 by adopting CS. However, the OS profit is
illusory since the savings from code-sharing would allow two additional
OS firms to enter the market after which industry profits would fall close
to zero (π = 0.000446). By contrast, adopting CS is stable since in this
case any new combination of CS and/or OS entrants would earn negative
profits. We therefore expect our four incumbents to deliberately block entry
by adopting CS. And this will be true even though entry following an OS
decision would create an n= 6 Pure-OS industry that offers higher welfare.
As usual, we expect these entry effects to be greatest for industries that are
highly concentrated (small n) or feature low substitutability (low γ).
Result 7. Industries that start in a Pure-OS (-CS) state can be stable against
the CS (OS) entry that would be needed to achieve a welfare-superior
Mixed-OS/CS state. Incumbents may also adopt CS strategically in cases
where choosing OS would facilitate entry and erode oligopoly profits.
6.5 Government Intervention
So far, we have limited our analysis to asking how much software we ex-
pect OS and CS firms to supply in equilibrium. However, government can
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also intervene to change this private sector outcome. For example, we
have stressed the role of OS as a de facto cartel that suppresses quality
competition. In principle, government could redress this using antitrust
(competitions) policy to render OS collaborations illegal. This, however,
would eliminate OS even where we expect it to be welfare-superior. More
fundamentally, it seems wasteful to discard OS’s cost-sharing advantage
unnecessarily. This section asks whether traditional policy levers based on
taxation and preferred procurement policies can provide a better solution.
6.5.1 Tax Policy
This section examines how government can use lump sum and progressive
taxes and tax breaks to change industry output of OS and CS code.
6.5.1.1 Discriminatory Lump-Sum Taxes
We have seen that market forces in Mixed-OS/CS industries invariably de-
liver far more OS firms than welfare-optimization requires. This suggests
that the governments should view typical proposals to foster OS as an infant
industry, say through special tax breaks, with suspicion. To the contrary:
The most obvious way to improve welfare in our model is to promote CS
firms instead. This is best done by taxing OS firms, giving tax breaks to CS
firms, or both.
For concreteness, consider a scheme where government imposes a fixed,
lump-sum tax on OS firms and uses the proceeds to give lump-sum tax
breaks or subsidies to CS firms. Detailed calculation confirms the intuition
that these interventions do indeed reduce the equilibrium ω in our model
Figure 6.9 presents a stylized illustration of this process. Here, suitable
taxation adjusts the market outcome so that it coincides with the desired
welfare-optimal proportion of OS firms. Furthermore, our hypothetical
lump sum taxes and tax breaks transfer profits from OS to CS firms while
leaving total industry profits unchanged. This means that both the desired
welfare-optimal OS:CS ratio and achievable welfare remain the same as
before. This suggests that taxes and tax breaks are a potentially powerful
tool. In practice, the main drawback is that government may not be able to
estimate the welfare optimal OS:CS ratio and/or proper taxation with any
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degree of precision. In this case, ambitious transfer schemes could easily
end up over-taxing OS firms and over-subsidizing their CS competitors. Ad-
ditionally, per-firm profits after new taxes and tax breaks could sometimes
be negative, forcing government to make up the difference from general
revenues.
6.5.1.2 Progressive Input-Tax
Lump sum taxes are not the only option. In principle, government can also
use progressive input-oriented taxation to change OS and CS-firms’ effec-
tive marginal cost function to (φ + t)x where t denotes the tax. Detailed
calculation shows, however, that this intervention does nothing to bring
equilibrium OS:CS ratios in mixed industries closer to welfare optimality.
The reason is that taxation simultaneously shifts both the OS:CS equilib-
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rium ratio and the target welfare-optimal ratio in the same direction. This
leaves the gap between the two just as wide as it was before.
On the other hand, changes in (effective) marginal costs do affect entry.
This suggests that they could have a significant impact in helping Pure-
CS or Pure-OS industries evolve into Mixed-OS/CS industries. Even here,
however, value-added taxes provide an ambiguous intervention. To see this,
compare a government tax policy that increases the slope of the (effective)
marginal costs to φ + t = 5 (Figure 6.10) compared to the φ + t = 2
case depicted Figure 6.8. On the one hand, taxation has eliminated the
right-hand (high γ) region where CS industries were formerly stable. This
clearly facilitates transitions to welfare-improving mixed states. On the
other hand, taxation also increases the second region near the bottom of
the figure where CS is stable. This suggests that policymakers trying to
destabilize a Pure-CS industry could accidentally reinforce it instead. This
is particularly likely to happen for high γ/low n industries where the two
regions are close to one another.
6.5.2 Government Provision of OS Software
Government can also intervene by paying contractors to create additional
OS code over and above what the market supplies. We have already re-
marked that many countries have established different institutes, collab-
orations, grants, and partnerships to fund OS software development and
adoption. The analysis is simplest for pure-CS markets where incumbents
would otherwise be able to block entry by OS firms. Here, government-
supplied OS reduces entry costs so that an OS sector can establish itself.
The case for government funding in mixed industries is more ambiguous
because it takes place at two levels. The first effect takes place entirely
within the private sector. Government-supported OS simultaneously (a)
makes OS firms more profitable so that the equilibrium ω increases, and
(b) reduces OS firms’ incentives to produce their own code (government
OS crowds out private investment) so that the welfare-optimal ω falls. The
net result is to make the already-large mismatch between the equilibrium
and desired welfare-optimizing proportion of firms even worse. Indeed,
sufficiently large government OS investments can drive CS firms out of the
market entirely.
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The second effect takes place across the entire economy. Suppose that
government only cares about achieving the correct level of production with-
out regard to how much the private sector contributes. Suppose further
that government contractors have the same cost structure that the pri-
vate OS firms do. Then the new, government-supplied code writers can
be thought of as an additional OS firm that chooses output based on gov-
ernment fiat instead of our Cournot analysis. This allows policymakers to
select any desired level of quality and still benefit from significant sharing
with other private sector OS firms.21 In principle, government can use this
lever to increase welfare although it may be hard to estimate how much
OS software to fund in practice.
21Llanes and de Elejalde (2009) similarly predict that government investment in OS in-
creases the OS stock directly and also encourages more OS firms to enter the market.
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6.5.3 Government Procurement Preferences
We have already noted that government is a major software purchaser.
Many governments have tried to turn this spending into a policy instrument
by establishing formal preferences (and even mandatory requirements) that
systematically favor OS over CS products. This provides a powerful incen-
tive for new OS entrants in cases where Pure-CS industries that would not
otherwise evolve into welfare-improving mixed states.
In order to analyze the impact of preferences on mixed industries we add
government demand to our model by assuming that government procures
D bundles. We start with a neutral government as reference: Absent pref-
erences, government buys one bundle from each firm so that each firm’s
demand is shifted by d = D/n. With government OS preferences, however,
each OS firm sees an extra demand of d = D/z while CS firms see d = 0.
As with government provision of OS code, this widens the gap between the
equilibrium ω and the ω needed to maximize welfare. Furthermore, the
equilibrium proportion of OS firms increases. Unlike the case of govern-
ment provided OS, this intervention reduces welfare. The new equilibrium
ω has lower welfare than the equilibriumω for a neutral government. Con-
versely, government procurement preferences for CS22 yield the opposite
results and increase welfare.
Result 8. Government can use various policy instruments to improve wel-
fare by reducing high equilibrium proportions of OS firms. These include
competitions policy (antitrust), taxation and tax break schemes, govern-
ment-funded OS development, and government procurement preferences.
Of these, tax policy provides the most natural instrument for achieving the
target proportion needed to optimize welfare through private sector invest-
ment. By contrast, government-provided OS actually increases the gap be-
tween the desired and actual OS:CS ratio and depresses private OS invest-
ment still further. Despite this, government-funded OS still improves social
welfare by boosting the total (private + government) supply of OS. Govern-
ment procurement preferences for OS software have the worst outcome by
not only increasing the gap between desired and equilibrium OS:CS ratio
but also reducing total welfare.
22In this case each CS firm has an extra demand of d = D/r and CS firms have d = 0.
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6.6 Discussion
We have presented a general model that allows us to compare equilibrium
OS:CS ratios against the target ratios that would be needed to maximize
welfare. However, it remains possible that real markets may require more
complex models. This section explores the extent to which such extended
models would qualitatively change our results.
6.6.1 Basic Analysis
Our model OS output reflects a delicate balance between (a) lower per-firm
costs through shared development, (b) reduced appropriability and hence
smaller investment incentives in case of strong quantity competition, and
(c) a cartel effect that suppresses quality competition among OS firms. The
first two effects are fairly straightforward and have previously been noted
in, for example, Llanes and de Elejalde (2009), and Henkel (2006).
To the best of our knowledge, however, our third (”quality cartel”) fac-
tor has never been noticed before. This is puzzling because Llanes and
de Elejalde (2009)’s model is somewhat similar to ours. We conjecture
that quality cartels do not appear in their model because they require firms
to set quality and prices in a single, simultaneous decision. Introducing a
single simultaneous decision similarly suppresses quality competition (and
therefore quality cartel effects) in our model.23 We therefore expect a sim-
ilar ”quality cartel” effect to appear in an extended Llanes and de Eleljalde
model—and, indeed, most generic models that require firms to make their
quality and price decisions sequentially. Such models are also more re-
alistic given the substantial lags between most firms’ R&D (i.e. software)
investment and pricing/output decisions.
23We analyzed a one-stage version of our model where firms choose the profit-maximizing
(price, quality) pair. In the Pure-CS case quality competition is so weak that output
continues to decline even at high γ.. In the Pure-OS case, our results approximate the
results for a formal OS quality-cartel described in Appendix D.1
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6.6.2 Technology Assumptions
The quality of our bundles is completely determined by a single technology
(software) which is (a) indivisible, (b) can be developed jointly, (c) can
be shared, and (d) confers an identical quality “boost” on every product
with which it is compatible.24 In principle, all of these assumptions can be
relaxed.
Our first assumption that all quality comes from a single indivisible tech-
nology (“software”) is more general than it looks since “software” can triv-
ially be relabeled (a) to include other technologies (e.g. hardware) and (b)
to exclude any technology (including GPL code) that is only usable by the
author. Assuming that software is indivisible, however, does exclude situ-
ations where quality depends on multiple technologies each of which can
be separately developed using OS or CS methods. One natural speculation
is to ask what happens when firms can also invest in a second technol-
ogy whose benefits are primarily limited to their own ‘stage two’-product.
Intuitively, we would expect this additional quality investment to drain re-
sources from stage one R&D leading to fewer OS firms, less cost-sharing,
and less development of shared software. This is more or less what happens
when Llanes and de Eleljalde (2009) allow firms in their model to invest in
a second technology focused narrowly on their products. The existence of
a second, severable technology also facilitates strategic behaviors in which
firms keep at least one technology closed as a barrier to entry (Schmidtke
2006).
Relaxing the second assumption that firms can develop code jointly is
likely to be strongly model-dependent and should probably await convinc-
ing evidence that such failings actually exist. In the meantime, we note
that Henkel (2006) has explored a model in which joint development is
impractical at the level of individual OS modules so that each project is
effectively controlled by one (and only one) company. Henkel argues that
firms self-select toward developing whichever modules they value most and
that this biases total OS investment upward. More generally, one can also
imagine models in which OS joint development is possible but inefficient
or imperfectly monitored. This could happen, for example, if participants
24Conversely, the software confers no benefit on incompatible products. These are auto-
matically excluded from out model.
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adopted mixed strategies that encouraged them to strategically withhold
effort from the collaboration in hopes that some other member would do
the work (Johnson, 2002)
The third assumption that firms can share OS might be relaxed if, for
example, substantial ”tacit knowledge” was needed to use completed soft-
ware. We therefore explored a variation of our model hat features a “spill-
over parameter” σ ∈]0,1], such that αi = 1+σX os. We find that our OS
results gradually converge to CS where spillovers are small.
Finally, completed software may not boost all firms’ products quality
equally. Naively, we would expect the presence of some firms that gain
relatively little from OS to produce free-rider effects. However, Henkel
(2006) has shown that the existence of specialized interests within firms
can actually increase total OS production. Relatedly, firms’ willingness to
invest in OS could depend on the size of their respective stage two mar-
kets. It would be natural to investigate this by allowing different qualities
of the ‘stage two’-products in our model. For now, it is probably safe to say
that the answer will sensitively depend on how many separate technolo-
gies exist and the distribution of preferences among firms. Absent detailed
empirical guidance, it will be hard to know which models to investigate.
6.6.3 Demand Side Assumptions
Our model assumes that consumers choose between products based quan-
tity supplied, substitutability, and a one-dimensional ‘quality’ parameter
based on the amount of software produced. We recognize, however, that
consumers may have idiosyncratic preferences for particular products. Na-
ively, we expect strong consumer preferences to reduce the payoffs from
quality improvements leading to lower code production. To the best of our
knowledge, Llanes and de Elejalde (2009) are the only authors who have in-
vestigated firms’ decisions to invest in quality using a Hotelling model that
includes for idiosyncratic demand and allows for n > 2 firms. While their
results are broadly similar to ours, Pure-OS industries are indeed much
more common in their model. We conjecture that idiosyncratic consumer
preferences reduce the importance of appropriability so that shared OS
software production becomes more lucrative.
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Similarly, the degree of substitutability (γ) is exogenous in our model.
Over time, however, one might expect firms to design new products strate-
gically so that γ becomes endogenous. This could be accomplished by, for
example, linking our two appropriability variables n and γ. Alternatively,
one might think that shared code would make OS products more similar
(higher γ) to each other than to CS products. Llanes and de Elejalde (2009)
explore this possibility by introducing different substitutability parameters
for bundles that contain OS compared to bundles that contain CS. Not sur-
prisingly, they find that increased substitutability leads to greater compe-
tition among OS firms which, in turn, makes CS firms larger and more
profitable. We conjecture that endogenizing substitutability in our model
would produce similar results.
Finally, we have limited our analysis to the case where products are sub-
stitutes. However, not all products compete and some are complements.
As Schmidtke implicitly points out, OS provides a natural way for firms to
encourage the production of complements that promise to increase their
own product sales. Extending the current model to include this case would
be reasonably straightforward. Doing so would probably mitigate the free
rider but not the cartel effect. Furthermore, the number of such comple-
mentary products—and hence the importance of Schmidtke’s observation—
remains unclear.
6.6.4 ‘Spooky’ OS Incentives
We started this chapter by remarking that commercial incentives have in-
creasingly crowded out other incentives. However, volunteer labor remains
important for many OS collaborations and dominate some. In principle,
some of this voluntarism may reflect the desire for future wages and could
in principle be endogenized in our model as a kind of prize. In general,
however, many motives (reputation, altruism, fugue-state) are likely to re-
main forever outside predictive modeling. Following Einstein’s reference to
“spooky action at a distance” (Pais, 1983) we refer to such non-commercial
incentives as ‘spooky OS’ in what follows.
The effects of spooky OS on our model are similar to those already con-
sidered for government provided OS. Thus, we expect increased spooky
OS to (a) increase the total supply of OS, (b) increase the total number
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of OS firms, and (c) reduce the total amount of OS produced for commer-
cial reasons. The main difference is that spooky OS potentially increases
welfare faster than government OS. The reason is that programmers who
gain psychic benefits from voluntarily supplying spooky OS have already
been compensated. By definition, such hobby activities have no opportu-
nity costs and thus increase welfare even more (see also von Engelhardt
and Pasche 2004).
6.7 Conclusions and Outlook
Today’s open source is increasingly dominated by business strategies in
which firms make proprietary products whose quality depends on a shared
OS code base. We have presented a generic Cournot model based on simple,
realistic assumptions about the costs of developing OS and CS code. We
find that Pure-OS industries are welfare-superior to Pure-CS states so long
as quantity competition is modest so that appropriability is high. Otherwise,
Pure-CS industries are welfare-superior except for some industries where
cost functions rise so steeply that CS firms are forced deep into diminishing
returns in the case of nearly-identical products and strong quality compe-
tition. Finally, mixed industries containing a suitably-selected proportion
of OS firms are superior to both Pure-OS and Pure-CS industries. This is
because the presence of CS firms introduces quality competition which in-
duces OS firms to produce much more code than they otherwise would.
Ironically, then, OS is only able to realize the full benefits of cost-sharing
when CS firms are present.
Unfortunately, we find no evidence that the OS:CS ratios needed to max-
imize welfare are ever realized in practice. Instead, equilibrium mixed
states consistently produce too many OS firms. Additionally, many pure
markets are stable and cannot transition to the mixed markets needed to
improve welfare. In some cases, incumbents can also deliberately block
entry by choosing CS.
Policymakers trying to improve welfare can cope with these problems in
several ways. Probably the most elegant (and also revenue-neutral) pro-
posal is to tax OS firms and use the proceeds to subsidize their CS rivals.
A more politically-correct—and ambitious—alternative would be for gov-
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ernment to fund OS production directly. This would increase welfare over
the market outcome although it also widens the gap between the equilib-
rium and welfare optimal proportion of OS firms. By contrast, procurement
preferences that concentrate government spending on OS bundles should
be rejected. Such schemes invariable decrease welfare and make the mis-
match between the equilibrium and welfare-optimal proportion of OS firms
even worse.
Finally, Section 6.4 shows that inferior lock-ins in Pure industries are pos-
sible, and incumbents might choose CS over OS to block entry. This points
to the importance of entry. In addition, firms in the model are symmetric,
except for the horizontal and vertical (quality) differences of their products.
Chapter 4 points out that different individual resources are one reason why
some economic agents choose the OS regime and others the CS regime.
Taking these two aspects together leads to the question of how firms en-
tering the market with OSS-based business models differ from those with
CSS-based business models. The next chapter deals with this question.
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7 Who Starts with Open Source?
Institutional Choice of German
ICT Start-Ups
7.1 Introduction∗
Institutions affect start-up activities and entrepreneurship in many ways.1
Typically, institutions differ among regions, countries or sectors. Research
on the connection between entrepreneurship and IPRs (Burke and Fraser,
2007), or between entrepreneurship and institutions in general (Amoros,
2009; Hall and Sobel, 2008; Nyström, 2008) therefore has to compare re-
gions or countries. A more direct comparative research is possible only if
firms from the same country and sector can choose different institutional
(sub-)settings. The ICT sector offers such an opportunity, as here firms can
choose between the two different, software-related IPR regimes OSS and
CSS. Firms with OSS- and CSS-based business act not only in the same sec-
tor but often directly compete in the same market. This chapter analyses
the choice of OSS- vs. CSS-based business models of new business forma-
tions in the German ICT sector.
As already mentioned, OSS vs. CSS lead to different allocations of IPRs
and different governance structures regarding the software development
process. This has implications for firms using OSS- rather than CSS-based
business models. The following is a brief description of these differences,
for more details see 1.2.2, 1.2.3 and Chapter 4. CSS is based on exclusive
ownership of the software and its source code. Beside cases like contract
programming, CSS-users do not have the right to change or further develop
∗This Chapter is based on Fritsch and von Engelhardt (2010)
1See for example Acs et al. (2008); Foss and Foss (2006); Henrekson and Sanandaji
(2010); Henrekson (2007), for an overview see Bosma et al. (2010).
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the code (abusus). CSS-licenses only transfer the right to use the software
as it is (usus and usus fructus). Consequently, the source code is “closed”
as customers receive only the binary code, which is the machine-readable
version. CSS-users have to pay license fees for using the software, while
the source code remains with the developing firm. Hence, the exclusively
owned source code is an asset for the developing firm. In contrast, OSS is
based on inclusive ownership. The OSS licenses transfer the usus, usus fruc-
tus and also the abusus rights. Therefore OSS is marked by free access to
the source code in order to enable users to change and further develop the
code. However, many OSS licenses contain restrictions to ensure that OSS
cannot be turned into CSS. Hence, firms cannot use OSS code as an exclu-
sive asset, and one cannot separate producers from users via IPR-allocation.
Thus, OSS is developed by community-based projects. Such OSS projects
are governed by a mix of formal and informal institutions. This implies, for
example, that firms with OSS-based business models have to act compliant
with the community rules, otherwise they risk that cooperation is stopped
etc. Finally, firms with OSS business models have to generate revenue by
selling products (goods or services) that are complements to the free acces-
sible OSS.
So far, research on OSS-based business models has focused on OSS firms
only. The literature analyzes the various business models of OSS-firms
(Bonaccorsi et al., 2006; Ghosh et al., 2002a), why and how they are en-
gaged in the OSS community (Dahlander and Magnusson, 2006; Dahlander
and Wallin, 2006; Rossi and Bonaccorsi, 2006) or release software prod-
ucts under OSS licenses (Fosfuri et al., 2008; Harison and Cowan, 2004),
and whether such community-participation has an impact on their perfor-
mance (Stam, 2009), etc. The relationship between OSS and entrepreneur-
ship is analyzed by Gruber and Henkel (2006), who focus on new ven-
tures that apply embedded Linux. Based on data from personal interviews
they conclude that the key challenges for new ventures discussed in the
entrepreneurship literature are of less relevance for such OSS-firms. To the
best of our knowledge, the only two comparative studies of OSS and CSS
firms are Lamastra Rossi (2009) and Harison and Koski (2010). Based
on a sample of 134 software solutions developed by Italian small and
medium sized enterprises, Lamastra Rossi (2009) concludes that OSS so-
lutions seems to be more innovative. Harison and Koski (2010) use survey
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data from 170 Finish software companies and analyze how the firms’ prop-
erties shape their OSS-vs-CSS decision. They distinguish between firms
with no OSS (firms that provide only CSS) and firms with OSS (either
purely or as hybrid strategy, i.e. an OSS-CSS-mix). Harison and Koski
(2010) find that the decision to use some vs. no OSS can be explained
by several characteristics of the software firms. In particular, human capi-
tal (education) has a positive impact on OSS strategies, and firms that are
younger and smaller more often apply OSS supply strategies. Software
firms owned by one or two individuals or a family tend to be CSS-only.
Finally the magnitude of the service variety provided by the firms has a
positive impact on the propensity to adopt OSS strategies.
The study presented in this chapter analyzes which aspects shape the
institutional choice (OSS- vs. CSS-based business models) of German ICT
start-ups. We distinguish different levels of OSS-intensity—ranging from
never OSS to always OSS—in the different business fields of the ICT start-
ups, ranging form hardware and software to web-related services. The
remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 gives an
overview on the relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship
based on a conceptual model. We then develop in Section 7.3 our hypothe-
ses about the connection between the characteristics of new businesses and
their decisions to use OSS- or CSS-based business models. Section 7.4 intro-
duces the data and Section 7.5 reports the results of the empirical analysis.
Finally, we discuss our findings and draw conclusions for further research
(Section 7.6).
7.2 Institutions and Entrepreneurship
The relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship can be explai-
ned on the basis of a conceptual model (Figure 7.1). The starting point of
this conceptual model entails the feasible entrepreneurial opportunities, i.e.
existing chances that are in principle accessible for everyone (for a more
detailed exposition see Bosma et al., 2010). The available entrepreneurial
opportunities are in many respects shaped by the governing formal and
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informal institutions.2 Examples of how formal institutions shape the en-
trepreneurial opportunities are the formal requirements that have to be
fulfilled before legally starting a business, or labor market regulations. In-
formal institutions like certain modes of conduct, routines, or even culture
(Freytag and Thurik, 2010; Nguyen et al., 2009), also determine (the per-
ception of) entrepreneurial opportunities. The differences of OSS and CSS
with respect to formal (licenses) and informal (e.g. the hacker ethics) in-
stitutions thus determine differences in the entrepreneurial opportunity of
OSS- vs. CSS-based business models. The licenses and the resulting IPR al-
location determine the availability of code, and how this code can be used.
For example, an OSS-based business model can be more flexible as the start-
up firm has access to the source code and can thus change the given code
(e.g. customize)3 Furthermore, the informal institutions of the OSS com-
munity, for example the culture of helping each other but also the notion
of `contributing back’ (expected reciprocity), shape the entrepreneurial op-
portunity.
Because the informal institutions, the unwritten rules, emerge through
the networks of interactions and face-to-face contact, these networks can
be regarded as part of the informal institutions. The overlap between net-
works and informal institutions is particularly due to the fact that certain
rules or a certain ‘culture’ may be specific to a certain network and do not
pertain to other networks, like the example of the OSS hacker ethics shows.
2There is a pronounced interdependence between the formal and the informal institutions.
The formal institutions have often emerged from the informal institutions. However,
the governing formal institutions feed back to the informal institutions by providing
the legal framework for interaction that may lead to the further development of formal
rules. The emergence of OSS is a good example for such a development. OSS emerged
from the dissatisfaction with CSS. Based on the informal institutions of hacker ethics
and a culture of making software freely available, Richard Stallman designed the GPL.
With the GPL Stallman invented a new concept of copyright-based ownership. It was
an act of institutional entrepreneurship that changed the level of institutionalization by
transferring some cultural norms—i.e. informal institutions—into formal institution, i.e.
the GPL
3Of course, customizing given CSS code is also possible. But the difference is that in case
of CSS the firm needs a special license agreement with the original CSS developer and
has to pay license fees. In case of OSS the code can be further developed without such
a special agreement.
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Figure 7.1: Institutions and Entrepreneurship: A Conceptual Model
(Source: Bosma et al., 2010)
The realization of entrepreneurial opportunities depends on the individ-
ual recognition of these chances as well as on the opportunity costs of start-
ing a business instead of pursuing available alternatives (e.g. dependent
employment, unemployment benefits and education opportunities). The
opportunity costs work as a ‘filter’ for the realization of business concepts.
According to the model of occupational choice (Knight, 1921; Lucas, 1978;
Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979; Holmes and Schmitz, 1990) benefits that they
anticipate to earn through employment with those they expect to accrue
from starting a business. The opportunity costs of entrepreneurship are af-
fected (a) by some formal institutions like unemployment benefits or the
tax system, and some informal institutions like the social prestige of self-
employment ot the family history, and (b) by the individual resources as
well as by the available network resources.
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Individual resources comprise all those input factors needed to start a
business such as labor, human capital, financial capital, organizational cap-
ital, social capital, physical capital, knowledge and technology. These rele-
vant resources also include personal characteristics such as education, risk
attitudes, motivations and preferences, that are partially innate, but that
are also influenced and shaped by a persons’ environment (e.g., the role
models).
A persons’ network of relationships, his ego network, represents his or
her organizational capital, i.e. the ability to mobilize resources that are
owned by others for a venture. An important distinction has to be made
between the overall network and the ego network of an individual ac-
tor. Networks may particularly enable actors to connect their individual
resources to the resources of other actors, thereby aggregating and trans-
forming these resources into the overall resource-stock. The total available
resources are the aggregate of the actor’s individual resources and the re-
sources possessed by other actors. They shape an actor’s ability to recog-
nize and to pursue entrepreneurial opportunities. The OSS ‘community’ is
an example for such a type of network that should reduce the amount of
individual resources which are needed to start an own businesses in this
sector.
7.3 CSS- vs. OSS-Based Start-Ups: Hypotheses
ICT-Firms have an institutional choice, as they can choose between OSS-
and CSS-based business models. OSS and CSS co-exist in the market as
well as within firms (hybrid business models). As already mentioned, OSS
business models are based on selling complementary products like hard-
ware, premium versions of the software, or different kinds of service in-
cluding individually customized OSS. Based on the conceptual model of
institutions and entrepreneurship, we will now derive hypothesis about the
factors that shape the degree of OSS vs. CSS usage of ICT start-ups.
First, the decision to use OSS or CSS has implications for the individual
resources needed to start up: CSS-based start-ups either have to pay license
fees for the software, or have to develop the code on their own, i.e. by own
staff. OSS-based start-ups on the contrary can use the code developed by
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the community and may be supported by other member of the community
in the development of the software code. The support that OSS-based start-
ups may receive from the OSS community is mainly based on two channels:
collaborative code development and help via the respective discussion fo-
rums. Particularly the support received via discussion forums, which is an
important part of the OSS culture, may also reduce the amount of person-
nel that is needed to start a firm. Thus the available network resources
of an OSS-based strategy can substitute for individual resources. Conse-
quently, OSS-intensive start-ups should need less personal resources to be
competitive than CSS-based start-ups. Hence, we assume that
H1: OSS-based new businesses start with a smaller size than CSS-based
start-ups.
The expected statistical relationship between OSS usage and start-up size
raises the question of causality: Do founders choose OSS-based business
concepts out of need because they have not enough resources available
to set-up a CSS-based firm, or is the choice of an OSS-based concept pri-
marily motivated by other reasons which are independent of resource re-
quirements? Regarding capital we can control for this issue to some degree
based on information whether a lack of capital was one of the main prob-
lems when starting the business. If we find that OSS founders have indeed
experienced stronger capital bottlenecks than founders of CSS-based firms
this can be regarded an indication that lower capital requirements of an
OSS-based concept may have been the reason to favor this type of strat-
egy. If capital bottlenecks play no special role for OSS founders, then the
smallness of OSS start-ups may be regarded more a result than a reason to
choose OSS. We will assume the latter, as anecdotal evidence indicates that
OSS facilitates new entrepreneurial opportunities and/or it’s recognition.
Therefore we expect that
H2: OSS-intensive start-ups less often have the problem of a lack of own
capital than CSS-based new businesses.
One characteristic of OSS-start-ups in the ICT sector could be having
more problems to convince potential financiers. Basically there are two
reasons why OSS-based founders may face special problems in this respect.
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First, there might be a lack of acceptance because OSS-business models
as such are relatively new and may be regarded more skeptically by po-
tential investors than the more conventional CSS-based concepts. More-
over, financiers might expect that potential customers will only hardly ac-
cept OSS-based solutions. Second, financiers might assess OSS-based start-
ups more risky since the OSS-code as such is public and can, therefore,
hardly be sold. Thus, the economic success of OSS start-ups relies more
on complementary products and services than is the case for CSS start-ups.
Moreover, OSS-based firms depend on the respective software community.
Firms have to act compliant with the informal rules of the community oth-
erwise they will be cut off further cooperation. Generally, the future of an
OSS-based business models depends on the future of the collaboratively
developed OSS project. It may be split up (forking) or even die out be-
cause of lack of further voluntary contributions. In other words: The dif-
ferences in (formal and informal) institutions of OSS vs. CSS determine
differences in the entrepreneurial opportunity of OSS-based business mod-
els. Potential financiers, who have a different opportunity cost filter than
the entrepreneurs, may thus valuate the OSS business models lower than
CSS-based ones. For these reasons, we expect that
H3: OSS-based start-ups have more problems of convincing potential fi-
nanciers than CSS-based new businesses.
As already mentioned above, OSS vs. CSS affects the opportunity cost
filter as it lowers the barriers to entry in terms of individual resources
needed. But relatively low entry barriers for OSS-based businesses may
attract mainly start-ups with relatively poor quality in terms of qualifica-
tion and experience which would be hardly able to set up a CSS-based firm
(Fritsch and Schroeter, 2009; Parker, 2009). This does in no way mean
that all OSS-start-ups are of low quality, but low quality start-ups are more
likely to be OSS-start-ups than be based on CSS. With regard to the qualifi-
cation of the personnel one may, therefore, expect that OSS start-ups with
less experienced founders and less educated staff to have a higher level of
OSS-intensity.
H4: Founders and personnel of OSS-based start-ups have lower levels of
qualification and experience than CSS-based new businesses.
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Please note that Hypothesis 4 is not contradictory to Harison and Koski
(2010) who find that software firms with OSS-business models have higher
human capital (education). Harison and Koski’s statement relates to estab-
lished software firms, while we relate to start-ups (of the whole ICT sector).
For example, low qualified start-ups may have a lower survival rate, and es-
tablished OSS-firms can have started with CSS.
Furthermore, due to the lower entry barriers for OSS-based firms we
expect that
H5: Founders of OSS firms are more likely to be necessity motivated than
persons which set-up CSS-based firms.
OSS-based businesses have lowers barriers to entry, what makes it relatively
easy to realize a business idea (opportunity) as well as to establish a firm
out of necessity. The reason to expect more necessity-motivated founders
among the OSS firms is that opportunity-based start-ups are more likely to
enter also in fields with relatively high entry barriers.
7.4 The Data
Our data is based on a survey among founders of ICT firms in Germany
conducted in Fall 2009. In a first step we sent out a postal invitation letter
to about 6,000 firms4 asking to participate in an online-inquiry containing
4The addresses of the ICT firms have been selected from the heise IT-Markt, which is
an online catalogue for German ICT firms run by the heise publishing company. Among
other products heise publishes the periodical c’t, a highly reputated IT- journal as well as
the German version of MIT’s Technology Review. The homepage of heise is a well known
web-adress for ICT issues, and with the heise news ticker the company runs one of the
most successful (German) ICT news portals. The heise IT-Markt offers German ICT
firms the opportunity include their profile, i.e. their name, address, product-portfolio
etc., into a freely available internet-data base. Potential customers can search for ICT
firms in this data base using different search parameters (region, products, etc.). Such a
platform is a unique opportunity for being recognized by customers, especially for small
and medium sized firms. Starting by the end of March 2009, we collected names and
postal addresses of firms operating in the industry sub-categories which were of interest
for the purpose of this study. After cleaning the data from duplicates and misleading
entries we ended up with addresses of 15,300 firms. From this database we drew a
random sample of 6,000 firms.
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an individual access key. After about two weeks we sent out reminder. As
a result, more than 700 founders of ICT firms filled out our online-survey
completely. As some of those firms did not sufficiently match the focus of
our research we finally ended up with a dataset of usable answers of 680
founders which makes a response rate of more than 11 %.
The survey raised some general information about the firm (e.g., number
of employees, date of start-up, problems at start-up etc.) as well as about
the use of OSS and CSS. The questions focused particularly on OSS- vs.
CSS-based business models, thus tried to investigate in how far OSS is
part of the end-product that is sold to the customers (OSS-business model).
This does not included aspects like the use of freely available software such
as OpenOffice for business correspondence etc. Participants in the survey
were asked to select their activities from a predefined set of business fields.
If a firm was active in more than three such business fields we asked to
select the three most important ones in terms of revenue. Specific questions
where then asked for each of these fields. The firm-founders were also
asked to select those up to three business fields they were active in when
founding the firm. For each of these business fields at the time of start-up
we then asked for the usage of OSS5. Table E.4 and E.5 in the Appendix
provide an overview of the information we use in the current chapter.
Over the years, more and more firms got engaged in OSS business. This
institutional change in the ICT sector, induced by institutional choice (OSS-
vs. CSS-based business models), is also reflected in our data. In Figure
7.2 the reader can see the shift in the institutional choice of founders: In
the period 1984-20086 the share of start-ups with no OSS, hence CSS-only-
5Regarding OSS we asked whether the software used in the respective business field at
time of founding was OSS. Possible answers were “yes, exclusively”, “mainly”, “about
50%”, “a small extent”, “no (nearly) never”, and “I do not want to answer this question”.
6Start-ups before 1983/84 are not of interest here. The reason is the the history of OSS vs.
CSS (see also 1.2.1): The concept of CSS as we know it today evolved not earlier than
the late 1970s and early 1980s. As a reaction, Richard Stallmann announced the plan
for the GNU project on September 27, 1983. On January 5, 1984 software development
of the GNU project began. Thus the year 1984 can be seen as the initial year for what
we nowadays call Open Source Software. (Two other possible cut-off points are the
year 1986, as the Free Software Foundation published the free software definition in
February 1986, and the year 1989, when the first version of the GPL (the GNU General
Public License) was published.) Thus, before 1984 it does not really make sense to
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Figure 7.2: Institutional Change by Institutional Choice: OSS/CSS Usage
































































Only OSS Mostly OSS OSS and CSS fifty−fifty Mostly CSS Only CSS
start-ups, considerably decreased. Since the late 80s there is a rising share
of start-ups (their respective business areas) with a level of OSS usage of
50% and more. At the same time, newly started businesses seem to have
favored a portfolio of OSS and CSS: the share of start-ups with 100% OSS-
based business models never exceeds 16%. Thus, there is both, an institu-
tional coexistence of mainly OSS-based and mainly CSS-based firms in the
market as well as a coexistence of the both IPR-regimes within firms, here:
within start-ups. The share of start-ups with hybrid strategies (i.e. business
models based on a mix of OSS and CSS) increased over the years reaching
a maximum of 68.42 % in the year 2008.
analyze the use of OSS vs. CSS. Accordingly, none of the firms founded in the years
before 1984 reported to have used OSS at time of start-up. But of course this does not
necessarily imply that all of them have entirely used “closed” code in the sense of CSS.
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Since we could only raise information for start-ups that still existed until
the time of our survey we have to be aware of a survivor bias in the data set.
Examining the number of firms ordered by their reported year of founding
illustrates this bias. Starting with the year 1984 the number of firms tends
to increase reaching its peak in the year 2004. Comparing these numbers
with general data about newly founded ICT businesses from the start-up
panels of the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW Mannheim)7
shows that for earlier years the trend in our data (number of start-ups)
does not coincide with the trend of the ZEW data. This is clearly driven by
the fact that we have the survivor only. In addition, in our data is a drop
in the number of start-ups of the year 2008, which does not coincide with
the general trend of the ZEW data. This suggests an under representation
of 2008 start-ups in our sample, which can be explained by a time-lag
for being included in the heise data base, the source of addresses for our
survey.
7.5 Results of Ordered Logit Analyses: Who
Chooses OSS?
We want to explain the OSS-intensity in the different business fields by the
individual characteristics of the respective start-up firms. As the dependend
variable is of ordinal character—ranging from never OSS (value = 0) to
always OSS (value = 4)—we applied ordered logit analyses (see Greene,
2008, for details). In order to avoid a survivor bias we estimate the models
for the relatively recent cohorts of the years 2005 to 2008, but also for 2003
to 2006 (around the peak in 2004).8 Since our sample of start-ups in the
year 2008 may be biased due to a relatively incomplete coverage of that
specific vintage, we also run all models for the 2005 to 2007. In addition,
the analysis was also performe for all start-ups of the years 1984 to 2008
and 2003 to 2008.
As we perform ordered logit regressions we have to test for the parallel
regression (proportional odds) assumption. Therefore we do the brant test
7We are indebted to the Centre of European Economic Research for providing these data.
8The two periods overlap by one year in order to have a sufficient number of observations
available
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for each of our models. Furthermore, we include two control variables for
the business fields. In the tables represented in this chapter, we make use of
two aggregated business field dummies: “further dev. software” and “new
media & internet”. The first dummy has a value of 1 if the founder has
reported that software, further-developed by the start-up firm itself, was
used in the business field.9 The latter dummy is 1 if “web hosting”, “web
design and web service”, or “services of new media agencies and related”
was the start-up business field. We also run all ordered logit regression
models with the complete set of detailed business field dummies (see Table
E.5 the Appendix E.2 for the list of dummies). The results are very similar,
but the brant test cannot be computed, as the disaggregated business field
dummies cannot be retained in all binary logits.
In all groups of start-up cohorts—except the two most recent ones (pe-
riod 2005 to 2008, Table 7.1, and 2005 to 2007, Table 7.2)—we find that
the control variable for the age of a firm is significantly related to the use of
OSS at the time of start-up, This means that older firms show a lower prob-
ability of having been an OSS-based start-up than more recently founded
businesses. This may be interpreted in two ways. First, as our descriptive
statistics indicate, OSS has been less common in earlier periods and has
become more popular as a business concept in recent years. Second, in
case that OSS start-ups should be to a higher degree subject to failure than
CSS start-ups, this statistical relationship may be a result of a survivor-bias
in the data. Because of this, in the following analysis we treat the results
of the cohorts of 2003 to 2006 with care, and exclude those of 1984 to
2008 and 2003 to 2008. The descriptive statistics of the cohorts from 2003
to 2006, from 2005 to 2007 and from 2005 to 2008 can be found in the
Appendix E.1, tables E.3, E.2 and E.1.
The results for the more recent cohorts (period 2005 to 2008, Table 7.1)
that should not be strongly affected by a survivor-bias clearly indicate that
OSS-based start-ups tend to be smaller in terms of personnel and in terms
of capital invested. Accordingly, OSS start-ups are to a lesser degree con-
strained by the availability of capital: in the 2005 to 2008 cohorts they do
9This implies that either “selling own hardware with further-developed software”, “selling
third-party hardware with further-developed software”, or “selling further-developed
software” was a start-up business field. The term further-developed implies here that
the software was further-developed by the respective start-up firm, not by a third-party.
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not face special problems in convincing investors. In one model each, the
founders of OSS firms have an on average higher qualification level and
more experience than those who start a firm based on CSS. We cannot find
any statistically significant evidence that OSS start-ups are more motivated
by necessity than CSS-based new firms. The brant test indicates that only
the models (7) and (8) are problematic.
The highly significant aggregated business field dummy “new media &
internet” indicates that start ups from the “new economy” have a strong
bias towards the usage of OSS, which is consistent with the descriptive
statistics. This is also intuitively, as for example some of the most successful
OSS projects are products used by the internet-economy, like e.g. the Lamp
stack software for running web servers (see Section 1.2.3). Therefore, we
also run the ordered logit regressions without the new media & internet
group. The results remain quite robust: size in terms of staff and capital as
well as lack of own capital are still significantly and negatively correlated
with the OSS intensity.10
We also check whether there is a bias because of a “hardware effect”,
meaning that firms selling hardware have a significant different affection
towards OSS than the software firms. As hardware firms may also system-
atically differ with respect to the tested firms properties, this could lead to
distorted results. Therefore, we use as alternative business field control a
hardware/software dummy in the regressions without the new media and
internet start ups. However, this was never significant. Furthermore, the
results do not change, if one concentrates on the software firms only, thus
exclude the hardware-firms.
The recent cohorts without the year 2008, i.e. the period 2005 to 2007
(Table 7.2), show nearly the same results than the 2005 to 2008 period.
Mainly, the results differ with respect to education: in the 2005 to 2007
cohorts the level of education of the founders has a positive impact on the
OSS-intensity in seven out of nine models. The brant test for the 2005 to
10Without the new media and internet start-ups, there are only a few firms doing only
OSS. Thus, for regressions that can be tested with the brant test, we must regroup the
dependent variable in the sense that we merged the two highest categories (“mainly
OSS” and “only OSS”) in one. Furthermore we had to exclude the variable experience
to run the brant test. The resulting models are approved by the brant test (except one












Table 7.1: OSS-Intensity of Start-Ups 2005 to 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
size (staff) -0.398∗∗ -0.340∗ -0.402∗∗ -0.358∗ -0.396∗∗ -0.406∗∗ -0.407∗∗
(0.028) (0.070) (0.027) (0.062) (0.032) (0.029) (0.026)
size (capital) -0.406∗∗∗ -0.443∗∗∗ -0.401∗∗∗ -0.407∗∗∗ -0.407∗∗∗ -0.386∗∗∗ -0.422∗∗∗ -0.433∗∗∗ -0.403∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
lack of capital -0.874∗∗ -0.745∗ -0.905∗∗ -0.909∗∗ -0.784∗ -0.852∗∗ -0.870∗∗
(0.041) (0.071) (0.019) (0.039) (0.064) (0.040) (0.041)
convince financiers -0.0947 -0.228 -0.570 -0.287 -0.414 -0.0283 -0.0871
(0.861) (0.652) (0.284) (0.605) (0.428) (0.957) (0.872)
edu 0.568 0.415 0.574 0.559 0.509 0.617∗ 0.463 0.507 0.557
(0.117) (0.241) (0.121) (0.122) (0.167) (0.091) (0.192) (0.138) (0.121)
experience 0.854 0.833 0.911 0.878 1.113∗∗ 0.889 0.848
(0.128) (0.127) (0.120) (0.111) (0.043) (0.101) (0.136)
necessity -0.379 -0.389 -0.352 -0.370 -0.272 -0.425 -0.429 -0.366
(0.333) (0.294) (0.364) (0.340) (0.469) (0.282) (0.250) (0.352)
age of firm 0.0859 0.111 0.0836 0.0850 0.0717 0.0799 0.107 0.0736
(0.585) (0.478) (0.610) (0.591) (0.664) (0.616) (0.496) (0.651)
new media & internet 2.413∗∗∗ 2.429∗∗∗ 2.349∗∗∗ 2.419∗∗∗ 2.367∗∗∗ 2.284∗∗∗ 2.302∗∗∗ 2.367∗∗∗ 2.375∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
further dev. software 1.500∗∗ 1.462∗∗ 1.517∗∗ 1.489∗∗ 1.434∗∗ 1.497∗∗ 1.461∗∗ 1.395∗∗ 1.480∗∗
(0.011) (0.016) (0.024) (0.011) (0.031) (0.014) (0.019) (0.022) (0.013)
(constants skipped)
Observations 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 135
Pseudo R2 0.169 0.159 0.157 0.169 0.154 0.163 0.153 0.166 0.169
df_m 10 9 9 9 8 9 8 9 9
probchi2 5.71e-09 1.50e-09 8.16e-10 1.99e-09 5.40e-11 2.08e-09 5.57e-10 2.25e-09 2.40e-09
p-values in parentheses












Table 7.2: OSS-Intensity of Start-Ups 2005 to 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
size (staff) -0.408∗∗ -0.327∗ -0.414∗∗ -0.343∗ -0.410∗∗ -0.403∗∗ -0.403∗∗
(0.036) (0.089) (0.035) (0.081) (0.042) (0.040) (0.028)
size (capital) -0.435∗∗∗ -0.462∗∗∗ -0.426∗∗∗ -0.438∗∗∗ -0.437∗∗∗ -0.432∗∗∗ -0.458∗∗∗ -0.451∗∗∗ -0.433∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lack of capital -0.813∗ -0.625 -0.844∗∗ -0.822∗ -0.636 -0.783∗ -0.805∗
(0.070) (0.134) (0.040) (0.071) (0.134) (0.071) (0.067)
convince financiers -0.0966 -0.265 -0.538 -0.175 -0.341 -0.0464 -0.107
(0.865) (0.611) (0.334) (0.760) (0.516) (0.932) (0.849)
edu 0.715∗ 0.528 0.671∗ 0.712∗ 0.633∗ 0.767∗∗ 0.579 0.677∗ 0.707∗
(0.055) (0.153) (0.077) (0.056) (0.094) (0.044) (0.124) (0.056) (0.063)
experience 0.598 0.584 0.612 0.612 0.719 0.595 0.608
(0.328) (0.316) (0.320) (0.315) (0.224) (0.319) (0.312)
necessity -0.251 -0.214 -0.183 -0.242 -0.0861 -0.255 -0.213 -0.251
(0.546) (0.587) (0.659) (0.556) (0.826) (0.547) (0.592) (0.546)
age of firm -0.0299 0.0706 0.0548 -0.0370 0.0231 -0.0661 0.0374 -0.0287
(0.907) (0.777) (0.828) (0.884) (0.927) (0.792) (0.879) (0.911)
new media & internet 2.334∗∗∗ 2.363∗∗∗ 2.273∗∗∗ 2.340∗∗∗ 2.291∗∗∗ 2.241∗∗∗ 2.272∗∗∗ 2.311∗∗∗ 2.341∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
further dev. software 1.488∗∗ 1.386∗∗ 1.471∗ 1.479∗∗ 1.398∗ 1.529∗∗ 1.422∗∗ 1.406∗∗ 1.481∗∗
(0.030) (0.049) (0.059) (0.029) (0.068) (0.026) (0.044) (0.043) (0.028)
(constants skipped)
Observations 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123
Pseudo R2 0.164 0.153 0.153 0.164 0.150 0.161 0.150 0.163 0.164
df_m 10 9 9 9 8 9 8 9 9
probchi2 1.98e-08 2.79e-08 6.65e-09 7.71e-09 9.58e-10 1.36e-08 1.65e-08 1.27e-08 7.90e-09
p-values in parentheses












Table 7.3: OSS-Intensity of Start-Ups 2003 to 2006
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
size (staff) -0.0705 -0.0465 -0.0236 -0.0217 -0.0705 -0.0530 -0.0346
(0.565) (0.691) (0.834) (0.847) (0.565) (0.662) (0.767)
size (capital) -0.215∗∗ -0.227∗∗∗ -0.242∗∗∗ -0.233∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.215∗∗ -0.227∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.012) (0.007) (0.020) (0.004)
lack of capital -0.598∗ -0.581∗ -0.284 -0.598∗ -0.581∗ -0.621∗∗ -0.476
(0.057) (0.061) (0.304) (0.056) (0.059) (0.044) (0.141)
convince financiers 0.787∗∗ 0.752∗∗ 0.457 0.787∗∗ 0.752∗∗ 0.777∗∗ 0.770∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.122) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.033)
edu 0.576∗∗ 0.556∗∗ 0.615∗∗ 0.624∗∗ 0.638∗∗ 0.576∗∗ 0.556∗∗ 0.593∗∗ 0.410
(0.024) (0.030) (0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (0.024) (0.029) (0.019) (0.100)
experience 0.00242 0.00141 0.0583 -0.0401 0.00652 0.0405 -0.137
(0.995) (0.997) (0.887) (0.920) (0.987) (0.923) (0.715)
necessity 0.301 0.285 0.335 0.292 0.315 0.301 0.285 0.496∗∗
(0.235) (0.265) (0.181) (0.256) (0.213) (0.231) (0.260) (0.043)
age of firm -0.365∗∗∗ -0.358∗∗∗ -0.325∗∗∗ -0.357∗∗∗ -0.334∗∗∗ -0.365∗∗∗ -0.357∗∗∗ -0.404∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.001)
new media & internet 1.277∗∗∗ 1.279∗∗∗ 1.243∗∗∗ 1.232∗∗∗ 1.224∗∗∗ 1.276∗∗∗ 1.279∗∗∗ 1.307∗∗∗ 1.258∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
further dev. software 1.018∗∗ 1.037∗∗ 0.990∗∗ 1.116∗∗ 1.079∗∗ 1.018∗∗ 1.037∗∗ 1.071∗∗ 0.971∗∗
(0.024) (0.022) (0.031) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.021) (0.016) (0.036)
(constants skipped)
Observations 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
Pseudo R2 0.075 0.074 0.069 0.068 0.066 0.075 0.074 0.073 0.064
df_m 10 9 9 9 8 9 8 9 9
probchi2 1.26e-07 3.95e-08 3.75e-07 1.85e-07 3.10e-07 5.52e-08 1.68e-08 5.14e-07 2.39e-07
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2007 cohorts can only be performed if the variable “convince financiers” is
excluded. The results do not change much11 and the brant test indicates
that none of the regressions violate the proportional odds assumption
The cohorts containing the latest peak (2003 to 2006, Table 7.3) show
quite similar results. However, the impact of staff vanish here and, as al-
ready mentioned above, the age of the firm becomes significant. As in the
2005 to 2007 period, education is significant throughout the models. It
is quite remarkable, that different to the more recent cohorts, problems to
convince investors seem to play a role as a special bottleneck for OSS-based
start-ups in the models with the 2003 to 2006 cohorts. The respective mea-
sure is significant with a positive sign. However, as already mentioned, the
results of the 2003 to 2006 period have to be treated with care, because of
possible survivor bias.
With regard to our hypotheses we can conclude that the results of our
analyses support hypothesis 1, stating that smaller start-ups—in terms of
staff and capital—are more likely to be OSS-intensive than larger ones. Ac-
cording to hypothesis 2 we find that OSS-intensive start-ups report a lesser
degree of capital shortages. This may be regarded an indication that OSS-
based start-ups do not use OSS because they cannot afford CSS. In that
sense OSS is in most cases not a strategy of the weak, but provides new en-
trepreneurial opportunities. A statistically significant relationship between
problems of convincing potential financiers and OSS-intensity of the busi-
ness concept (hypothesis 3) can only be found for the 2003-2006 cohorts.
This suggests that the problems of convincing were driven by a lack of ac-
ceptance due to the relative newness of OSS business models in the older
cohorts. In other words: if the problems of convincing are mainly caused
by the fact that financiers assess OSS-based start-ups more risky, then “con-
vincing financiers” would have to be significant also in the latest cohorts.
If our indicators for experience and education are statistically significant
they assume a positive sign so that hypothesis 4, stating that founders of
OSS firms have lower levels of education and experience has to be rejected.
According to our data, OSS seems to rather attract relatively highly quali-
fied entrepreneurs than low quality ones. We find no evidence that OSS is
particularly attractive for necessity-based start-ups (hypothesis 5).
11Only the significance niveau of the “lack of capital” variable increases.
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7.6 Summary and Outlook
We find evidence that OSS-based business models enable firms to be smal-
ler in terms of staff and capital so that they tend to experience capital
shortages to a lesser degree than new businesses based on CSS. The pos-
sible disadvantage with regard to convincing potential financiers to invest
into the firm vanishes over time: in the latest cohorts there is no longer any
significant effect. Furthermore, the rising share of OSS-intensive start-ups
over time indicates that this type of business concept is an attractive option
for entrepreneurs. In this context it is important to notice that OSS does
not represent a special attraction to relatively low-qualified entrepreneurs
or to entrepreneurs who start a firm primarily out of necessity. We even
find some evidence that founders of OSS-based businesses have a relatively
high level of both, experience and education.
This results show a clear effect of institutions, here: the IPR regime,
on the characteristics of market entry. This study therefore contributes to
research on IPR and entrepreneurship (e.g. Simcoe et al., 2009; Libecap,
2004). However, the effect of the different IPR regimes on the character-
istics of the ICT start-ups is of a rather complex nature. Obviously, simple
hypotheses based on the lower individual resources that are needed for an
OSS entry tell, at best, only a small part of the story. Further work should
try to study these effects in more detail. It would be particularly interesting
to learn more about the business models of OSS start-ups and how they dif-
fer from those of CSS firms. Since many start-ups are based on elements of
OSS and of CSS it would be interesting to know more about the dynamics
of this co-existence at the firm level. Do firms that start with a high share
of OSS over time switch to more CSS? Do mainly CSS-based firms tend to
increase their share of OSS? What makes these types of business models
successful? How does the emergence of OSS firms affect the innovative
performance of markets? Does the voluntary division of labor in the OSS
community drive innovation processes? If yes, what kind of innovation,
mostly incremental innovation, mostly radical innovation, or both? These
are important questions for further research in the field.
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8 Summary of the Dissertation and
Outlook
This dissertation empirically and theoretically analyzes two coexisting IPR
regimes, namely OSS and CSS. Individual institutional choices, the actions
under the particularIPR regime (including the strategic interactions) and
the resulting payoffs lead to the fact that OSS and CSS coexist. This chapter
summarizes the findings of the dissertation and then discusses the possibil-
ity to derive policy implications. The chapter finishes with a section about
further research.
8.1 Summary of Results
While OSS development is a global phenomenon, most (active) developers
come from developed countries. This is the result of Chapter 2, which
shows the geographic origin of registered developers at SourceForge in
2006. Information about the developers’ IP address, email address, indi-
cated time-zone, and the number of posted messages deliver detailed coun-
try data about the number of registered developers, active developers and
their activity level. This unique dataset shows that 85% of all active devel-
opers come from OECD countries. Nevertheless, differences in the supply
side of OSS per country cannot solely be explained by GDP and access to
the internet. To explain these differences further, country-specific aspects
like culture and institutions have to be taken into account.
The cross-country study presented in Chapter 3 shows that individual
decisions for OSS are strongly influenced by country-specific institutional
and cultural factors. Social capital interpreted as interpersonal trust has a
positive impact on the number of OSS developers as well as on the OSS
activity level. Furthermore, a culture characterized by individualism/self-
determination and an optimistic view of scientific progress favors OSS ac-
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tivities. And finally, a low degree of regulation as well as good protection of
IPRs supports OSS. This study contributes to the understanding of the role
of cultural and institutional factors in general as well as in particular with
respect to OSS. Additionally, it improves the understanding of the supply-
side of OSS in two ways. First, the findings confirm some results from
microeconomic research on OSS. The regression results support the view
that OSS has similarities to technical science and scientific culture. Also
in line with the findings is the following view, summing up some common
research results: OSS development is a public good game where interper-
sonal trust (as the basis for reciprocal behavior etc.) helps to play the ‘right’
equilibrium, while the individual motives of the players are of extrinsic as
well as intrinsic nature. Second, the results of the study help to clarify
some aspects. OSS is indeed rooted in the Western capitalist culture. OSS
is based on an entrepreneurial spirit which is linked to individualism, and
the results regarding regulation point to the commercial aspect of OSS. Fur-
thermore the positive impact of IPR protection supports the view that OSS
is not anti-IPR but a new IPR paradigm. OS is a new ownership concept for
digital goods, with the OSS licenses define the intellectual property of the
code.
OSS is thus a new intellectual property paradigm, which coexists with
the CSS paradigm. In the tradition of the property rights theory, Chapter 4
asks “Which problem of internalization leads to the dichotomy of OSS and
CSS?” The analysis shows that the first-best allocation of IPRs of a source
code cannot be achieved. OSS and CSS are two pragmatic second-best so-
lutions. The reason is a combination of ex-post transaction costs with the
characteristics of software. Some applications imply access to the source
code. Here the rights can de facto not be separated and must stay bun-
dled. A code owner has therefore to decide whether to exclusively claim
the whole bundle or not. Because of non-rivalry in use and feedback-effects,
the source code is a non- and anti-scarce resource. This has implications
for the rationale to claim all rights. Forgoing rights can enable feedback ef-
fects that yield a higher payoff than the rights themselves. Furthermore, it
is not costly to forgo rights that cannot be traded anyway because of trans-
action costs. Therefore, code owners decide whether to exclusively claim
the whole bundle or not, based on individual cost-benefit analysis. This is
technically mirrored by the question whether the source code is ‘closed’ or
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‘open’. Therefore CSS is developed within firms, based on exclusive own-
ership of the code and only the separable rights are traded. While CSS
is developed only by the programmers hired by the firm, the principle of
OSS aims to attract a wider set of participants. OSS minimizes exclusive
ownership and makes use of passive control rights. The OSS licenses are
non-specific contracts that permit the transfer of the whole set of rights.
From a social welfare perspective OSS and CSS both offers specific benefits
and drawbacks, which are mirror inverted. The advantage of CSS is the
benefit of exclusive ownership: direct control, internalization of external
effects, etc. The disadvantage of CSS results from the boundaries of a firm:
transaction costs inhibit contracting with all possible contributors, not all
possible feedback effects are generated, thus: the source code is not opti-
mally used. Because of its openness, OSS can create more spillover and
feedback-effects, but lacks direct control. Therefore the coexistence of OSS
and CSS is probably welfare superior to pure OSS or CSS scenarios.
Chapter 5 and 6 focus on the coexistence of OSS and CSS in terms of the
chosen business strategy of firms. The two chapters analyze this topic in a
general two-stage model that goes beyond the existing literature. It is not
restricted to the software industry but covers OSS vs. CSS business models
from the whole ICT industry. Furthermore, the model-setup allows one
to vary the contributions that come from the non-commercial community.
This allows for analysis of situations without non-paid volunteers. The
model analyzes the ‘economics of commercial OS’ in a general way, and
can be readily applied to other examples of OS (e.g. OS biotechnology).
Thus, 5 and 6 present the economics of OS vs. CS business models, and
analyze welfare implications.
Chapter 5 concentrates on the strategic nature of OS vs. CS business
models and the role of OS license type. The model combines aspects of
non-cooperative R&D with the theory of differentiated oligopolies. In stage
one, firms develop software, either as OS or CS. If the license is of liberal
type (e.g. the BSD), firms can use an OS-CS-mix, otherwise not. In stage
two, firms bundle this software with complementary products and compete
à la Cournot. The software determines the quality of the products. Thus
OS lets firms avoid quality competition as they can cooperate on quality
without an explicit contract. The model allows for horizontal product dif-
ferentiation in stage two. It turns out that CS-decisions are always strategic
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substitutes, while OS-decisions can be strategic complements. Furthermore,
CS is a strategic substitute for OS and vice versa. The type of OS license
plays a crucial role. In the case of liberal licenses, firms only develop OS
code if the products are horizontally differentiated such that quality com-
petition is low (e.g. mobile phones vs. servers etc.). Nash-equilibria with
firms producing OS code for all parameters only exist for restricted licenses
(e.g. the GPL). In the next step, the equilibrium ratios of OS/CS firms in
a mixed industry with restricted licenses are analyzed. Given the ratio of
OS/CS firms needed to stabilize the market against further entry OS, firms
offer lower quality than their CS-rivals. Where horizontal product differen-
tiation is low (e.g. mobile phones vs. mobile phones), CS-based products
have the largest market share.
Chapter 6 concentrates on welfare aspects and mainly focuses on cases
without non-paid OSS volunteers (all OS code is commercial OS). The chap-
ter first deepens the analysis of OS and CS code output, as this is the ba-
sis of understanding the welfare effects. From a social point of view, the
cost-saving benefits from OS code-sharing are contrasted by the OS cartel
effect: code-sharing guarantees that no OS firm can offer better software
than any other OS firm. This suppresses quality competition between OS
firms and restricts their code output. Competition from CS firms weakens
this quality-cartel effect. As result, the equilibria of mixed industries offer
higher welfare than Pure-OS or Pure-CS. Furthermore, Pure-OS (Pure-CS)
industries are sometimes stable against CS (OS) entry so that the mixed
OS/CS state never occurs. Even where mixed OS/CS industries do exist,
the proportion of OS firms needed to stabilize the market against entry
is always larger than the target ratio required to optimize welfare. Chap-
ter 6 then discusses various government interventions for addressing this
imbalance with tax policy, funding of OS development, and procurement
preferences. It turns out that the first-best solution in the model is to tax
OS firms and grant tax breaks to CS firms. Conversely, government inter-
ventions that fund OS development or establish procurement preferences
for OS software increase the gap between desired and actual OS/CS ratios
still further. Despite this, funding OS development can still improve wel-
fare by boosting total (private plus government) OS investment above the
levels that a private OS cartel would deliver.
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For the sake of simplicity, the firms in the model of Chapters 5 and 6
are symmetric, except for the horizontal and vertical (quality) differences
of their products. But different individual resources are one reason why
some economic agents choose the OS regime and others the CS regime
(see Chapter 4). This should also be true for e.g. new businesses based
on OSS vs. CSS. Furthermore, the fact that there can be an inferior lock-
in in Pure-OS and Pure-CS industries points to the importance of entry.
Therefore Chapter 7 of this dissertation focuses on entry, namely on OSS-
vs. CSS-intensive start-ups in the German ICT sector. The empirical study
of Chapter 7 analyzes the characteristics of new businesses in the German
ICT industry distinguished by their choice between the two IPR-regimes,
OSS and CSS. The analysis is based on a survey among founders of ICT
firms in Germany conducted in fall 2009. This is the first study that di-
rectly compares OSS- and CSS-based start-ups and analyzes which aspects
shape their institutional choices. The results contribute to research on OSS
and CSS and to the understanding of the relationship between institutions
and entrepreneurship. The findings are that firms with OSS-based business
models tend to be smaller in terms of staff and capital. OSS-firms also ex-
perience less shortages of capital. Furthermore, the data show that OSS
business models seem to be established nowadays, as only OSS-intensive
start-ups in older cohorts have larger problems than their CSS counter-
parts to convince potential financiers to invest. The data do not indicate
that the lower entry barriers for OSS firms are particularly attractive for
start-ups with low human capital endowment or to necessity-motivated en-
trepreneurs.
8.2 Policy Implications
This section briefly discusses the possibility of deriving policy implications
from the results. Note that the main purpose of the research presented in
this dissertation is not to derive concrete, i.e. specific and detailed policy
implications. Such policy advice would need further research. Nevertheless
it is possible to derive some general statements.
The coexistence of OSS and CSS can be explained with the fact that both
are second best solutions. Both IPR regimes have their specific advantages
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and disadvantages, and they are complements rather than substitutes. Ad-
ditionally, the coexistence itself leads to effects that improve the situation,
like the interaction between OS and CS firms: the OS cartel effect is re-
duced by competition from CS-rivals. From this one can derive the rule
that policymakers should not favor OSS over CSS or vice versa. In general,
neither the OS nor the CS paradigm should exist alone. The theoretical
results indicate that a situation where OS and CS principles coexist lead to
higher welfare. Therefore policy should favor the coexistence.
Furthermore, the analysis of different government interventions in Chap-
ter 6 shows that direct support of OS firms reduces welfare. This is true
for tax breaks, but also for procurement preferences. Here the theoreti-
cal analysis provides an argument against the pro-OSS procurement policy
of many governments. However, the model suggests that government can
improve welfare by providing OSS. In practice this would imply that gov-
ernment funds certain OSS projects. Clearly, such a policy would yield sev-
eral problems which are typical for subsidies. Government has to decide
how much money goes to which projects. First, policymakers do not know
which projects deliver the most social benefit (pretence of knowledge, von
Hayek, 1975). Second, this would induce rent-seeking activities. The mem-
bers of the different OSS projects (including the firms involved) have high
incentives to lobby in order to get financial support for their project.
According to the model, there can be an OS-only or CS-only industry
lock-in. Policy should be aware of this fact, although this does not nec-
essarily imply the need for government interventions. Rather, persisting
situations without the coexistence of the two IPR regimes should lead to
further economic analysis. The reader should moreover note that lock-ins
exist only for a small set of parameters in the model. Entrants are often en-
trepreneurs in the sense that they create new products or modify existing
ones. This would change the parameters of the model (i.e. the degree of
horizontal product differentiation).
Ghosh (2006)—a study for the European Commission—supports pro-
OSS government policies. Ghosh (2006) states that OSS and OSS-based
business models can foster innovation and the competitiveness of the ICT
sector, as OSS can encourage the creation of small and medium enterprises
and jobs. The reader should note that Ghosh (2006) is not based on an em-
pirical comparative analysis of OSS and CSS business models. The study of
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Chapter 7 provides a comparative analysis of start-ups in the German ICT
sector. The results seem to indicate that OSS indeed fosters new business
foundations. OSS enables to start-up with less capital and staff. But well-
founded policy implications cannot be drawn from these results unless the
long-term impacts are taken into account. This fact points to the need for
further research.
8.3 Further Research Questions
The impact of OSS- vs. CSS-based business models on the long-term per-
formance of firms is still not explored. Here the dataset used in Chapter 7
contains further information. This should therefore be used to analyze the
impact of the chosen IPR-Regime on the performance measures “growth
of staff”. The research question therefore is: What is the link between
OSS-intensity and firm growth (in terms of employees)? This would re-
fer to realized growth as well as expected growth, the latter based on the
expected staff in three years. Furthermore it is of interest how the OSS-
intensity within the (faster-growing) firms evolves. Over time, the share
of OSS-intensive start-ups increased. But does the OSS-intensity of firms
also increase over time (e.g. a general trend towards OSS), or do firms
who have entered as OSS-intensive start-ups switch to CSS-based business
models?
The model of Chapters 5 and 6 shows that restricted OS licenses ensure
commercial OS, and CS licensing ensures CS development by firms. This
result is based on a distinction between CS license and restricted vs. lib-
eral OS license. In reality, firms and project leaders use a scope of licenses.
It could be of interest to further differentiate the types of licenses in the
model. How restrictive must a license be to ensure private investments?
In addition, it is known that firms contribute back for reasons that are be-
yond the scope of the model. This is especially important if the license is
liberal. For example firms contribute back because of ideological reasons,
because of learning effects, or because of reciprocal behavior of the com-
munity (they trade code for help), etc. see section 1.3.4. An analysis of firm
behavior and the underlying motives is provided by Rossi and Bonaccorsi
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(2006). Although these motives are well explored, there is still a lack of a
simple model that captures these incentives.
The model of Chapters 5 and 6 also shows that with restricted licenses,
commercial OS development can establish even in the absence of non-
commercial OS contributors. This is an important result, especially for
research on OS beyond software. Research on OS biotechnology still lacks
theoretical work. Model extensions and specifications could be used to ana-
lyze OS and CS principles regarding the several stages of the drug discovery
pipeline.
Based on the property rights theory, the framework of Chapter 4 provides
the rationale and conditions for the coexistence of OS and CS principle for
digital goods. First, a feedback mechanism (anti-scarce use) which implies
access is combined with an access problem that yields non-separable rights.
Second, transaction costs lead to the fact that for some actors it is a rational
choice to forgo the bundled rights. Applying this general framework to the
case of OS biotechnology can be fruitful. This might show some limits
of the developed framework and can help to further develop it. Other
possible examples for the coexistence of OS and CS principles should also
be taken into account. Based on this, the notation of Chapter 4 can be
used to develop a formal theory of (intellectual) property rights of scarce,
non-scarce and anti-scarce goods, based on set theory.
The impact of culture and formal and informal macro-level institutions
on OSS activities is analyzed in Chapter 3. On the micro-level, OSS de-
velopment is characterized by an interplay of formal and informal institu-
tions. Legally, the OSS licenses are based on copyright law. But from a
cultural point of view, they are based on the so-called ‘hacker ethics’. The
OSS-project hierarchies are based on formal institutions like licenses or
trademarks and on informal institutions like community rules. It would be
interesting to know whether and how the macro-level (country-specific cul-
tural and institutional factors) shapes the micro-level institutions of OSS:
Do the governance structures of projects with participants mainly from one
country or region differ from more global ones? Is there an ‘Asian’ vs. a
‘European’ type of OSS governance?
Finally, the history of CSS and OSS gives some insight into the micro-
level of endogenous institutional change: institutional entrepreneurs can
be driven by profits, efficiency and other ‘rational’ motives, but also by non-
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commercial intentions including ideology. Created for whatever reason, the
institutional inventions then have to survive the competition with alterna-
tive (new or already established) institutions and arrangements. The his-
tory of OSS demonstrates how conscious invention can lead to unintended
consequences (Did Richard Stallman intend to lay ground for today’s OSS-
based business models?), a spontaneous order in the sense of von Hayek
(1967). Formal theory about institutional change should take this into ac-
count. It could be of interest to incorporate ‘unintended consequences’ into
models of institutional change. In other words: While some institutional
changes are induced by intention, some are induced by mutation. A theory
of institutional change should take both aspects into account. In addition
to this, the history of CSS and OSS also points to an ‘action vs. reaction’
relationship: some actors introduced the CSS-principle (action) which lead
to the institutionalization of OSS by e.g. the GPL (reaction). Finally, both
types of IPR arrangements, OSS and CSS, do coexist until today, i.e. the in-
stitutional competition has not yet led to a dominating role of one of these
alternative regimes over the other. If further examples of coexisting insti-




A Appendix to Chapter 3
Table A.1: OSS Developers per 1,000 Inhabitants (without SLD)
Ia Ib IIa IIb IIIa IIIb
GDP -0.777 -0.715 0.843 0.721 -0.801 -0.755
(0.602) (0.627) (0.428) (0.520) (0.602) (0.618)
education 0.232 0.235 0.317 0.253 0.0937 0.0969
(0.583) (0.579) (0.374) (0.429) (0.817) (0.811)
inet users 1.419∗∗∗ 1.415∗∗∗ 1.070∗ 1.063∗ 1.581∗∗∗ 1.576∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.055) (0.050) (0.003) (0.003)
prefer new ideas 2.047 1.722 1.053 0.822
(0.473) (0.519) (0.733) (0.779)
science advance help 1.104∗ 1.038∗ 1.022∗ 0.974
(0.056) (0.080) (0.078) (0.104)
self-determ/indiv 1.125∗ 1.084∗ 0.476 0.564 1.185∗∗ 1.154∗∗
(0.056) (0.055) (0.383) (0.328) (0.049) (0.046)
intpersonal trust 1.183∗∗ 1.196∗∗∗ 0.587∗ 0.542∗ 1.177∗∗ 1.187∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.073) (0.099) (0.020) (0.018)
competition/merit -0.133 0.264 -0.0976
(0.671) (0.380) (0.735)
IPR protection 0.317 0.321 0.309 0.299 0.451 0.453
(0.341) (0.316) (0.357) (0.374) (0.166) (0.155)
degree of regulation -1.016 -1.004 -0.835 -0.816
(0.126) (0.114) (0.105) (0.122)
_cons -0.929∗∗ -0.903∗ -0.300 -0.218 -1.095∗∗ -1.075∗∗
(0.042) (0.058) (0.350) (0.459) (0.020) (0.028)
N 60 60 70 70 60 60
adj. R2 0.786 0.790 0.759 0.760 0.777 0.781
d. of freedom 49 50 61 62 50 51
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.2: Active OSS Developers per 100 Inhabitants (without SLD)
Ia Ib IIa IIb IIIa IIIb
GDP -1.964 -1.922 2.596 2.263 -2.019 -2.016
(0.525) (0.530) (0.315) (0.411) (0.530) (0.528)
education 0.578 0.580 0.563 0.388 0.254 0.254
(0.533) (0.529) (0.475) (0.578) (0.775) (0.772)
inet users 2.519∗∗ 2.516∗∗ 1.900 1.881∗ 2.898∗∗ 2.898∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.026) (0.108) (0.099) (0.010) (0.010)
prefer new ideas 4.948 4.728 2.618 2.602
(0.410) (0.405) (0.684) (0.674)
science advance help 1.909∗ 1.864∗ 1.718 1.714
(0.082) (0.096) (0.134) (0.143)
self-determ/indiv 2.641∗∗ 2.613∗∗ 1.124 1.366 2.780∗∗ 2.778∗∗
(0.038) (0.034) (0.354) (0.291) (0.032) (0.028)
intpersonal trust 2.668∗∗∗ 2.677∗∗∗ 1.144∗ 1.020 2.655∗∗ 2.656∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.087) (0.140) (0.014) (0.013)
competition/merit -0.0900 0.721 -0.00699
(0.897) (0.274) (0.991)
IPR protection 1.350∗ 1.353∗ 1.037 1.011 1.666∗∗ 1.666∗∗
(0.073) (0.065) (0.183) (0.200) (0.027) (0.026)
degree of regulation -2.382∗ -2.374∗ -1.981∗∗ -1.928∗
(0.065) (0.056) (0.043) (0.061)
_cons -1.961∗ -1.943∗ -0.621 -0.397 -2.350∗∗ -2.349∗∗
(0.052) (0.064) (0.365) (0.515) (0.026) (0.030)
N 60 60 70 70 60 60
adj. R2 0.809 0.813 0.781 0.780 0.797 0.801
d. of freedom 49 50 61 62 50 51
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.3: OSS Activity Level: Messages per 10,000 Inhabitants (without
SLD)
Ia Ib IIa IIb IIIa IIIb
GDP -1.943 -1.885 2.445 2.209 -1.978 -1.944
(0.288) (0.300) (0.273) (0.344) (0.285) (0.293)
education 0.590 0.592 0.472 0.348 0.385 0.387
(0.465) (0.461) (0.492) (0.576) (0.626) (0.620)
inet users 1.630∗∗ 1.626∗∗ 1.220 1.207 1.869∗∗ 1.866∗∗
(0.048) (0.049) (0.140) (0.129) (0.024) (0.024)
prefer new ideas 4.012 3.711 2.539 2.372
(0.380) (0.389) (0.593) (0.603)
science advance help 1.148∗ 1.087 1.028 0.993
(0.094) (0.106) (0.148) (0.151)
self-determ/indiv 2.741∗∗∗ 2.702∗∗∗ 1.498 1.668∗ 2.829∗∗∗ 2.806∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.103) (0.089) (0.006) (0.005)
intpersonal trust 2.676∗∗∗ 2.688∗∗∗ 1.305∗∗ 1.218∗∗ 2.667∗∗∗ 2.674∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.027) (0.001) (0.001)
competition/merit -0.123 0.511 -0.0708
(0.851) (0.329) (0.907)
IPR protection 0.980∗ 0.984∗ 0.492 0.473 1.179∗∗ 1.181∗∗
(0.100) (0.087) (0.439) (0.468) (0.043) (0.040)
degree of regulation -1.505 -1.494∗ -1.218∗ -1.181
(0.103) (0.085) (0.071) (0.105)
_cons -1.546∗ -1.522∗ -0.527 -0.369 -1.792∗∗ -1.777∗
(0.079) (0.091) (0.366) (0.482) (0.048) (0.052)
N 60 60 70 70 60 60
adj. R2 0.835 0.838 0.800 0.799 0.829 0.832
d. of freedom 49 50 61 62 50 51
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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B Appendix to Chapter 4
This Appendix presents a more detailed notation of IPRs. As Chapter 4 is
about software we thus refer to IPRs in the following. However, in principle
the notation can be applied to PRs and IPRs.
Following Furubotn and Richter (2005); Eggertsson (1990); Hart and
Moore (1990), and others, we distinguish coordination rights (usus and
abusus) from residual rights (usus fructus and alienation rights). The com-
plete set of rights is defined as H = {H c ∪ H r}, with H c as the set of coor-
dination rights, and H r as the set of residual rights. Let h ∈ H denote one
property right.
At first, coordination rights are defined: The conjunction of a coordi-
nation right hc ∈ H c with a resource X (we write “hc : X ”) leads to a
distinction-criteria between the applications that are covered by the IPR
and those which are not. Notice that there is no need to know the whole
set of possible applications, as the distinction-criteria yields a selecting-rule
r that tells whether a y ∈ Y (X ) is covered by the IPR or not: r : y →
[0,1] ∀ y ∈ Y . This leads to
hc : X −→

y ∈ Y | r(y) = 1
	
. (B.1)
For example, let hu denote the vector of all usus rights, ha the vector of all
abusus rights, and hu&a all usus and abusus rights. This yields e.g.
hu : X −→

y ∈ Y | y = f (Z)
	
= Y (Z), (B.2)
hu&a : X −→

y ∈ Y | y = f (V )
	
= Y (V ). (B.3)
Next is to define the residual rights, where whave to distinguish between
usus fructus and alienation rights: Let h f denote the vector of all usus
fructus rights, and π the payoff gained from y, then
h f : X −→





B Appendix to Chapter 4
The right to transfer IPRs of a resource has to be represented in a slightly
different way, as it is a ‘right on rights’. Let hh denote the alienation right
regarding h. An individual holding an alienation right with respect to h can
therefore decide wether to keep this right, or transfer it, i.e. do not hold it
anymore:
hh = ‘decision’ ◦ h=
(
0 if right h is transferred,
h if right h is not transferred.
(B.5)
Let hh be the vector of all alienation rights. Holding alienation rights on a
resource X is then formally given by





















[0,1] · h1 : X
...






Notice, that there exist “recursive” alienation rights. A recursive alienation
right is the right to transfer an alienation right. This means, that








C Appendix to Chapter 5
If φ > φos_
x
, then there is always only one unique equilibrium in OS devel-
opment, and furthermore CS output decreases xos∗. Figure C.1 depicts this

















d xcs > 0
with an example of z = 2 OS-firms: if xcs is moderate, OS firms develop
xos > 0 (left hand), while if there is much xcs, xos production is driven to
zero (right hand).
For φ < φos_
x
, the situation is more complex. In this case the slope of the
OS-reaction functions (with respect to the other firms’ OS) are greater than
one. This implies that multible equilibria can exist. Again, we illustrate
this graphically for the case of z = 2. If xcs = 0 or low enough, then
the OS firms together develop the cutoff, see the left hand of figure C.2.
But if xcs is high enough, then the OS-rection functions are shifted so that
multible equilibria exist. The right hand side of figure C.2 depicts such a
situation. Without additional assumptions, each of the three equilibria are
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d xcs > 0
plausible. Hence, either the OS firms develop the cutoff, or the equilibrium
0< X os <
_
x establishes, or the OS firms develop no code at all.
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D Appendix to Chapter 6
D.1 OS versus a ‘Real’ OS-Cartel
In this section we compare the outcome of individual investment decisions
by OS firms (the normal case analyzed in our model) against a hypothetical
formal cartel in which firms agree to coordinate their activities to maximize
joint profits. We find that individual decisions produce less output than a
‘real’ OS cartel would supply. Because of this underprovision/public good
problem, the suppression of quality competition among OS firms only leads
to a ‘second best’ cartel compared to the outcome under a ‘real’ quality
cartel.
D.1.1 OS-Firms, No Formal Cartel
In case of OS with competition, each OS firm i = 1 . . . n maximizes its profit


























































then yields optimal decision of each firm, i.e. firm i’s reactionfunction
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By symmetry this same reaction function governs all i = 1 . . . n firms.
This determines the equilibrium value of xos, and hence the equilibrium





= n · xos given by




φh2 (1+ n)− n
D.1.2 A Formal OS Quality-Cartel




























2 (1+ X os)
h2
−φX os != 0
then yields the cartel-output given by









For all φ > 2n
h2
(the second order condition of the cartel), the cartel pro-
duces more code than individual firms do:1
X os, cartel > X os∗.





Finally, in terms of welfare we have
W os, cartel <W os∗.
1If the second-order condition for cartels is not satisified, i.e. φ < 2n
h2
, the cartel produces
software up to the cut-off.
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D.2 Welfare
Our welfare analysis is based on Hsu & Wang (2005) who provide a general
welfare analysis for differentiated oligopolies. Applied to our model, this






















(1+ xcs− zθ (zxos− xcs))
h
.
The producer surplus is given by
B = z ·πi∈Z + r ·πi∈R,
with profits given by
πi∈Z =















In case of Pure-OS (n= z) we obtain
X os = n · xos =
n4
 
φh2 (1+ n)− 4n
 ,
and thus welfare is given by
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In case of Pure-CS (n = r) we obtain
xcs =
2 (1+ (n− 1)θ)
 
h2φ − 2 (1+ (n− 1)θ)
 ,
and thus welfare is given by





























In case of a mixed industry we obtain
X os = z · xos = z
(1+ θ r)
 
θ r (1+ (n− 1)θ)−ψ

β





z2θ (1+ θ r)−χ

β
(1+ θ r)θ2r (1+ (n− 1)θ) z2 −ψχ
Inserting these in our quantity and profits functions (see above) lets us
















+ z ·πi∈Z + r ·πi∈R.
D.3 Different φ and Welfare Comparison of Pure
Cases
Here we show that adopting values of φ different from 2 does not substan-
tially change our welfare comparison of Pure-OS and Pure-CS industries.
Figure D.1 shows how our φ = 2 results (solid line) and φ = 20 results
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Figure D.1: Welfare Superiority of φ = 2 vs. φ = 20
CSS only is superior















(dashed line), change for different degrees of industry concentration rang-
ing from n= 2 to n= 30.
As the reader can see, the situation does not change much when φ in-
creases by a factor of ten. While the region where OS is superior expands
slightly for low values of γ and contracts slightly for γ near 1 the qualitative
results change very little. (Notice that we have exaggerated the differences
by drawing the figure so that the affected regions are magnified compared
to the figure in our main text.) The reason for this similarity is that changes
in φ affect the cost function for Pure-OS and Pure-CS industries identically.
Furthermore, the values of γ where (a) X os = x cs and (b) where x cs has its







/2(n−2) and hence independent of φ.
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D.4 Welfare of Pure vs. Mixed Cases in
Concentrated Industries
Figures D.2 and D.3 show how our welfare analysis of Pure vs. Mixed cases
changes for concentrated (small n) industries.
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Figure D.3: Welfare-Comparison of Pure vs. Mixed Cases, n= 5










































D.5 Alternative Motivation of OS-Entry into a
Pure-CS Industry
Assume that an industry contains n> 2 incumbents, all of whom follow CS
business models. Assume further that each incumbent’s profits are zero so
that further CS entry would produce negative profits. Finally, assume that
there are e ≥ 2 potential OS entrants. Each OS firm faces the following
YES/NO choice on whether to enter.
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For simplicity, we consider the case where e = 2 although our argument
also holds for e > 2 entrants. Suppose that the e = 2 OS firms will earn
a positive profit if they enter. Then the strategic problem is to ensure that
both firms enter. (If only one OS firms enters, code-sharing cannot occur
and the entrant will become a de facto CS firm earning negative profits.)
This problem can be analyzed in terms of the following game where the




This coordination game has two Nash-equilibria (YES, YES) and (NO,
NO). Furthermore, this is a common interest game in which both two po-
tential entrants would like to occupy the same (YES, YES) equilibrium. If
players can signal which strategy they wish to play, we can assume that
they will both arrive the common interest equilibrium. In our OS problem,
this can readily be done if each OS entrant announces that its code will be
subject to GPL.
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Table E.1: Descriptive Statistics of the 2005 to 2008 Cohorts
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
oss 198 1.550505 1.43381 0 4
size (staff) 198 1.616919 1.141768 0.25 11
size (capital∗) 135 1.217891 1.716922 0 8
lack of capital 198 0.3686869 0.4836718 0 1
convince financiers 198 0.2070707 0.4062338 0 1
Education 198 0.5808081 0.4946776 0 1
Experience 196 0.9030612 0.2966321 0 1
Necessity 198 0.510101 0.5011651 0 1
age of firm 198 4.050505 1.001255 2 5
new media & internet 198 0.4292929 0.49623 0 1
further dev. software 198 0.0808081 0.273231 0 1
* capital is in 10,000 EUR
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Table E.2: Descriptive Statistics of the 2005 to 2007 Cohorts
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
oss 182 1.521978 1.451637 0 4
size (staff) 182 1.643681 1.175875 0.25 11
size (capital∗) 123 1.274515 1.784314 0 8
lack of capital 182 0.3846154 0.4878463 0 1
convince financiers 182 0.2032967 0.4035616 0 1
Education 182 0.5659341 0.4970009 0 1
experience 180 0.9111111 0.2853771 0 1
necessity 182 0.5164835 0.5011068 0 1
age of firm 182 4.230769 0.8287236 3 5
new media & internet 182 0.4230769 0.4954103 0 1
further dev. software 182 0.0769231 0.2672044 0 1
* capital is in 10,000 EUR
Table E.3: Descriptive Statistics of the 2003 to 2006 Cohorts
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
oss 343 1.364431 1.430092 0 4
size (staff) 343 1.506851 1.072301 0.2 11
size (capital∗) 260 1.185492 1.615155 0 8
lack of capital 343 0.3381924 0.4737855 0 1
convince financiers 343 0.1836735 0.3877834 0 1
Education 343 0.6355685 0.4819735 0 1
Experience 341 0.9208211 0.2704146 0 1
Necessity 343 0.3965015 0.4898854 0 1
age of firm 343 5.74344 1.016563 4 7
new media & internet 343 0.3877551 0.48795 0 1
further dev. software 343 0.0874636 0.2829259 0 1
* capital is in 10,000 EUR
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E.2 Details on Variables of the Start-Up Analysis
Table E.4: Description of Variables
Variable Coding Explanation
oss ordinal Intensity of OSS-usage in the respective business
field, at start-up time. The answering categories and
the corresponding values are: 4 = “Yes, only”, 3 =
“Mainly”, 2 = “About 50%”, 1 = “To a small ex-
tent”, 0 = “No (nearly) never”.
size (staff) real Number of full positions – including the founders.
We asked participants to count part-time positions
regarding their percentage of full-time.
size (capital) real Sum of real capital and financial capital.
lack of capital binary 1 if founders marked “Lack of own capital” as one of
the start-up problems they faced (possibility to mark
one or more problem).
convince financiers binary 1 if founders marked “Difficulties in convincing po-
tential financiers regarding the business concept” as
one of the start-up problems they faced (possibility
to mark one or more problem).
education binary 1 if there was at least one person in the firm with
an university diploma or other corresponding level of
education (at start-up time).
experience binary 1 if at least one of the founders had already experi-
ence in the sector.
necessity binary 1 if start-up was necessity-based. Question: “Did you
found the firm in order to realize a business idea or
because there was no better alternative to generate
income?” Answer categories are “To realize business
idea”, “There was no alternative way to generate in-
come” (=necessity), “Because of both reasons”, and
“Other reasons, namely . . . ”
age of firm real 2010 minus the year of start-up. Question: “When
did you start your business (Year of first turnover)”
new media & internet binary 1 if “webhosting”, or “web design/service” or “new
media agency” is 1 (see list below)
further dev. software binary 1 if “selfHW_furthSW ” or “extHW_furthSW” or
“furthSW ” is 1 (see list below)
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Table E.5: Description of Disaggregated Controls for the Business Fields
Variable Coding Explanation
Webhosting binary 1 if “web hosting” is a start-up business field.
web design/service binary 1 if “web design and web service” is a start-up busi-
ness field.
new media agency binary 1 if “services of (new media) agencies and related” is
a start-up business field.
selfHW_extSW binary 1 if “selling own hardware with third-party software”
is a start-up business field.
selfHW_furthSW binary 1 if “selling own hardware with further-developed
software” is a start-up business field.
selfHW_selfSW binary 1 if “selling own hardware with self-developed soft-
ware” is a start-up business field.
extHW_extSW binary 1 if “selling third-party hardware with third-party soft-
ware” is a start-up business field.
extHW_furthSW binary 1 if “selling third-party hardware with further-
developed software” is a start-up business field.
extHW_selfSW binary 1 if “selling third-party hardware with self-developed
software” is a start-up business field.
extSW binary 1 if “selling third-party software“ is a start-up busi-
ness field.
furthSW binary 1 if “selling further-developed software” is marked sa
start-up business field.
selfSW binary 1 if “selling self-developed software” is a start-up busi-
ness field.
Service_othSW binary 1 if “service for software bought from a third-party”
was a start-up business field.
Note: The category “third-party software” is defined as software developed by a
third part, and the firm does not change the code before giving it as part of it’s end-
product to the customers. The category “third-party hardware” was distinguished
from “own hardware” by the question whether the hardware was completely produced
by a third party, or contains self-produced parts.
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